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FOREWORD
In its look back at more than 15 years of experience with public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) for urban water utilities in developing countries, this 
book examines the performance of a large sample of PPPs in different 
regions. Directed at policy makers in governments as well as donors and 
other stakeholders, its aim is to better understand the contribution of water 
PPPs to help improve the provision of water and sanitation services to the 
urban populations of the developing world. 
This report shows that despite diffi culties in several countries, water PPP 
has largely passed the test of time. The urban population served by private 
water operators in the developing world has been growing every year since 
1990, reaching about 160 million people by 2007. The positive record on 
service and effi ciency improvements reaffi rms the value of PPPs, even though 
the level of private fi nancing did not match initial expectations. Over time, 
a more realistic market has developed, with a growing number of private 
investors from developing countries and with contract designs based on a 
more pragmatic allocation of risks between partners. What emerges from 
examining the available empirical evidence is that well-designed partner-
ships between the public and the private sectors are a valid option to turn 
around poorly performing water utilities in developing countries.
The water sector has many features that set it apart from other infra-
structure sectors. This book suggests that a careful consideration of these 
specifi cities is important for successfully involving private operators. In the 
challenging environment of many developing countries, the main focus of 
water PPP should not be about attracting direct private investment, but rather 
about using private operators to improve service quality and effi ciency. This 
approach fosters a virtuous circle whereby the utility improves its fi nancial 
situation and gradually becomes able to fi nance a larger share of its invest-
Forewordxii
ment needs. Although concessions have worked in a few places, contrac-
tual arrangements that combine private operation with public fi nancing of 
investment appear to be the most sustainable option in many countries. An 
obvious implication for governments and donors is that they need to remain 
heavily engaged in the water sector, especially in the poorest countries.
These fi ndings are important. When money—public and private—is 
scarce, improvements in service and effi ciency are essential, leading to a 
better functioning of water utilities and eventually to improved creditwor-
thiness, which is even more true at a time of global fi nancial crisis. Well-
designed public-private partnerships can help. Decision makers in developing 
countries need to have various options to tackle the many challenges of 
water utilities. This report confi rms that PPPs can be one of them. 
Jamal Saghir Zoubida Allaoua
Director Director
Energy, Transport, and Water Finance, Economics, and Urban
Chair, Water Sector Board  Department
World Bank World Bank 
 Chair, PPIAF Program Council
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1OVERVIEW 
Many governments in the 1990s embarked on ambitious reforms of their 
urban water supply and sanitation (WSS) services that often included 
delegating the management of utilities to private operators under various 
contractual arrangements. Hopes were high that public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) would turn around poorly performing public utilities by 
bringing new expertise, fi nancial resources, and a more commercial orien-
tation. Since 1990, more than 260 contracts have been awarded to private 
operators for the management of urban water and sanitation utilities in the 
developing world. 
PPP projects in the water sector have been controversial, particularly 
after a series of highly publicized contract terminations in recent years 
raised doubts about the suitability of the approach for developing coun-
tries. The lack of data on the populations served and on the quality of ser-
vices provided has made it diffi cult to assess the overall contribution of 
PPP projects in developing countries. The debate has sometimes been driven 
more by ideology than by objective results, and the performance record of 
many PPP projects has never been scrutinized. Today, about 7 percent of the 
urban population in the developing world is served by private operators, 
and doubts remain over the merits of this approach for improving the per-
formance of water utilities in developing and transition countries. 
This study seeks to contribute to the understanding of the performance 
of PPP projects in urban water utilities in developing countries. It focuses 
on projects in which a private operator is introduced to run the utility, 
consequently excluding build, operate, and transfer (BOT) projects and 
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similar arrangements limited to the construction and operation of treatment 
facilities. It reviews the overall spread of urban water PPPs during the past 
15 years and seeks to respond to the questions of whether and how they 
have helped to improve services and to expand access for the populations 
concerned. The study analyzes performance data from more than 65 large 
water PPP projects that have been in place for at least fi ve years (three years 
in the case of management contracts), a sample that represents a combined 
population of about 100 million people—close to half of the urban popu-
lation that has been served by private water operators some time between 
1990 and 2007. This sample represents, by size of population served, close 
to 80 percent of the water PPP projects that were awarded before 2003 and 
that have been active for at least three years.
Four dimensions of performance are analyzed: access (coverage expan-
sion), quality of service, operational effi ciency, and tariff levels. The analysis 
focuses on the net improvements and actual impact for the concerned popu-
lations, rather than whether contractual targets were met. Based on what 
worked and what did not, conclusions are then drawn on how governments 
can better harness private initiative to improve water supply and sanitation 
services in the developing world. 
Growth of Water PPPs since 1990
Between 1991 and 2000, the population served by private operators 
in developing and transition countries grew steadily from 6 million to 
94 million. The number of developing and transition countries with active 
water PPP projects increased from 4 to 38. However, problems started to 
appear in the late 1990s, and the number of new PPP contract awards began 
to decrease. 
Although the general perception is that water PPPs in developing countries 
are on the decline, the situation is more nuanced. The population served by 
private water operators in developing and emerging countries has continued 
to increase steadily, from 94 million in 2000 to more than 160 million by 
the end of 2007. Large countries such as Algeria, China, Malaysia, and the 
Russian Federation have started to rely on private water operators on a large 
scale. Out of the more than 260 contracts awarded since 1990, 84 percent 
were still active at the end of 2007, and only 9 percent had been terminated 
early. Most cancellations were in Sub-Saharan Africa, a challenging region 
for reform, and in Latin America, among concession schemes.
Performance of Water PPP Projects
This study analyzes four dimensions of performance: access (coverage 
expansion), quality of service, operational effi ciency, and tariff levels.
3Overview
Access 
The analysis of the impact of PPPs on access to piped water focuses on con-
cessions (where most of the investment is funded by the private partner) and 
leases-affermages (where it is mostly funded by the public partner). Overall, 
it is estimated that water PPP projects have provided access to piped water 
for more than 24 million people in developing countries since 1990. 
The overall performance of concessions for expanding access to service 
has been mixed. The 30 large concessions under review provided access to 
piped water for about 17 million people, but many of those concessions 
failed to invest the amount of private funding they had originally commit-
ted, and did not always meet their original contractual targets for coverage. 
Many of the good performers were concessions in which private fi nancing 
was actually complemented by public funding (Colombia, Guayaquil in 
Ecuador, and Cordoba in Argentina).
The performance of leases-affermages was usually more satisfactory. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the affermage approach, with investment carried out 
by a public asset-holding company, has been very successful for expanding 
access in Senegal. The case of Côte d’Ivoire deserves special note: almost 
3 million people there have gained access to piped water through household 
connections since 1990—entirely fi nanced through cash-fl ow generation 
from tariff revenues without any government money.
Quality of Service
Often water PPPs have substantially improved service quality, especially 
by reducing water rationing. Rationing is possibly the number one quality 
challenge for many water utilities in the developing world. Without ser-
vice continuity, meeting drinking water standards cannot be guaranteed 
because of the risk of infi ltration in pipes. The poor, who often live at the 
low-pressure ends of distribution networks and cannot afford coping equip-
ment (such as private wells, roof tanks, and fi lters), are disproportionately 
affected. Once water rationing becomes the standard practice in a utility, it 
is very hard to reverse. Frequent surges in pressure speed up the deteriora-
tion of the network, and any attempt to increase the average service pressure 
causes more burst pipes and lost water. In this context, it is remarkable that 
many of the PPPs that started from a situation of water rationing succeeded 
in improving service continuity and that some even managed to reestablish 
continuous service. 
A good illustration is provided by the case in Colombia, where private 
operators have consistently succeeded in improving service continuity in 
many cities and towns, often starting from highly deteriorated systems. Pri-
vate operators also have a good track record of reducing water rationing 
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in Western Africa (Guinea, Gabon, Niger, and Senegal). Several manage-
ment contracts also achieved notable progress despite their short duration. 
However, not all PPPs have succeeded in improving service continuity. For 
instance, in Manila (the Philippines) the concessionaire in the Western zone 
failed while that in the Eastern zone succeeded. 
Operational Effi ciency 
A key objective for incorporating private operators is to improve operat-
ing effi ciency. Although utility operation has multiple facets, in practice, 
the overall effi ciency of an operator can be broadly captured by three main 
indicators: water losses, bill collection, and labor productivity.
Water Losses. Controlling water losses is a priority for any well-run 
utility. Recent multicountry studies by Andrés, Guasch, Haven, and Foster 
(2008) and Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008b) found that private opera-
tors were effective in reducing water losses. Confi rming their fi ndings, this 
study found that many private operators succeeded in reducing water losses, 
notably in Western Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco, and Eastern Manila 
in the Philippines. In some cases, private operators even reduced non-
revenue water (NRW) to less than 15 percent, a rate similar to that in some 
of the best-performing utilities in developed countries.
However, not all the PPP projects reviewed achieved a signifi cant reduc-
tion in water losses. For instance, in Guayaquil (Ecuador), Maputo (Mozam-
bique), and Western Manila (the Philippines), no notable progress was 
achieved, and NRW remained at very high levels (more than 50 percent). 
In several countries, including Argentina, tracking the actual evolution of 
water losses is diffi cult because a large proportion of residential customers 
are billed on estimated, not actual, consumption. Less than half of the man-
agement contracts under review showed sizable progress.
Bill Collection. It is common for poorly performing public utilities to 
have low bill-collection rates because of lax enforcement and the fact that 
people often resent paying for poor services. Bill collection is an area in 
which it is widely assumed that private operators are effi cient, because of 
direct fi nancial incentives. Indeed, this study found that, in most cases, the 
introduction of a private operator markedly improved collection rates. This 
is the dimension in which the positive contribution of management con-
tracts was most consistent, with all the projects in the sample achieving 
signifi cant improvements. 
Labor Productivity. There is strong evidence that the introduction of pri-
vate operators resulted in improvements in labor productivity (measured 
as the number of staff per thousand customers), achieved through both 
staffi ng reductions and increases in the customer base. Many of the utili-
ties concerned were overstaffed, and PPP projects were often accompanied 
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by signifi cant layoffs, ranging from 20 percent to 65 percent of the initial 
labor force. The layoffs were often motivated not just by overstaffi ng but 
also by the need to change the overall profi le of employees and to hire more 
skilled staff. 
Overall Effi ciency. When analyzing these three indicators of performance 
in combination, operational effi ciency appears to be the area in which the 
positive contribution of private operators has been the most consistent. To 
capture the full impact of a PPP on operational effi ciency, detailed fi nancial 
analysis of individual projects would have been required, going beyond the 
scope of this study. Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn.
The overall effi ciency of concessionaires is hard to judge, because they are 
responsible for both operations and investment; their investment effi ciency 
was not addressed in this study. In the case of Manila, a detailed analysis by 
the regulator showed that the concessionaire in the Eastern zone had signifi -
cantly improved operational effi ciency, while the one in the Western zone 
had not. In the case of Argentina, it is not clear whether concessionaires 
achieved much improvement in effi ciency. 
In leases-affermages, the effi ciency of private operators is easier to assess, 
because the responsibility for operation and that for investment are sepa-
rated between the private and public partners. Detailed information avail-
able for such projects in Senegal and Cartagena (Colombia) showed that 
clear gains in operational effi ciency were achieved, which were passed to 
consumers over time through tariff reductions in real terms. 
Management contracts entail only a limited transfer of responsibility to 
private operators, giving them limited control over a utility’s labor force. 
Effi ciency improvements under management contracts—measured using 
the global effi ciency index (the ratio of water billed and paid for to water 
produced, a measure that combines water loss reduction and improved bill 
collection)—were signifi cant in most cases under review.
Tariff Levels 
Most poorly performing public utilities in developing countries have water 
tariffs that are well below cost-recovery levels, and raising them is often a 
necessary component of reform toward fi nancial sustainability. In practice, 
the potential impact of a PPP on the tariff depends on how far the initial 
tariff level is from the cost-recovery level and on the extent of effi ciency 
gains that can be made by the private operator—two factors that move 
in opposite directions and can be of very large magnitude in developing 
countries. 
The evolution of tariff levels in a number of PPP projects was analyzed as 
part of the present study. In most cases, tariffs rose over time, but the under-
lying reasons, as well as whether those increases were justifi ed, could not be 
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assessed. Analyzing the impact of PPPs on tariffs can be easily misleading, 
because it is heavily dependent on prevailing tariff policies. Tariff increases 
are not necessarily a bad thing for customers when they also translate into 
wider access to better services, as happened under many PPPs. In many 
developing countries, low water tariffs mostly benefi t the connected middle 
class and work against the interests of the unconnected urban poor who 
need to access water from often unsafe and/or more expensive sources. It is 
likely that many of the poor households that gained access to piped water 
under PPP projects ended up paying a lower price for water than when 
they were not connected to the network. It must also be noted that in a 
few recorded cases, private operators made large enough effi ciency gains to 
allow for signifi cant tariff reductions in real terms after a few years.
The evidence from the literature on the impact of PPPs on tariffs is also 
largely inconclusive. Costs are greatly affected by local factors, such as raw 
water availability, and comparing tariff levels between private and public 
utilities can be misleading because of differences in the legal, administra-
tive, and fi nancial frameworks in which the two sets of utilities operate. The 
recent study by Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) uses a large sample to 
control for the many exogenous factors. It found no statistically signifi cant 
difference in water tariffs between comparable public and private utilities.
Key Findings
Water PPPs Are a Viable Option in Developing Countries 
Despite limitations related to data accessibility and reliability, and the ambi-
guity of indicators, the analysis of the four dimensions of performance 
(access, quality of service, operational effi ciency, and tariff levels) suggests 
that the overall performance of water PPP projects has been generally quite 
satisfactory. Several PPP projects performed well on coverage (access), ser-
vice quality, and effi ciency together. More performed well in one or two key 
aspects. Some brought sizable improvements to the populations they served 
even though they proved unsustainable and were terminated early. A few 
others failed to achieve any meaningful results by most accounts. 
It is noteworthy that out of 65 developing countries that embarked on 
water PPPs during the past two decades, at least 41 still had private water 
operators, and 84 percent of all awarded contracts were still active, by the 
end of 2007. Twenty-four countries had reverted to public management, 
and several contracts had been terminated early following confl icts between 
the parties. These numbers are not unreasonable considering what has in 
practice been a market test of a wide variety of contractual designs in many 
different (and often challenging) environments. Details do matter; the choice 
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of contractual designs, as well as the willingness of the public and private 
partners to make it work during implementation, have proved to be major 
determinants in the fi nal outcome.
To draw a general picture of the overall outcome of water PPP projects in 
the developing world, this study attempted a broad classifi cation. A total of 
205 million people in developing and emerging countries have been served 
by water PPP projects at some point during the past 15 years. Of these, 
160 million people were still being served at the end of 2007, while about 
45 million people had been served by PPPs that were either terminated early 
or not renewed at expiration. 
Among the 160 million people served by private operators in 2007, about 
50 million are served by PPP projects that can be classifi ed as broadly suc-
cessful. These are projects that have brought signifi cant benefi ts to the popu-
lation and where a working relationship has developed over time between 
the public and private partners. Successful PPP projects exist in all regions of 
the developing world, including Latin America (Colombia, Chile, Guayaquil 
in Ecuador, and several concessions in Brazil and Argentina), Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal), Asia (Eastern Manila in the 
Philippines), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Yerevan in Armenia), and 
the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco). Active PPP projects whose 
performance was mixed or disappointing are estimated to represent a popu-
lation of about 20 million. The remainder (90 million people) receive service 
under PPP projects that were not reviewed in this study, most of these proj-
ects being recent (awarded since 2003).
The Most Consistent Contribution of Private Operators Has Been 
Improved Effi ciency 
In the 1990s, the main attraction of PPPs in the sector was their supposed 
ability to supply private fi nance. Experience has shown that this was largely 
the wrong focus. The review of the cases that worked shows that the 
biggest contribution that private operators can make is improving opera-
tional effi ciency and service quality. These improvements have a major 
impact on access to fi nancing, but indirectly. Customers become more will-
ing to pay their bills when service improves and more effi cient operation 
creates more cash fl ow from operations to invest in expansion, which in 
turn increases the customer base and revenues. As creditworthiness improves, 
a utility can more easily access funding and invest in service expansion. 
An effi cient operator will make good use of the funding that is available 
for investment, regardless of whether the funding comes from public or pri-
vate sources.
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Contractual Arrangements for Water PPPs Have Evolved Differently 
in Different Regions 
A large proportion of the PPPs that were awarded during the 1990s, par-
ticularly in Latin America, focused on attracting private funding and there-
fore adopted the concession scheme. The early termination of many of 
these concessions demonstrated the inherent vulnerability of this approach 
in the volatile economic environment of developing countries. Colombia 
was the fi rst to depart from the standard concession approach, using the 
mixed-ownership companies approach or providing public grants to pri-
vate concessionaires to accelerate investment. Many of these hybrid PPPs 
had positive results. In other regions, several countries experimented with 
long-term PPPs that combined private operation with public investment, 
such as leases-affermages, mixed-ownership companies, and management 
contracts. 
Looking Forward
The fi ndings of this study suggest that a new approach is emerging for maxi-
mizing the potential contribution of private water operators in the develop-
ing world. The focus of PPP should be on using private operators to improve 
operational effi ciency and quality of service, instead of primarily trying to 
attract private fi nancing. A new generation of water PPP projects already 
has been gradually emerging, as these elements were being internalized by 
the market. In practice, the optimal modalities for fi nancing investments 
depend on the specifi c situation of each country.
Emerging Options to Finance Long-Term PPPs: Toward Hybrid Models 
Despite the diffi culties that were experienced with concessions in several 
countries, private fi nancing should not be discarded altogether. It has started 
to prove viable in a few of the more advanced developing countries, where 
medium- and long-term private debt in local currency have become avail-
able. However, in most of the developing world, the bulk of the large capital 
outlays required to expand access in the near future will have to come from 
public sources. 
More and more countries are adopting a PPP model in which investment 
is largely funded by public money, with the private operator focusing on 
improving service and operational effi ciency. In practice, funding for invest-
ment under these mixed-fi nancing PPP projects comes from a combina-
tion of direct cash fl ows from revenues, with a variable mix of government 
and private sources that tends to make the traditional dichotomy between 
leases-affermages and concessions increasingly obsolete. Several successful 
approaches have been developed over the past decade:
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• Concessions that rely largely on revenue cash fl ow for investment, with 
cross-subsidies from electricity sales (Gabon), tariff surcharges (Côte 
d’Ivoire), or both (Morocco).
• Affermages, as developed in Western Africa, bolstered by enhanced incen-
tives for operational effi ciency, a program of subsidized connections to 
expand coverage for the poor, and a gradual move to full cost recovery 
through tariffs (Senegal, Niger, and now Cameroon).
• Mixed-ownership companies, as used in Latin America (Colombia, La 
Havana in Cuba, and Saltillo in Mexico) and several countries of Eastern 
Europe (the Czech Republic and Hungary).
• Concessions with public grants for investments to spearhead access 
expansion or rehabilitation while minimizing the impact on tariffs. This 
is typifi ed by the PPPs in Colombia designed under that country’s Pro-
grama de Modernización de Empresas (PME); a similar approach has 
been adopted in Guayaquil in Ecuador and in a few concessions in Argen-
tina (Cordoba and Salta).
New Private Water Operators from Developing Countries 
In parallel with a shift in PPP models, many new players have been enter-
ing the market. In 2000, fi ve international water companies accounted for 
about 80 percent of the water PPP market in developing countries. Since 
2001, private operators from developing countries have signed most of the 
new contracts, and some international operators have also transferred their 
existing contracts to local investors. 
Some 90 percent of the growth in the number of people served by PPP 
projects since 2001 is due to private operators from developing countries. 
By 2007, local private water operators served more than 67 million people, 
or more than 40 percent of the market. This study identifi ed as many as 
28 large private operators from developing and emerging countries, each 
serving a combined population of at least 400,000 people. In East Manila 
in the Philippines as well as several PPP projects in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Colombia, local private investors have proved their capacity to learn the 
trade, deliver good performance, and become credible players. 
It would be hard to overestimate the importance of this new trend. Not 
only do these new operators provide much-needed competition in the sec-
tor, but they also may have a better capacity to manage the various risks 
inherent in the urban water utility business. Their understanding of local 
culture can allow them to more easily establish a viable partnership with 
local authorities and better mitigate political risks. They are also probably 
better suited than their international competitors to serving small cities and 
towns, where the needs are considerable.
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Toward a More Balanced Debate
It is clear from the many experiences of the past 15 years that public-private 
partnership is not a magic formula to address all the multiple issues of fail-
ing public water utilities in the developing world. For many governments in 
developing and transition countries, PPP projects have proved to be complex 
undertakings that carry strong political risks and large uncertainties as to 
the magnitude and timing of the expected benefi ts. Contractual targets are 
diffi cult to set and baseline data are seldom reliable; they generate many 
opportunities for confl ict. Private operators do not always deliver and have 
a tendency to seek renegotiations to their advantage. Reforms can become 
easily subverted by vested interests. Many obstacles can lead to confl icts 
and costly early termination. Still, the overall performance of water PPPs 
is more positive than is commonly believed. PPP projects for urban water 
utilities have brought signifi cant benefi ts to tens of millions of people in the 
developing world. 
Transferring a majority of urban water services to private operators is 
unlikely to be the chosen option for most developing countries. But having 
a few water supply PPPs in a country can still be very benefi cial, by generat-
ing much-needed pressures to move the whole sector toward higher levels 
of performance. The public water utilities that have succeeded in improving 
performance are those that have applied sound commercial management 
principles, emphasizing fi nancial viability, accountability, and customer ser-
vice. Complacency is the worst enemy of public utilities, and it is rooted in 
the assumption that poor service has no consequences. That attitude makes 
it diffi cult for even the most skilled and best-intentioned public managers 
to introduce and sustain improvements in the face of the various groups 
that have vested interests in the status quo. In that sense, the actual con-
tribution of water PPPs may be greater than that achieved in specifi c proj-
ects—through the introduction of a much-needed sense of competition and 
accountability in an erstwhile monopolistic sector.
Many public water supply utilities in the developing world are also 
opening the door to the private sector through practices that fall short of 
delegated management but open the way for a new, broader approach for 
private sector involvement. These include other forms of providing oper-
ational expertise, such as performance-based service contracts, twinning, 
and subcontracting. The private sector is also gaining a new role with pub-
lic utilities thanks to the increasing recourse to private fi nanciers in the 
most advanced countries—with, in addition to nonrecourse BOT projects 
for treatment facilities, the recent development of subsovereign borrowing 
or sale of minority equity shares through initial public offerings (IPOs). 
Finally, publicly owned water utilities are starting to look for delegated 
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management or other contracts outside of their jurisdiction, where they 
contractually become private partners. All this makes the traditional bound-
aries between public and private water utilities increasingly blurred, foster-
ing a more buoyant and competitive market and more choices for decision 
makers in government. 
The private sector has much to offer, and in many forms. To tackle the 
immense challenges facing the urban water sector in developing countries, 
policy makers need all the help they can get. It might just be time for a 
broader concept of partnership, one that includes all and excludes none.
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1.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, many governments embarked on a series of reforms of urban 
water supply and sanitation (WSS) services, often with support from inter-
national fi nancial institutions. Reforms were badly needed: millions of peo-
ple lacked access to piped water and sanitation services; and for millions 
of others, service was often poor. Deteriorated infrastructure, fast urban 
growth, and large investment needs coexisted with poorly run utilities, arti-
fi cially low tariffs, and scarce fi scal resources. Efforts to strengthen publicly 
managed utilities had proved largely incapable of addressing the sector’s 
mounting challenges.
A major component of the new reforms was a heavy reliance on the 
private sector. For governments that lacked enough fi scal resources to cover 
the fi nancial losses of public utilities and to invest in infrastructure rehabili-
tation and expansion, public-private partnerships (PPPs) for water utilities 
seemed to be an attractive solution. Hopes were high that with their exper-
tise and fi nancial resources, private operators would provide better services 
for a larger number of customers. Since 1990, governments in developing 
and emerging countries have signed more than 260 PPP contracts in the sec-
tor, and it is estimated that by 2007, PPP projects were supplying water to 
more than 160 million people in these countries. Nonetheless, the market 
share of water PPP projects in developing and emerging countries stood 
at only about 7 percent of the total urban population, up from less than 
1 percent in 1997 and about 4 percent in 2002.
Public-private partnership in urban water supply has been controversial, 
particularly in recent years, after a series of highly publicized contract ter-
minations raised doubts about the suitability of the approach for developing 
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countries. Differing perspectives have generated a large body of literature 
with ambiguous and, in some cases, contradictory fi ndings. The diver-
gences stem from several factors, including (a) variations in methodology 
(such as a detailed case study versus cross-sectional econometric analysis); 
(b) variations in data availability and reliability; and (c) variations in evalu-
ation frames (many focus on a single topic or set of topics—for example, 
regulation or tariff setting, poverty targeting, or connection costs—whereas 
others incorporate more variables but cover a time span of only one or 
two years).
Some observers have viewed contracting of the provision of such essential 
services as inherently fraught with confl icts, given the monopolistic nature 
of these services. Others are more pragmatic but question whether PPP 
arrangements can work well in the diverse settings of developing countries, 
pointing to weak institutional capacities, poor governance, and gaps in the 
rule of law and enforcement of contracts. Others point to a few highly pub-
licized failures as evidence that PPPs as such are not suited to the WSS sector 
and to conditions in developing countries in particular. Still others attribute 
those failures to vested interests and political manipulation, and point to 
selected successes for lessons on how to make PPPs work. Underlying most 
studies are gaps in data coverage and quality, refl ecting the fact that perfor-
mance data disclosed by water utilities are limited and rarely comparable 
among utilities and over time. The scarcity of published performance infor-
mation contributes to an impression of secrecy and lack of accountability, 
whether for public utilities or private operators.
This study provides objective information and analysis on the perfor-
mance of PPP projects in urban water supply and sanitation in develop-
ing countries. It reviews the spread of urban water PPP projects during the 
past 15 years, and assesses whether and how they have helped to improve 
services and expand access for the populations concerned. The study uses 
a structured framework to assess the performance of more than 65 large 
water PPP projects that have been in place for at least fi ve years (three years 
in the case of management contracts) and that provide services to a com-
bined population of almost 100 million (see appendix A). By population 
size, this sample represents close to 80 percent of the water PPP projects 
that were awarded before 2003 and have been active for at least three years. 
The analysis focuses on the actual impact of these projects for the con-
cerned populations, that is, the net improvements achieved under these part-
nerships.1 To the extent that the available data permit, four dimensions of 
1.  This approach does not look at the operators’ compliance with contractual targets, which is 
an important but altogether different issue and not the subject of this study.
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performance are analyzed: access and coverage expansion, quality of service, 
operational effi ciency, and tariff levels. The limitations and pitfalls inherent 
in the analysis of each performance dimension are addressed.
The term public-private partnership is used in different ways in the litera-
ture, so it is important to clarify what this report is about. The PPP projects 
analyzed in this study are those in which the provision of urban water and 
sanitation services is delegated by contract to a private operator, which usu-
ally takes over the management of an existing utility. The sample set covers 
divestitures (in which infrastructure assets are sold to private investors); con-
cessions (whereby a private operator becomes responsible for both operation 
and investment); leases-affermages (whereby a newly established private util-
ity operates a publicly owned system and collects revenues that it then shares 
with the public owner, who remains in charge of investment); management 
contracts (in which the services are provided by a publicly owned utility 
that is managed by a private operator); and mixed-ownership companies 
(in which a private investor takes a minority share in a water company and 
operates it on behalf of the local authorities, sharing the fi nancial gains with 
the public partner). This report refers to water PPPs for the sake of simplic-
ity—because, in most cases, sewerage services were a secondary (or absent) 
activity—and data on sanitation are provided where available.
The study does not cover several other schemes involving the private 
sector, such as contracts limited to bulk facilities for construction, fi nanc-
ing, and operation of water purifi cation and wastewater treatment plants 
(build, operate, and transfer projects, or BOTs and similar arrangements), 
or technical assistance and service contracts. It also does not include cases 
in which a portion of public utilities’ shares were sold to private investors 
without transfer of management control to a private party. Finally, only 
urban water supply and sanitation PPPs serving at least 25,000 people are 
reviewed, thereby excluding the many small and often informal operators 
that provide service to many households living in periurban areas in devel-
oping countries.
This study is not intended as a policy manual, nor is it a census of all PPP 
projects operating in the urban water sector. Neither does it presume to sys-
tematically assess the relative performance of public versus private modes of 
service delivery, although in the few cases where such information is avail-
able and relevant, comparisons are made. Finally, it is important to keep 
in mind that a PPP is merely one instrument among many for improving 
performance outcomes, and its effi cacy depends on the presence of a constel-
lation of other measures: sectoral policies, regulatory oversight mechanisms, 
fi nancing instruments, subsidies, and related poverty targeting programs. 
Those measures, although important, are not the focus of this study.
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Chapter 2 summarizes the historical development of water PPPs in 
developing countries, reviewing the current state of the market, the rate of 
contract cancellations, and the evolution of the industry. Chapter 3 reviews 
the performance of PPP projects in terms of access, service quality, opera-
tional effi ciency, and tariffs. Chapter 4 draws conclusions and lessons on 
how to make public-private partnership a more viable and sustainable 
option for improving WSS services in the developing world.
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2.
EVOLUTION OF WATER PPPs IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Part of the controversy over private water operators in developing countries 
has deep historical roots. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, urban water 
systems in many cities of the Americas and Europe (as well as in colonies or 
dependencies) were fi nanced, built, owned, and operated by private fi rms. 
Many of these private waterworks abused their monopolistic position, often 
by restricting investment and disregarding service quality. Not surprisingly, 
this led to the nationalization of water utilities almost everywhere. Two 
decades ago, private waterworks had all but disappeared, except for a small 
portion of the markets in the United Kingdom and the United States.
In France and Spain, however, an alternative way of involving private 
companies in water operations, different from outright privatization, had 
been emerging over more than a century. The concept was that of a part-
nership with shared responsibilities, in which local governments delegated 
the management of a water utility to a private operator while retaining the 
assets as public property. Various contractual forms evolved, with differing 
levels of responsibility and risk for the private partner, ranging from conces-
sions to management contracts. In France, the most original concept was 
probably the affermage (a newly established private utility operates a pub-
licly owned system and collects revenues that it then shares with the public 
owner, who remains in charge of investment), whereas in Spain, empresas 
mixtas (mixed-ownership companies) emerged. Options other than conces-
sion schemes leave investments in the hands of the public partner, allowing 
local authorities to keep control over the expansion of the water system—
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a key determinant of urban planning—while freeing them from the daily 
operation of the utility.
In what is now the developing world, the private sector also played a 
major role in the development of the fi rst urban water systems, often 
through foreign investors. During the fi rst half of the 20th century, a similar 
movement occurred with a return to public management and control of 
water utilities. In Africa, though, several private water companies remained 
in place well after independence.
The Water Sector in the 1990s
By the end of the 1980s, water supply systems in most cities of the develop-
ing world were facing growing problems of quality, reliability, and coverage. 
Burgeoning urban populations required massive investments in expansion, 
which few public utilities had the means to carry out, and water rationing 
was becoming the norm. Political interference and clientelism had led to 
excessive staffi ng and low morale, which translated into ineffi ciency and 
poor service quality. Governments, both local and national, had found it 
politically convenient to let infl ation erode tariffs to levels well below costs. 
Many utilities, dominated by a civil engineering culture, were more inter-
ested in building large hydraulic works than in operating them. Because 
investment resources came more from central government budget transfers 
than from tariff revenues, customer service was hardly a priority.
A vicious circle had developed: without maintenance, systems deterio-
rated, delivery became unreliable, and water quality worsened. Ill-served 
customers neglected to pay their water bills and resisted tariff increases, 
leaving even fewer resources. Meanwhile, national budgets in developing 
countries grew tighter, starving the sector of its traditional source of invest-
ment funds. The situation had become untenable by the early 1990s, but 
the existing state monopolies offered no obvious solutions. Even if politi-
cians could agree that tariffs should be raised to improve service quality 
and access, they had scant trust that their public utilities would use the 
proceeds effi ciently to deliver improvements for the population. The special 
interest groups that had come to control many public utilities were loath to 
change the status quo. Often, households that could afford to had developed 
alternative sources (private wells) or coping measures (rooftop rainwater-
collection tanks, and fi lters) and, consequently, were reluctant to pay more. 
The poor, who could not afford such investments, were left to suffer. Central 
governments and donors became increasingly reluctant to provide public 
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money to the urban water sector. Under such circumstances, replacing the 
public management of water utilities with private management—under 
contracts that specifi ed service obligations and fi nancial incentives—
appeared to be a sensible way to break the status quo.
Private Financing of Water Infrastructure
Infrastructure utilities in a few countries, such as Chile, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom, had been privatized in the 1980s, and the early results 
suggested that privatization might provide a solution for poorly performing 
public utilities. The rationale was that a private operator would operate 
more effi ciently because of its profi t motive and the fact that its contract 
contained clear, consistent objectives and means rather than the multiple 
and often confl icting goals assigned to state-owned utilities (Harris 2003). 
The separation of policy and regulation (which would remain the govern-
ment’s responsibilities) from the provision of services (which would become 
the responsibility of the private operator) would provide accountability 
through an arm’s-length relationship that was largely missing under pub-
lic provision. The gains from reforming poorly performing utilities were 
expected to be large enough to allow private operators to directly fi nance 
the investments that were needed to improve service quality and expand 
access for the poor.
Private participation expanded rapidly in the early 1990s in the telecom-
munications, electricity, and transport sectors, bringing in massive amounts 
of private investment. The water supply and sanitation (WSS) sector also 
appeared to be a good candidate, despite the special challenges involved. 
Competition in the sector was to be limited to contract awards, because 
water supply and sewerage services constituted a natural monopoly. Under-
ground assets were diffi cult to assess, introducing much uncertainty in 
investment plans. Tariffs tended to be very low (indeed, below cost), and 
the sector as a whole was beset with entrenched social and cultural issues.
The 1989 water privatization in England and Wales played a major role 
in convincing policy makers that private fi nancing of urban water utilities 
could be viable. This privatization was a momentous event for the industry 
worldwide, raising massive amounts of private money from international 
fi nancial markets, and a new regulatory scheme was put in place (box 2.1). 
Many observers expected that such a promising new approach could be 
replicated on a large scale in the developing world, where a considerable 
amount of money was needed to fund the investment backlog.
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Evolution of the Water PPP Market since 1990
The development of water public-private partnerships (PPPs) in develop-
ing and transition countries occurred in several phases. The fi rst contracts 
awarded in the early 1990s generated considerable momentum during that 
decade. However, as problems started to appear in several high-visibility 
projects, enthusiasm faded somewhat, and since 2001, the market has grad-
ually taken a different course.
BOX 2.1
Putting in Place a Modern Regulatory Framework: 
The 1989 Water Privatization in England and Wales
In England and Wales, 29 private water companies were still in place in 
the late 1980s, serving about a quarter of the population. The rest of the 
population received water supply and sewerage services from 10 regional 
public water authorities, which had been created by the consolidation 
(around hydrological boundaries) of 1,400 public water and sewerage 
services through the 1973 Water Act.
In 1989, the regional water authorities in England and Wales were 
converted into 10 companies operating under private law. The companies 
were responsible for both water supply and sewerage services in their 
appointed areas; their shares were sold in a massive public fl oatation. This 
was the largest-ever transfer of water and sewerage assets to the private 
sector, and it adopted a fundamentally different model from that of France 
and Spain. In addition to granting licenses to operate the systems and 
collect tariffs from customers, the reform transferred ownership of the 
water infrastructure entirely to private investors.
The privatization was accompanied by the creation of the Offi ce of 
Water Services, a special regulatory agency for the sector. The agency was 
responsible for implementing an innovative regulatory mechanism based 
on the so-called price-cap methodology, with tariff reviews occurring every 
fi ve years. For each private company, the regulator set the tariff evolution 
for the next fi ve years according to effi ciency-improvement objectives. If a 
company was able to cut costs below the level set by the regulator, it could 
keep the savings it made during that fi ve-year period. Then, at the next 
fi ve-year tariff review, the tariff would be adjusted so that actual savings 
could be passed on to customers. This was a major departure from the 
cost-plus regulation that had been used previously for the economic regula-
tion of private providers.
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The First Wave of Water PPP Contracts
By the end of the 1980s, large private water operators had mostly van-
ished from developing countries. The major exception was in Côte d’Ivoire, 
where the private operator Société d’Amenagement Urbain et Rural (SAUR) 
had been present since 1960 and operated the national private water utility 
Société de Distribution d’Eau de Côte d’Ivoire (SODECI) under an affer-
mage contract. Then, in the late 1980s, the government of Guinea requested 
assistance from the World Bank to replicate the Côte d’Ivoire approach, 
leading to the award in 1989 of a 10-year affermage contract to SAUR. 
Under this arrangement, the private operator was to be responsible for 
improving service quality and effi ciency, and the government would remain 
in charge of investment.
It was in Latin America, however, that the development of water PPPs 
would get the most impetus. Several large countries in Latin America had 
undertaken water sector reforms in the 1980s, dismantling their national 
water utilities to create decentralized bodies at either the provincial level (as 
in Argentina and República Bolivariana de Venezuela) or the municipal level 
(Colombia). These reforms had proved largely disappointing, because the 
transfer to ill-prepared local governments often caused massive reductions 
in investment. The region was also undergoing widespread economic liber-
alization at the time, and private sector participation was being introduced 
on a large scale for infrastructure services. For governments facing consid-
erable investment needs, accessing private capital became the major motive 
for seeking private sector participation in urban water utilities.
The fi rst water PPP of the period in Latin America was a concession 
awarded in 1991, for the Argentine provincial utility of Corrientes, to a 
consortium led by a newly privatized British operator (Thames Water). This 
rather small venture was followed by two much more ambitious attempts, 
with tenders launched for the concession of the water utilities of two major 
capitals: Caracas (República Bolivariana de Venezuela) and Buenos Aires 
(Argentina). Although the Caracas tender did not go through, the Greater 
Buenos Aires concession was successfully awarded. The winning consor-
tium took over in May 1993, committing to invest US$4 billion over the 
30 years of the contract—an unprecedented amount for the water industry 
in a developing country.
Initial Momentum for Water PPPs
The award of the Buenos Aires concession generated considerable momen-
tum. The concessionaire achieved early successes after assuming control. 
The city’s recurrent water-rationing problems during the summer months 
were solved in the fi rst year, and more than a million people were connected 
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to the water network during the fi rst four years of private operation, closing 
the gap with the national coverage average (Ducci 2007).
A series of PPP contracts for water utilities followed in the next three 
years, all over the developing world. The most signifi cant included 
Cancun (Mexico) and Gdansk (Poland) in 1994; Kelantan state (Malaysia) 
and Santa Fe province (Argentina) in 1995; Senegal, Manila (the Philip-
pines), Cartagena (Colombia), and Aguascalientes (Mexico) in 1996; and 
Gabon, Cordoba (Argentina), La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia), Budapest (Hun-
gary), Barranquilla (Colombia), and Casablanca (Morocco) in 1997. All 
except the Cancun concession were awarded to foreign operators. As shown 
in fi gure 2.1, the number of new contract awards went up steadily, and the 
population served by private operators rose from 6 million to 93 million 
between 1991 and 2000.
More and more governments were embarking on the contracting of 
private water operators for their urban water utilities. The number of devel-
oping countries with water PPP projects increased ten-fold, rising from 
4 to 38 between 1991 and 2000.2 There were initially only a few isolated 
cases of early contract termination (Tucuman province in Argentina and 
Kelantan state in Malaysia). During that period, Latin America played a lead-
ing role, accounting for 43 million (45 percent) of the 93 million people who 
were served by private water operators by 2000 in developing countries. By 
that year, Argentina had become the largest market by far, with as many as 
18 million people (more than half the urban population) served by private 
water operators. Other regions were far behind, with 14 million in Asia 
(Manila and Jakarta), 16 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 million in East-
ern Europe and Central Asia, and just 7 million in the Middle East and 
North Africa.
Expectations for Private Finance Proved Unrealistic
Publicly reported fi gures on the private fi nancing of water infrastructure 
were initially encouraging. Between 1990 and 2000, projects with private 
investment committed almost US$43.2 billion to water utilities in develop-
ing countries.3 Observers concluded that international fi nancial institutions 
2.  These are countries with at least one water PPP serving more than 100,000 people. Be-
fore 1991, water PPPs (according to the defi nition of this study) in developing countries were 
mostly limited to Côte d’Ivoire, Macao (then under Portuguese administration), Guinea (since 
1988), and Chile (Lo Castillo, an affl uent neighborhood of Santiago).
3.  The investment fi gures recorded in the World Bank/PPIAF Private Participation in Infra-
structure (PPI) Projects Database (2007 U.S. dollars) refer to contractual arrangements in 
which private parties have at least a 25 percent participation in the project contract according 
to publicly available information. The divestitures covered are those with at least 5 percent of 
equity owned by private parties. Contracts in which operational control has been transferred 
to the private sector but without obligation to invest (or with obligation smaller than the 
threshold already indicated) are not included in the PPI database investment fi gures. 
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could reduce sovereign lending to the sector and, instead, provide support 
through private fi nancing instruments.
These expectations did not materialize. When compared with other 
infrastructure sectors, private fi nancing of urban water utilities was limited, 
representing only 5.4 percent of the total investment commitments in private 
infrastructure between 1990 and 2000. Only a few private companies were 
participating, and the fi ve most active among them (Suez, SAUR, Veolia, 
Thames Water, and Agbar) represented 90 percent of the total investment 
commitment during the period 1991–97. Furthermore, fi gures on invest-
ment commitments were for the total amounts to be invested over the dura-
tion of the contracts (often 30 years), and most of the commitments were 
for a few large projects, with those in Chile, Buenos Aires (Argentina), and 
Manila (the Philippines) representing nearly half the total amount. Finally, 
many concessionaires proved unable to borrow on a project fi nance (non-
recourse) basis from private fi nanciers as originally expected and became 
constrained by their balance sheet. All in all, much less private investment 
occurred than was initially expected.
Trends since 2001
The year 2001 was a turning point for water PPPs (fi gure 2.2), with the 
fallout from the acute economic crisis in Argentina, which was the largest 
Figure 2.1 Water Utility PPPs Awarded and Urban Populations Served in 
Developing Countries, by Region, 1991–2000
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database 
(PPI database), World Bank/PPIAF.
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market for private water operators at the time. The number of contract 
awards dropped the following year, and in 2003–05, new activity became 
concentrated essentially in four countries (Chile, China, Colombia, and the 
Russian Federation). Since 2006, the number of contracts awarded annually 
has dropped sharply to pre-1999 levels, and the new awards are concen-
trated in a few countries, with China taking the largest share.
In contrast with the decline in the number of contract awards, the size 
of the urban population served by private water operators has continued 
growing. It rose from about 94 million in 2000 to an estimated 160 million 
in 2007. Two factors lie behind this growth: fi rst, many new contracts 
awarded in the past fi ve years have been for large urban utilities, and sec-
ond, many operators have signifi cantly expanded their customer base on 
existing contracts.
By the end of 2007, there were more than 220 active water PPPs in 
41 developing and emerging countries. Water PPP projects have been devel-
oping in different ways, depending on the country or region, responding 
to the specifi c features of reforms, country risks, and fi nancial markets, 
and to the local political economy. Between 2000 and 2007, the number 
of PPP customers fell from 44 million to 39 million in Latin America, but 
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Figure 2.2 Water Utility PPPs Awarded and Urban Populations Served in Developing 
Countries, by Region, 1991–2007 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PPI database.
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it rose sharply, from 14 million to 50 million, in East Asia, which has now 
become the biggest market for private water operators. It also rose in all 
other regions: from 15 million to 25 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 
15 million to 29 million in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and from 
7 million to 13 million in the Middle East and North Africa.
This evolution was underlined by a gradual change in the fi nancial design 
of the new contracts awarded. Water PPP projects have increasingly been 
based on a combination of public and private fi nancing: either in lease-
affermage arrangements (Africa and Eastern Europe) or in concessions in 
which the government provides a sizable part of the capital expenditure 
fi nancing (for example, Colombia). In contrast with the dominance of the 
concession model in the 1990s, this second generation of PPP projects relies 
more and more on public fi nancing for investment. Private fi nancing in 
water infrastructure is occurring, as seen in PPP projects in Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Malaysia, Morocco, and the Philippines, but it is concen-
trated in countries where operators have gained access to long-term debt in 
local currency.
(a) Breakdown of total water 
PPP projects 
Figure 2.3 Status of Water Utility PPP Projects—Active, Expired, and Terminated, 
by Region, 2007
Source: Author’s calculations based on PPI database.
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Early Termination and Expiration of PPP Projects
The fact that several highly visible water PPPs ran into diffi culties that led to 
the early termination of their contracts has encouraged the perception that 
many water PPPs in developing countries are encountering problems and 
being canceled. Indeed, PPPs did not always work as expected in the con-
tractual arrangements, and several projects have failed. But a closer look at 
the whole picture shows that only a minority of PPPs have been prematurely 
terminated. Figure 2.3 shows the status at the end of 2007 for all water 
utility PPPs that have been in place in developing countries since 1990: 
228 were active, 18 had expired (and the utility had returned to public man-
agement at the end of the contract), and 22 had been terminated early.
Most Water PPP Projects Still in Place
Some 84 percent of the contracts that have been in place since 1990 were still 
in operation by the end of 2007. Only two (the Mendoza and Catamarca 
concessions in Argentina) were reported by the PPI Projects Database as 
being in distress at the end of 2007.4 Other contracts that had previously 
been in crisis had been terminated in the previous three years, or the con-
fl icts had been resolved (usually by the exit of a foreign operator and trans-
fer to local investors).
Only 9 percent of the contracts awarded since 1991 have been termi-
nated early following confl icts between the government and the opera-
tor.5 This is a reasonable fi gure, considering the challenging situations that 
private operators have often had to face and the importance of the human 
factor (that is, whether the partners actually get along) in the outcome of 
any arrangement based on a partnership. Another 7 percent were cases—
mostly short-term management contracts—in which the utility returned to 
public management when the contract expired.6
About 205 million people have been served by water PPPs at one point 
in time during the past 15 years. When the 160 million people who were 
still being served at the end of 2007 are deducted, about 45 million people 
(about 25 million for terminated contracts and 20 million for expired con-
tracts) remain who are being served by utilities that returned to public 
management after experimenting with private operators.7
4.  The PPI database considers a project to be in distress when the exit of the private sector has 
been formally requested or a major dispute is ongoing.
5.  For contracts awarded before 1998, the rate of early termination is 14 percent; for contracts 
awarded between 1998 and 2002, the rate is 9 percent.
6.  PPP contracts that expired but were followed by another PPP arrangement (as when a man-
agement contract was replaced by a lease or concession) are not counted in this percentage.
7.  This includes several prominent contracts, including the one in Buenos Aires (8.5 million peo-
ple), which was the largest concession in the developing world and was terminated in 2006.
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Cancelled PPPs Largely Concentrated in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa
Cancelled PPPs are concentrated in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The most prominent of the contract terminations and nonrenewals—those 
of PPPs serving a population of at least 150,000—are listed in table 2.1. In 
Latin America, half of the cancellations took place in Argentina, whereas 
the overall rate of cancellation for the region stands at 10 percent, similar to 
the global average. In Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately half of the PPPs 
Table 2.1 Large Water Utility PPPs That Returned to Public Management 
between 1990 and 2007
   Population
  Contracts expired served
Region Contracts terminated early without renewal (millions)
Sub-Saharan  Central African Republic,  Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 17.0
 Africa Chad, Comoros, The  Madagascar, Zambia,
 Gambia, Mali, Rwanda,  Johannesburg (South
 Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)  Africa), Kampala 
  (Uganda)
East Asia  Kelantan (Malaysia)   0.5
 and Pacifi c, 
 South Asia
Middle East  Hebron (West Bank Amman (Jordan), Gaza 3.5
 and North  and Gaza) (West Bank and Gaza),
 Africa  Tripoli (Lebanon)
Latin  Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Guyana, Trinidad, Lara 20.0
 America Buenos Aires province (2),  & Monagas (Venezuela,
 Tucuman (Argentina),  R. B. de)
 La Paz–El Alto, Cochabamba  
 (Bolivia), Punta del Este  
 (Uruguay) 
Europe and  Antalya (Turkey), Borsodviz Kosovo, Elbasan 4.0
 Central Asia (Hungary), Vladivostok,  (Albania)
 Volgograd (Russian  
 Federation)
Source: Author.
Note: Only PPPs serving more than 150,000 people are recorded. The concession in West Manila (the 
Philippines), which was terminated in 2005 but was re-awarded to another private operator the 
following year, is also not fi gured.
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awarded either have been terminated early or have expired with a return to 
public management—a high rate that can be linked to a challenging envi-
ronment for reforms. It is also noteworthy that most of the cancelled PPPs 
in Africa were for combined power and water utilities, in which water was 
a secondary activity.8 The rate of active projects for combined water and 
power utilities is only about 20 percent, with half of the contracts hav-
ing been terminated early—contrasting sharply with the rate for water-only 
PPPs, for which about 90 percent of the contracts are still active.
Reasons for Early Termination of Contracts
Most cases of early termination of contracts involved signifi cant noncompli-
ance with contractual obligations by one or both sides, followed by a degra-
dation of the partners’ relationship to the point that ending the partnership 
was the chosen solution. A signifi cant proportion of these PPPs were termi-
nated after having been in place for many years; their termination usually 
refl ected diffi culties in adapting the contract over time to changing condi-
tions. Several governments grew dissatisfi ed with the modus operandi of 
PPP, and felt they could better solve the problems of the sector by regaining 
direct public control.
Part of the reason for the large number of terminations of concessions in 
Latin America probably stems from the rather bullish nature of the market 
in the 1990s, when a few private operators made overoptimistic offers in 
order to gain contracts. Several cases of early termination can be traced to 
contracts whose design was not viable or whose bidding process led to unre-
alistic fi nancial conditions, or both. An example is Cochabamba (Bolivia), 
where the contract was awarded following a tender from which all but one 
company had withdrawn. Substantial tariff hikes were needed to make via-
ble the large investment required from the private operator, something that 
proved socially unsustainable and brought about the rapid demise of the 
contract.
PPP projects that expired at the end of their contract duration, and were 
followed by a return to public management, represent 7 percent of the cases. 
They must be clearly distinguished from PPP contracts that were termi-
nated early. A large majority of the expired water PPPs were for short-term 
management contracts, with limited transfer of responsibilities to private 
operators. The reasons these utilities returned to public management are 
varied, and not necessarily linked to a failure to improve or to satisfy the 
government’s expectations—as illustrated by the successful management 
contract in Johannesburg, South Africa (Marin, Mas, and Palmer, 2009).
8.  This was the case in Chad, Comoros, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, 
Rwanda, and São Tomé and Principe (combined population of about 6.5 million). 
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New Operators
During the 1990s, tenders for water PPPs typically included rather restric-
tive prequalifi cation criteria, which often prevented the participation of 
investors with no previous experience in operating large urban water and 
sanitation systems. The rationale was that the provision of drinking water 
was too essential a service to be delegated to inexperienced private inves-
tors. Because only a few developed countries had experienced private water 
operators at the time, the consequence of this cautious approach was that by 
2001, fi ve international companies accounted for 80 percent of the popula-
tion that was served by private operators in the developing world.9
The period 2001–06 saw a major change, with the growing participation 
of new private operators from emerging and developing countries (fi gure 2.4). 
Since 2002, the population served by private operators from developing 
countries has been increasing steadily, accounting for most of the growth 
observed in this period (see box 2.2). The growth in their customer base rep-
resents an additional 55 million people served, according to estimates from 
this study; in the meantime, the population served by large international 
operators has remained fl at at about 95 million people since 2001.
9. The companies included Suez (36 percent) getting the lion’s share, followed by SAUR 
(15 percent), Veolia (12 percent), Agbar (11 percent), and Thames Water (6 percent).
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Figure 2.4 Urban Populations Served by Private Water Supply Operators in 
Developing Countries, by Country of Origin, 1991–2007
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Box 2.2
New Private Water Operators from Developing Countries
Most of the contracts awarded in the early 1990s went to large interna-
tional operators. The award in 1996 of the Manila concessions required 
that national investors own 60 percent of the shares of the concessionaire 
companies, prompting international operators to team up with local part-
ners who had a majority control. In the Manila Water concession (Eastern 
zone), the partnerships worked out well; the foreign partner transferred 
know-how, and this led to the gradual emergence of a competent Filipino 
private water operator, which by 2007 was looking for expansion through 
PPPs in Asia.
Meanwhile, in Latin America, national investors initially developed by 
taking on projects that did not interest the large foreign multinationals. In 
Argentina, Thames Water left control of the Corrientes concession in 1995 
to its local partner. In the following years, Argentine investors won several 
tenders for provincial concessions (in Salta, Santiago del Estero, Formosa, 
and La Rioja). A similar phenomenon started in Colombia and Brazil in 
1998–99; construction companies that were active in the water sector 
were awarded PPP contracts following tenders in which only local investors 
participated. In all these cases, governments chose to ease prequalifi cation 
criteria to increase competition, resorting to various mechanisms to ensure 
the winning bidder would be able to operate the water utility. In Colombia, 
the winning bidders contracted experienced technical staff (often former 
managers and engineers from public utilities). In Argentina, the investors 
who won the Salta concession signed a technical assistance contract with 
an established water utility (SANEPAR, the state-owned water utility of 
Paraná, Brazil).
National operators gained ground in Latin America after 2000, because 
the initial experiences with them proved encouraging. Between 2001 and 
2004, Colombian investors won almost all the PPP contracts awarded in 
that country under the Programa de Modernización de Empresas (PME). 
The same trend happened in Chile during the second wave of PPPs in 
2002–04. Several operators became signifi cant national players by winning 
multiple contracts. In recent years, national investors kept increasing their 
market share as several international operators were exiting the market. 
This was the case with Suez in Manaus and Limeira (Brazil) and in Cordoba 
(Argentina), with Agbar in Campo Grande (Brazil), and with Anglian and 
Thames Water in Chile.
(continued)
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Strong Growth of Private Operators from Developing Countries
By 2007, private water operators from developing countries were serving 
as many as 67 million people, or more than 40 percent of the market. This 
fi gure is an underestimate, because it excludes China, where recorded PPPs 
serving more than 24 million people are based on mixed control between 
the international operator and local investors (the latter holding a majority 
share) and where national operators in small cities may have gone unre-
ported. Neither does it include the two large private operators in Côte 
d’Ivoire (SODECI) and Senegal (Sénégalaise des Eaux, or SDE), which 
together serve more than 13 million people. Although controlled by a for-
eign operator, SODECI and SDE are essentially African companies run by 
national management and with a large local shareholding.
Many private water operators from developing and emerging countries 
have now become signifi cant players, and some are now taking a regional 
view of the market. For instance, Latinaguas (Argentina) won a conces-
sion for the city of Tumbes (Peru) in 2005, and ONEP (Offi ce National de 
l’Eau Potable, in Morocco) won an affermage contract two years later for 
the national water utility of Cameroon. Malaysian companies have been 
actively looking for opportunities abroad, even purchasing an English water 
utility in 2002. Table 2.2 summarizes data from the largest players identifi ed 
in this study, which serve at least 400,000 people.
Partial Retreat of Large International Operators
The picture is very different when looking at the large operators from 
developed countries. Overall, the total population served by international 
operators rose only marginally between 2001 and 2007, from 86 million to 
Box 2.2
New Private Water Operators from Developing Countries (continued)
In other developing countries, different patterns have emerged. A 
few large private groups directly negotiated PPP contracts for large water 
utilities. This occurred in Malaysia, where control over the concessions for 
Johor state (2001), and for Selangor state and Kuala Lumpur (2004) was 
sold to national companies. In Russia, the development of PPPs since 2003 
took place through direct negotiation, involving essentially two companies 
(RKS and Rosvodokanal) that had links to major energy conglomerates. The 
Tata group in India is yet another case; it had been providing water utility 
services in the industrial city of Jamshedpur since the 19th century. The 
water service had traditionally been provided as a special department of 
Tata Steel but was established as a separate water company in 2004.
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban W
ater Utilities
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Table 2.2 Largest Private Water Operators Owned by Investors from Developing Countries (excluding China)
    Population served
Country Operator (national) Start year Main PPP contracts (cities, states, and provinces) (millions)
Malaysia Puncak Niaga 2004 Kuala Lumpur and Selangor state 6.5
 Ranhill 2001 Johor state 2.9
 YTL 2002 Wessex Water (UK) 2.5
 Salcon 2005 Changle (China), Linyi (China) 0.7
Philippines Manila Water 1996 Manila Eastern zone 3.0
 DMCI–MPIC 2006 Manila Western zone 3.0
Indonesia PTJ 2006 Jakarta Eastern zone 3.1
India Tata group 2003 Jamshedpur 0.4
Russian Federationa Rosvodokanal 2003 Orenburg, Krasnodar, Tyumen, Kaluga, Barnaul 3.0
 EWP 2005 Omsk, Rostov 2.2
 RKS 2003 Kirov, Perm, Tambov 2.0
Morocco ONEPb  2007 Cameroon (national utility) 3.0
South Africa WSSA-Uzinzo  1992–2005 Queenstown, Maluti 0.6
Argentina Latinaguas 1996–98 Salta, Corrientes, La Rioja, Tumbes (Peru) 2.0
 Roggio 2006 Cordoba 1.3
 Sagua 1997 Santiago del Estero 0.4
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Brazil Vega 2006 Manaus 1.4
 Aguas do Brasil 1999 Campos, Niteroi, Petropolis (RJ) 1.3
 Saneatins 1999 Tocantins state 0.9
 Bertin 2005 Campo Grande 0.8
 Odebrecht 2006–07 Limeira, Rio Claro (sewerage) 0.4
Chile Fernandez Hurtado 2003 Esval (Valparaiso), ESSCO 1.9
 Solari 2004 ESSAR, ESSAT, ESSMAG 1.2
 Luksic 2003 ESSAN (Antiofagasta) 0.5
Colombia  Triple Ac  1997 Barranquilla, Santa Marta, Soledad and others (Atlántico) 2.2
 EIS 2006 Cucuta 0.7
 Conhydra 1998 Buenaventura, Marinilla and others (Antioquia) 0.6
 Sala 2003 Sincelejo, Corozal 0.4
Source: Author.
a. For Russian water operators, this table reports the population served under long-term PPP contracts only (several cities have one-year renewable operation and maintenance 
contracts with private operators representing several more million people served).
b. As a publicly owned national water utility, ONEP also serves about a third of the urban population in Morocco.
c. Triple A has a strategic partnership with the publicly owned water utility of Madrid (Canal Isabel II). It is, in practice, managed by nationals and has been branding itself as a 
Colombian private company.
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95 million people. By the end of 2007, some of these operators who were 
the most active during the 1990s had signifi cantly retreated from the market 
(fi gure 2.5).
Suez, in particular, has left Latin America and refocused on specifi c mar-
kets such as China, Morocco, and Eastern Europe. The one-year drop in the 
population served by international operators, which took place in 2006, is 
largely attributable to the disengagement of Suez from Latin America; the 
termination of its Buenos Aires and and Santa Fe (Argentina), and La Paz–
El Alto (Bolivia) concessions in 2006 accounted for a net reduction of about 
11.5 million people served. The same year, two of Suez’s large management 
contracts expired—one in Amman (Jordan) and the other in Johannesburg 
(South Africa)—together accounting for an additional decrease of 5 million 
people served. Suez also transferred control of the concessions of Cordoba 
(Argentina) and Manaus and Limeira (Brazil) to its local partners. By 2007, 
Suez’s presence in developing countries was much reduced, after many years 
of dominating this market. Its only large remaining operations in developing 
countries outside of China were in Casablanca (Morocco), Algiers (Algeria), 
Cancun (Mexico), and West Jakarta (Indonesia).10 English water companies 
also signifi cantly reduced their presence in developing countries.11
In contrast, other international companies have been quite active, not 
just in the booming Chinese market but also in low-income countries. Over 
the past fi ve years Veolia has signifi cantly expanded its presence in emerging 
and developing countries. Its total population served grew threefold between 
2000 and 2007, from 7 million to 30 million. Notably, it started to expand 
its operations in emerging countries mostly after the so-called market down-
turn of 2001.12 Several water operators from Western Europe have also been 
awarded PPP contracts: namely Acea (Italy), Gelsenwasser and Berlinwasser 
10.  Though Suez had always been the main, albeit minority, shareholder in Agbar, it acquired 
control in 2007 by taking a majority shareholding. After consolidating Agbar, the market 
share of Suez in developing countries became comparable to that of Veolia. By the end of 2007, 
Agbar’s main contracts abroad were in Cartagena (Colombia), La Havana (Cuba), Saltillo 
(Mexico), Greater Santiago (Chile), and Oran (Algeria).
11.  The largest U.K. operator, Thames Water, announced that it would withdraw from devel-
oping countries, followed by a decision by its owner, RWE, to refocus on energy. Thames trans-
ferred the Eastern Jakarta (Indonesia) concession to local investors in 2006 and sold its Chilean 
water utilities (serving about 2.6 million people). Anglian Water sold its shares in water utilities 
in the Czech Republic and Chile (ESVAL Valparaiso) in 2003–04.
12.  Veolia achieved this growth not only by concentrating on high-end markets (such as 
Eastern Europe and China), but also by being active in poor countries. It won an affermage 
contract in 2001 for the national water utility in Niger (one of the poorest countries in the 
world), and another affermage in 2005 for the city of Yerevan (Armenia). It had submitted 
unsuccessful bids for PPPs in Madagascar and Ghana (2005) and Cameroon (2007), and won 
a small concession in Latin America through its partnership with the Spanish group FCC 
(Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas) in 2005 (San Andres, Colombia).
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(Germany), Aguas de Portugal (Portugal), Stockholm Water (Sweden), and 
Vitens (the Netherlands). Many of these operators are publicly owned utili-
ties that were not interested in the concession model of the 1990s but are 
now entering the market through management contracts.
other international operators Veolia Thames Water
Agbar  Suez SAUR
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Figure 2.5 International Operators in Water Utility PPPs in Developing Countries, 
1991–2007
Source: PPI database and author’s calculations.
Note: Population in millions is indicated in parenthesis; percentages are rounded.
(a) Urban population served by main private operators
(b) Repartition of populations served by main private operators, 2007
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Conclusions from Trend Analysis
Even though the number of new contract awards has been going down in 
recent years, the paradox is that more and more people are being served by 
private water operators, and more and more countries have been introduc-
ing water PPPs. During the fi ve years from 2002 to 2007, private water 
operators have made signifi cant inroads in big countries such as Algeria, 
China, Malaysia, and Russia. Contracts have been awarded for the fi rst 
time in the Arab peninsula, Cameroon, Georgia, Ghana, and Peru. Even the 
failed Manila West concession in the Philippines was rebid successfully at 
the end of 2006, and the series of contract cancellations in Latin America 
now seems to be over. The development of water PPPs has not been uniform 
throughout the developing world; although the PPP approach has suffered 
setbacks in Latin America, other regions have been gradually adopting it.
In many countries, water PPPs seem to have withstood the test of time. 
By the end of 2007, 44 developing and emerging countries had active urban 
water PPP projects. In Armenia, Cameroon, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, the Czech 
Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Malaysia, Niger, and Senegal, the majority of the 
urban population is now served by private operators. In several other coun-
tries, private operators serve close to or more than a third of the urban 
population; those countries include Algeria, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Hungary, Morocco, and Mozambique. Even Argentina still has more than 
10 water concessions serving 20 percent of the urban population.
However, about one-third of the developing countries and economies 
that had water PPP projects during the past 15 years decided to revert to 
public management.13 This is a signifi cant proportion, which underlines the 
fact that PPPs are complex and risky endeavors.
Since the late 1990s, governments and other stakeholders in urban water 
PPP projects have gradually learned what works and what does not and 
refl ected these lessons in a move away from pure concessions and toward 
partnerships that rely more on public funding. At the same time, new pri-
vate operators have entered the market. Many of the newcomers are from 
developing countries, and they are radically changing the face of a market 
that, during the 1990s, looked like an oligopoly among a few multination-
als. A more mature environment is appearing, more attuned to the needs 
and specifi cities of the developing world.
13.  Most of these projects were in Sub-Saharan Africa (Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), including seven for mixed water-electric power utilities; 
followed by Latin America (Belize, Bolivia, Guyana, Trinidad, Uruguay, and República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela); Middle East (Jordan, Lebanon, and West Bank and Gaza City); and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Kosovo and Turkey).
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This overall fi nding—that water PPPs have been spreading constantly in 
the developing world during the past 15 years despite diffi culties—raises a 
fundamental question: how and to what extent is this development associ-
ated overall with good performance by private operators? That is the sub-
ject of the next chapter.
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3.
PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT 
OF WATER PPP PROJECTS
For a better understanding of whether public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a 
viable option to improve the performance of water utilities in developing 
countries, this chapter examines whether and how water PPPs have contrib-
uted to improving service. This is not an easy task: performance is multi-
dimensional, and measurement of each dimension is fraught with pitfalls. 
In consideration of these factors, this study uses a case study approach to 
systematically review a large number of PPP projects. The focus is on assess-
ing whether the partnerships brought signifi cant net improvements to the 
population, compared with the previous situation, in each of four dimen-
sions of performance: (a) access to water and sanitation services, (b) quality 
of services, (c) operational effi ciency, and (d) impact on tariffs.
In practice, the performance of a PPP project depends on the actions 
of both the private operator and the contracting government, with the 
government playing a more or less important role depending on the PPP 
scheme adopted. Different contractual schemes cannot be expected to 
achieve the same things. This is especially the case with management con-
tracts, which are typically of short duration and entail only a limited trans-
fer of control to the private operator. The analysis of projects distinguishes 
management contracts from long-term PPPs (divestitures, concessions, 
leases-affermages,14 and mixed-ownership companies) in which services are 
14. A newly established private utility operates a publicly owned system and collects revenues 
that it then shares with the public owner, who remains in charge of investment.
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provided by a newly established utility, partly or fully owned by a private 
operator.
Evidence from the Literature
Even though a rather large body of literature has been published on PPPs, 
the existing evidence seems somewhat confusing. Part of the confusion stems 
from the many challenges associated with assessing the performance of pri-
vate operators. This study adopted a methodology that is a middle ground 
between individual cases studies and econometric studies.
The Challenge of Assessing the Performance of Water PPPs
The effect of public-private partnerships on the extent and quality of water 
supply and sanitation services has been much debated. Have PPP projects 
improved the service for existing customers? Have they extended services to 
those previously lacking access? Have they improved operational effi ciency? 
What is the effect on tariffs? These questions are essential, but they are dif-
fi cult to answer in practice, given some of the sector’s basic characteristics, 
which include the following:
• The ambiguity of performance indicators. The limitations of commonly 
used indicators are a persistent source of diffi culty. These indicators 
are often based on rough estimates and are calculated differently from 
one country or utility to another. Measuring water losses is notoriously 
complex, but even a seemingly straightforward indicator such as service 
coverage can be hard to estimate accurately (box 3.1).
• The multidimensional nature of performance. The various components 
of performance are linked: one cannot meaningfully discuss an increase 
in the number of connections while ignoring service interruptions, or dis-
cuss a tariff raise without reference to possible improvements in access 
and service quality. Parameters interact as well: one cannot understand 
water losses without simultaneously considering service continuity. The 
presence of sanitation services further complicates the picture, because 
data that distinguish between the two services are rarely available.
• Infl uence of multiple local factors on operating costs and wide variety 
of tariff structures. Operating costs of water utilities are largely deter-
mined by local factors such as availability of water resources and topog-
raphy. A wide variety of tariff structures can be found among utilities, 
with consumption brackets, fi xed charges, and billing sometimes based 
on estimates of consumption. The size of a utility also plays a signifi cant 
role through economies of scale, because fi xed costs represent a large 
portion of the cost structure. All these factors greatly complicate the task 
of comparing costs and tariffs across water utilities.
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Box 3.1 
Coverage Ratio: The Challenge of Estimating an Apparently Simple Indicator
The coverage ratio is computed starting from the number of active resi-
dential connections, which can be obtained from the utility’s customer 
database. Then one needs the fi gures for the total population in the service 
area and the number of people per household—fi gures for which only 
broad estimates can be obtained in most developing countries. The aver-
age number of people per household varies across countries and, within a 
given city, across social categories (with poor households tending to have 
a higher birthrate and a larger extended family under the same roof). The 
estimate of total population is also usually a broad one: offi cial censuses 
are often carried out only once a decade, and fast urban growth makes 
such fi gures unreliable.
A further issue is what fi gure to put in the numerator and denominator 
when calculating coverage. Illegal connections are numerous in some cities, 
but whether they should be included in the coverage fi gure is not obvious, 
and their number is hard to assess. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
use a ratio of 8–10 people per individual connection, to account for piped 
water provided to neighbors through resale. Some utilities report access 
based only on the population in “authorized” urban areas, leaving out the 
poor living in illegal slums, which results in overestimated coverage fi gures.
Another major issue is what is meant by access. The Joint Monitoring 
Program, which tracks progress toward the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), uses a criterion of “improved access,” meaning access to either 
an individual connection or a standpipe located within 200 meters of the 
household. In many published studies, it is not always clear what criterion 
is used—despite the obvious differences in the quality of service provided 
and investment costs. Estimating the actual number of people served under 
the improved access criterion is even more diffi cult than for household con-
nections. In cities where a large portion of the urban population accesses 
piped water through community standpipes or by purchases from neigh-
bors, the coverage ratio reported is sometimes no more than a guess.
• The diffi culty of obtaining performance data on water services. Perhaps 
the most important impediment to meaningful analysis is the widespread 
diffi culty of obtaining good performance data in the sector, whether from 
public or private providers. Many public water utilities in the developing 
world lack a proper framework for performance monitoring, and often 
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the data they report are unreliable. As a consequence, many projects have 
lacked an appropriate baseline against which to measure performance 
after the transfer to a private operator. Neither is information on PPP 
contracts always easily accessible to the public.
Findings from the Literature
Despite the data limitations, a rather large body of literature has been pub-
lished on water PPPs. Studies on the impact of private sector participation 
fall into two groups: case studies of individual projects, and econometric 
analyses of multiple utilities.
Case studies typically look at how the performance of a water utility 
evolves after the entry of a private operator. They have tended to concen-
trate on a few cases (Senegal, Buenos Aires [Argentina], and Manila [the 
Philippines]), leaving many others (such as Côte d’Ivoire, Casablanca 
[Morocco], Guayaquil [Ecuador], and Jakarta [Indonesia]) largely undocu-
mented. A desk review of published case studies on water PPPs (Clarke, 
Kosec, and Wallsten 2004) identifi ed 25 projects in developing countries 
and concluded that private participation had a broadly positive impact in 
16 cases, a negative impact in 5 cases, and mixed results in 4 cases. Espe-
cially visible were improvements in coverage, labor productivity, and the 
quality of services, which were often associated with tariff increases.
Econometric studies use larger samples, often attempting to compare the 
performance of public and private utilities, but they face the same limi-
tations of sample selection. To reach meaningful conclusions, they need 
to use a large enough sample to be able to control for the many external 
factors that can infl uence performance, but early studies often had to rely on 
small samples, representing only a small number of countries or utilities over 
short periods of time. The criteria for classifying utilities as private is not 
always clear or even relevant. This affected the robustness of their fi ndings. 
A second group of studies tried to overcome the limitations that were 
imposed when using data obtained from utilities, by relying instead on 
data from national household surveys, as with Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten 
(2004) on Argentina; and Gomez-Lobo and Melendez (2007) and Barrera 
and Olivera (2007) on Colombia.
The fi ndings of these studies are summarized in table 3.1. Considering 
each dimension separately, the fi ndings remain inconclusive. Overall, the 
average impact of PPPs appears neutral on access and coverage, positive on 
service quality and operational effi ciency, and rather inconclusive on tariff 
levels. Notably, none of the studies covers all four of the dimensions of 
utility performance—access and coverage, quality, effi ciency, and tariffs.
Two recent studies by the World Bank were able to rely on samples large 
enough to ensure that exogenous factors could be properly controlled. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Study Findings on the Impact of PPPs on Water Utility Performance
  Access or Service Operational Tariff
Region Study coverage quality effi ciency level
Africa Estache and Kouassi (2002) n.a. n.a. Positive n.a.
Africa Kirkpatrick, Parker, and Zhang (2004) n.a. n.a. Inconclusive n.a.
Argentina Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) Positive Positive n.a. n.a. 
Latin America  Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten (2004) Neutral n.a. n.a. n.a.
 (mostly Argentina)
Argentina Maceira, Kremer, and Finucane (2007) Neutral n.a. n.a. n.a.
Asia Estache and Rossi (2002) n.a. n.a. Neutral n.a.
Bolivia Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola (2005) Positivea n.a. n.a. Inconclusive
Brazil Rossi de Oliveira (2008) Inconclusive n.a. Positive Higher
Brazil Serão da Motta and Moreira (2004) n.a. n.a. Positive Neutral
Chile Bitran and Valenzuela (2003) n.a. n.a. Positive Higher
Colombia Gomez-Lobo and Melendez (2007) Inconclusive Positive n.a. Inconclusive
Colombia Barrera and Olivera (2007) Inconclusive Positive n.a. Neutral
Hungary Boda and others (2008) n.a. n.a. Unclear Neutral
Malaysia Lee (2008)  Inconclusive n.a. n.a. Inconclusive
World Ringskog, Hammond, and Locussol (2006) Greater Positive Positive Inconclusive
Source: Author.
n.a. = not applicable.
a. An earlier publication by Barja and Urquiola (2003) found inconclusive results on the impact on access.
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The studies adopted different but complementary approaches and covered 
all dimensions of performance simultaneously. Andrés, Guasch, and oth-
ers (2008) focused on Latin America and compared the performance of 
49 water utilities in seven countries, before and after the introduction of a 
private operator. Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) used a large sample 
to make a meaningful comparison of the performance of private and public 
water utilities. They compared the performance by building a data set of 
977 water utilities in developing countries, of which 141 had some form 
of private participation. Only those PPPs with data covering at least three 
years of private operation were included, and the water utility sample con-
tained 6,079 fi rm-year observations over the 1992–2004 period. To avoid 
bias in data reliability, the study focused on comparing private utilities with 
only the public utilities that had been corporatized or were operating under 
a comparable framework.
Both studies found improvements in service quality and operational effi -
ciency with private operators. On tariff levels, Andrés, Guasch, and others 
(2008) found that the introduction of a private operator usually resulted 
in tariff increases, which is not surprising, because most Latin American 
utilities had tariffs below cost-recovery levels in the early 1990s. However, 
Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) concluded on their larger sample that 
there was no signifi cant difference in tariff levels between PPPs and compa-
rable public operators over the same period.
The main divergence between the two studies concerns the utilities’ per-
formance in expanding access. Andrés, Guasch, and others (2008) found 
that, in Latin America, introducing a private partner did improve cover-
age, but the improvement was essentially for the transition period (one year 
before and two years after the takeover). Working with a larger sample that 
also represented other regions, Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) found 
that private operators had performed better when measured by growth in 
the number of connections, both during the transition period to private 
operation and after, but their results regarding residential coverage were 
inconclusive.
Methodology Applied in This Study
It is worth noting that this study has adopted a different methodology from 
that found in the literature to date. In view of the respective limitations of 
both the case study and econometric approaches, a choice was made to seek 
a middle ground between these two methodologies, so as to draw meaning-
ful conclusions despite the many diffi culties related to data collection and 
interpretation. First, this study reviewed a large number of projects, with a 
focus on performance indicators, thereby providing a more complete pic-
ture than has usually been provided in individual case studies. Second, the 
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performance data and analysis have been linked to well-identifi ed projects, 
contrary to the “black box” approach typical of econometric studies. The 
source for each project’s performance data is indicated in appendix A.
Access
The analysis in this section focuses on long-term PPPs, including leases-
affermages, mixed-ownership companies, and concessions. Management 
contracts, which are short-term arrangements typically focused on improv-
ing service quality and operational effi ciency, are not discussed. The PPPs 
reviewed in the study represent a combined population of more than 
65 million people served. This is equivalent to more than 75 percent of the 
population served by long-term PPPs that (a) lacked access to water supply 
and sewerage services at the time the private operator took over, (b) were 
signed before 2003, and (c) had at least three years of private operation.15
Experience with PPPs in Latin America
Latin America provides, by far, the largest sample to analyze the performance 
of long-term water PPPs to improve access and coverage. This section reviews 
cases of the various concessions in Argentina, the concession in La Paz–
El Alto in Bolivia, the concession in Guayaquil in Ecuador, the various water 
concessions in Brazil, and the concessions and mixed-ownership schemes in 
Colombia.
Concessions in Argentina
Argentina was the fi rst country in Latin America to embrace private partici-
pation in large-scale water operations, and by 2000, it had some 17 million 
people served by private water operators. In 1990, 76 percent of Argentina’s 
urban dwellers had access to piped water through a household connection, 
and 39 percent were connected to a sewer network. Only moderate progress 
of 7 percentage points for both services had been achieved by 2004 (see 
fi gure 3.1).16 The fi gure also shows the performance in service expansion 
of fi ve of the seven largest concessions (those active for at least four years 
and serving more than half a million people).17 The increase in the national 
urban average between 1990 and 2004 is provided for reference.
15.  For reference, the size of the population served will be provided in parenthesis for each 
project under review. It corresponds to the estimate of the number of people actually served by 
the water utility, as opposed to those living within the contract area. The fi gures used are either 
for 2007 or for the last year the contract was in operation. 
16.  The data are based on the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply 
and Sanitation. National coverage data mentioned elsewhere in the report come from the same 
source, unless otherwise noted.
17.  The concessions in Tucuman and Buenos Aires (Azurix) provinces, which lasted only about 
two years and did not achieve any signifi cant expansion in access, are not considered.
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For water supply (fi gure 3.1a), all fi ve concessions have expanded access 
signifi cantly. The concessionaires in Santa Fe, Cordoba, Salta, and Corri-
entes stand out for achieving coverage of about 95 percent, well above the 
national average, but the progress in Greater Buenos Aires does not appear 
much different from the evolution of the national average. For access to 
sewerage services (fi gure 3.1b), only Santa Fe and Corrientes stand out.
The concession in Greater Buenos Aires (serving 8 million people) served 
one-third of the country’s urban population. During the fi rst fi ve years of 
the contract, the concessionaire invested substantial amounts in infrastruc-
ture expansion and rehabilitation. Between 1993 and 1997, 244,000 water 
connections were installed, providing access for about 1.5 million people, 
mostly in poor neighborhoods at the periphery of the metropolitan area. 
Starting from 10 percentage points below the national average, the gap was 
Figure 3.1 Increases in Coverage under Five Concessions Compared with the 
National Increase in Argentina
Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply and Sanitation.
Note: Coverage at takeover by the concessionaire is compared with the last year of available data, 
except in the case of Buenos Aires, where the end data are for 2001 (little progress in coverage occurred 
afterward). Data were not available for Mendoza (active since 1998 but currently in crisis) and the Buenos 
Aires province concession operated by Aguas de Bilbao (terminated in 2006).
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closed as coverage went up from 70 percent to 80 percent between 1993 and 
1997. Meanwhile, sewer coverage went up from 58 percent to 63 percent, 
in line with the national average (Ducci 2007).
This initial good performance was not sustained. No further sizable 
improvement in coverage was achieved after 1998, and it appears that the 
concessionaire failed to suffi ciently invest in network expansion to reach the 
neighborhoods farther away in the periphery (Delfi no, Casarín, and Delfi no 
2007). This setback is disappointing, because a major contract renegotia-
tion had taken place in 1998 to facilitate service expansion, transferring a 
large portion of fi nancing the cost of network expansion from new to exist-
ing customers and signifi cantly increasing the concessionaire’s revenues.18 
Though coverage targets were also revised downward, the concessionaire 
failed to meet them.
The performance of the provincial concessions in Santa Fe (serving 
1.9 million people), Salta (1.2 million), and Corrientes (0.6 million) was 
more satisfactory. In Corrientes19 and Salta, coverage continued to expand 
even after the 2001 economic crisis. The provincial government in Salta 
contributed part of the investment, and the concessionaire also negotiated 
fi nancial contributions from municipalities, as well as in-kind contributions 
from communities, to reduce the impact of expansion tariff. In Santa Fe, 
contractual targets for expansion and investment were not fully met despite 
the sizable progress made in extending access to both water and sanitation; 
the concession was terminated together with the neighboring one in Buenos 
Aires in 2006 (Ducci 2007).
The concession in the city of Cordoba (serving 1.3 million people) was 
more limited in scope and performed well. Sewerage services remained with 
the municipality, and the contract made the concessionaire responsible 
for fi nancing only the primary network expansion, while the municipality 
and/or users were responsible for fi nancing secondary network expansion. 
Contractual targets for expansion were fully met and even exceeded. Water 
18.  The concession was originally designed so that the cost of service expansion would be 
borne by new customers, who had to pay an infrastructure charge covering the cost of connec-
tion plus a portion of the cost of expansion. The amount was considerable, averaging US$415 
for a new water connection and US$606 for a new sewer connection (WSP 2001), and proved 
very unpopular. The new mechanism replaced the infrastructure charge with a bimonthly uni-
versal service and improvement charge (SUMA), equivalent to a tariff surcharge and to be paid 
by all connected customers.
19.  Corrientes is the oldest concession active in Argentina, dating from 1991. Its good perfor-
mance in improving access has been consistent over more than 12 years of private operation. 
During the fi rst four years, when Thames Water was operating the concession, coverage rose from 
70 percent to 85 percent for water, and from 32 percent to 56 percent for sewerage. The trend 
has been maintained since national investors took over in 1996, reaching 94 percent for water 
and 72 percent for sewerage in 1995.
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coverage continued to increase even after the 2001 crisis, rising from 
90 percent in 2001 to 95 percent by 2004 (Ducci 2007).
The concession of Aguas de Bilbao in part of the Province of Buenos 
Aires operated from 2000 to 2006 and proved disappointing. The conces-
sion area comprised 13 municipalities with about 1.7 million people and 
had one of the worst poverty rates in the province.20 The access fi gures in 
2000 were very low: water coverage was 35 percent and access to sewerage 
was a mere 13 percent. The concessionaire took over as the fi nancial crisis 
was unraveling and found itself unable to borrow for investment. The con-
cession was terminated in 2006, with little apparent progress in improving 
access to water and sewerage.
It is diffi cult to make a judgment on the overall performance of private 
concessionaires in Argentina for service expansion. The end of the Argen-
tine peso–U.S. dollar parity in 2001, and the subsequent economic crisis, 
bankrupted the major concessions whose debt was largely denominated in 
foreign currencies. Though several concessions have performed well, the 
largest, in Greater Buenos Aires, failed to make progress after 1998—well 
before the country’s economic crisis erupted. Three econometric studies 
that focus on Argentina provide different fi ndings: Galiani, Gertler, and 
Schargrodsky (2005) found that private utilities outperformed public ones, 
while both Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten (2004) and Maceira, Kremer, and 
Finucane (2007) reported no signifi cant difference.
The La Paz–El Alto Concession in Bolivia
The concession of La Paz–El Alto (serving 1.5 million people), which was 
terminated in 2006, has been much publicized. Of the populations of La Paz 
and El Alto, 50 percent and 80 percent, respectively, are considered poor, 
and the PPP was specifi cally designed with coverage expansion for the poor 
as its main contractual objective. Before the concession was awarded, the 
tariff structure had been revised to signifi cantly lower the monthly water 
bills of small residential consumers, while raising tariffs substantially for 
other customer categories. The contract was awarded on the basis of the 
largest number of new water connections in El Alto. The winning bidder 
offered to install 72,000 water connections in El Alto in the fi rst fi ve years.
At the beginning of the contract, water supply coverage was about 
84 percent in La Paz and 71 percent in El Alto; sewer coverage stood at 
66 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Ducci 2007). These rates were for 
20.  The province tendered for its water services in fi ve distinct zones, using a complex meth-
odology to ensure it would have at least two different operators in separate zones for future 
benchmarking regulation. The consortium led by Azurix won the concession in the four richer 
zones, while a consortium led by Aguas de Bilbao, a publicly owned utility from Spain, won 
the concession in the fi fth zone.
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the whole area of the two municipalities, as distinct from the concession 
area, which covered La Paz but only a portion of El Alto. The contract 
required that within the service area of the concession, access to piped water 
through household connections be raised to 100 percent in La Paz and 
82 percent in El Alto by 2001. In the same year, the target for sewerage was 
82 percent in La Paz and 41 percent in El Alto (Ducci 2007).
The level of coverage that the concessionaire achieved has been contro-
versial, especially because of disagreement over whether coverage was cal-
culated for the entire municipal boundaries or just for the service area of 
the concession. Bolivia’s national regulator reported that by 2001, coverage 
within the concession area was at 99 percent for water and 79 percent for 
sewerage (Ducci 2007). Overall, the concession brought a sizable improve-
ment in access, with at least 400,000 people—mostly poor families in 
El Alto—gaining access to piped water.21
Despite this good performance, the access issue was the main reason why 
the concession was terminated in 2006. As many people were gaining access 
to the network, those living outside the service area of the concession began 
to protest about being excluded, and a campaign developed to pressure the 
concessionaire to connect them too. Such claims were reinforced by con-
troversies about whether the concessionaire had fully met its contractual 
obligations (the number of water connections installed in El Alto, at 53,000, 
was below the tender proposal) and about the way the regulator calculated 
coverage (Ducci 2007). The popular discontent was aggravated by the regu-
lator’s decision in 2002 to increase connection fees for new customers while 
leaving tariffs untouched.
The early termination of the La Paz–El Alto concession is a paradox. 
The PPP performed rather well in expanding access for the poor, in one of 
Latin America’s poorest countries and without recourse to public money for 
investment. The fact that the partnership ultimately proved unsustainable 
holds important lessons. First, to make possible the private fi nancing of 
expansion through international fi nancial markets, the parties had designed 
the contract with the customer tariff indexed to the U.S. dollar, but this 
mechanism proved unsustainable. Second, this experience showed the limi-
tations of relying on cross-subsidies to fi nance access expansion for the poor. 
The low tariff for small residential customers meant that the operator was 
serving them at a loss and, therefore, lacked fi nancial incentives to extend 
services to such customers beyond its strict contractual obligations (that is, 
in this case, the geographical boundaries of the concession).
21.  The fi gure reported by Ducci (2007) is 600,000 people gaining access, but this is based on 
rather broad estimates of the number of people per connection, and the 400,000 fi gure appears 
to be more realistic.
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A Concession with Public Funding in Guayaquil, Ecuador
The concession in Guayaquil has not been much publicized even though it 
is, after Buenos Aires, the second largest in Latin America by population 
served.22 Guayaquil is Ecuador’s economic capital and home to 2.4 million 
people, or one-third of the national urban population. When the conces-
sionaire took over in 2001, water coverage in the city lagged far behind the 
national average: only 60 percent of residents had household connections in 
2000, compared with the national urban average of 81 percent in 1998. The 
gap was smaller for sewerage, with coverage of 56 percent compared with a 
national urban average of 61 percent.
The concession performed remarkably well in expanding access to piped 
water through household connections. Starting from 245,000 connections in 
2000, the concessionaire installed 160,000 new connections in the fi rst fi ve 
years of operation—equivalent to more than a 10 percent annual increase 
and three times the contractual target of 55,000. Those gains brought water 
coverage in the city up to 82 percent in 2005 and benefi ted about 800,000 
people who gained access, most of them living in poor neighborhoods not 
previously served by the network. This achievement is even more notable, 
because at the national level, progress in extending urban water access stag-
nated in the same period. The concessionaire’s performance in improving 
sewerage access was more modest, raising coverage from 56 percent to 
62 percent.
The good performance for water access can be largely attributed to a 
special tax transfer mechanism (the telephone tax), which the central 
government had introduced back in the 1980s to subsidize new water 
connections nationwide. It was based on a 10 percent tax on telephone 
bills, the proceeds of which were granted to utilities to support expansion of 
the water network in uncovered urban areas. New water connections were 
provided free of charge to households in urban areas not previously covered 
by the water network (where most of the population is poor), and part of 
the cost for the utility of expanding the network was also subsidized. Most 
new water connections installed by the concessionaire in Guayaquil were 
fi nanced by this mechanism.23 Sewer connections were not eligible, explain-
ing why the progress there was much more modest.
22.  Santiago de Chile (5.3 million customers) is larger but is operated under a divestiture 
scheme (private ownership of infrastructure). 
23.  Of the US$85 million of the civil works done by the concessionaire during the fi rst fi ve 
years, US$39 million was funded from the grants of the telephone tax (Yepes 2007).
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Water Concessions in Brazil
Between 1995 and 2006, some 36 concessions for municipal water and sew-
erage services were awarded in Brazil to private operators, serving an urban 
population of about 6.5 million. Analyzing the evolution of access to piped 
water in Brazil is made diffi cult by the fact that utilities typically calculate 
the coverage ratio on the basis of the population living in “authorized” 
urban areas—a reference point that excludes illegal slums and that tends to 
change every year as new neighborhoods are legalized.24
The concession in Manaus (serving 1.6 million people) is Brazil’s larg-
est, and its record in improving access to piped water seems to have been 
fair. Based on company data, water coverage went up from 72 percent to 
86 percent of the population between 2001 and 2005. Ducci (2007) reports 
that water coverage within the service area was 96 percent in 2006. By then, 
an estimated 300,000 people had gained access to water. The improvement 
in sewer coverage was more modest: up from 3 percent in 2001 to just 
11 percent in 2006.
The second-largest private operator in Brazil is Aguas do Brasil, a 
national consortium of construction and engineering fi rms. According to 
public data, water coverage in Niteroi, Campos, and Petropolis (serving 
1.1 million people in the state of Rio) rose signifi cantly between 2000 
and 2005: from 85 percent to 100 percent in Niteroi, from 75 percent to 
96 percent in Campos, and from 70 percent to 80 percent in Petropolis.25 
Meanwhile, the water coverage performance of Companhia Estadual de 
Aguas e Esgotos (CEDAE), the public utility of the state of Rio, stagnated 
at about 85 percent.
Data available for 2000–05 on a few medium-size concessions sug-
gest that private operators often performed comparably with public 
state water utilities. In Itapemirim (200,000 people), coverage went up 
from 86 percent to 98 percent for water and from 72 percent to 90 per-
cent for sewerage, while the water coverage reported by the state public 
utility Companhia Espírito Santense de Saneamento (CESAN) remained 
at a high 97 percent. In Paranagua (130,000 people), the concessionaire 
improved coverage from 93 percent to 96 percent for water and from 
30 percent to 68 percent for sewerage—a performance comparable to that of 
24.  It is not uncommon for Brazilian water utilities to report coverage above 100 percent in 
some years. This refl ects a situation where several neighborhoods are being served even though 
they are still not legalized (that is, the corresponding population is accounted for in the nu-
merator but not in the denominator of the coverage ratio).
25.  The concessionaire took over those utilities in 1998–99, but no data were available for 
the years before 2000.
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the state utility Companhia de Saneamento do Parana (SANEPAR), whose 
coverage stood at 98 percent for water and went up from 31 percent to 
61 percent for sewerage.
Use of Hybrid PPP Schemes to Improve Access in Colombia
More than 40 water PPPs have been awarded in Colombia since 1996, 
serving a combined population of 7.3 million people by 2007. Many con-
tracts were awarded in poor municipalities with highly deteriorated infra-
structure and relied on a mix of public and private funding. The fi rst wave 
of contracts were awarded in 1996–98 and mostly followed the mixed-
ownership company model, with the municipality holding a majority of 
the shares but with management fully delegated to the private operator. A 
second group of projects started in 2000 with the implementation of the 
Programa de Modernización de Empresas (PME) by the central govern-
ment. The program focused on turning around public water utilities in very 
poor condition by transferring them to private operators, and featured con-
cession schemes with signifi cant public grants for investment.
Colombia’s eight largest and/or oldest PPPs’ performance in improving 
water coverage is compared with the national average improvement and 
with the achievements of the three largest public providers (see fi gure 3.2), 
with the period of comparison between the PPP’s fi rst year of operation and 
2006. The eight PPPs reviewed represent a combined population of almost 
4 million people and include all large contracts awarded before 2004.
The two mixed-ownership companies in Barranquilla (serving 1.3 mil-
lion people) and Cartagena (serving 1 million) are the largest and oldest 
water PPPs in Colombia, and both have good records in expanding access. 
That in Barranquilla made notable progress in both water supply and 
sewerage services: coverage rose from 86 percent to 96 percent for water 
and from 70 percent to 93 percent for sewerage (1997–2006). Performance 
was even better in Cartagena, where water supply coverage jumped from 
74 percent to almost universal coverage, while sewer coverage went up from 
62 percent to 79 percent (1996–2006). Cartagena achieved full water sup-
ply coverage despite a 50 percent jump in the size of its population during 
the same period, largely due to the arrival of poor rural migrants. Half a 
million people gained access, and 60 percent of the new connections ben-
efi ted families in the poorest income quintile. To achieve universal coverage, 
the operator in Cartagena made extensive use of community bulk-supply 
schemes that provided safe water to the many illegal settlements that were 
expanding on the city’s periphery.
Mixed-ownership companies were also established in several mid-size 
Colombian cities. In Santa Marta, water coverage improved rapidly during 
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the fi rst three years, going from 74 percent to 87 percent, but it has stag-
nated since 2001 (access to sewerage followed the same pattern). In Palmira 
(220,000 people) and Girardot (100,000 people), full coverage was achieved 
for both water and sewerage.
The city of Tunja (120,000 people) was the fi rst in Colombia to 
award a water concession. Both water and sewer coverage went up from 
89 percent in 1996 at the start of the concession to 100 percent four 
years later. A series of smaller concession contracts were also awarded to 
national operators in 1997–98 for towns and small cities in the depart-
ment of Antioquia. The largest of these operators is Conhydra, whose 
performance in expanding access appears to have been satisfactory. In the 
towns of Marinilla, Santafe, and Puerto Berrio (combined population 
100,000), full coverage was achieved within a few years, starting from lev-
els of 80–90 percent, and improvements in sewer access were even more 
Figure 3.2 Increases in Water Supply Coverage under Private Operators 
Compared with That of Public Utilities and with the National Urban 
Average in Colombia
Source: National regulator (utilities data), with WHO/UNICEF and PAHO for national urban coverage.
Note: Coverage begins with the PPP’s fi rst year of operation and ends in 2006. The coverage fi gure in Cali 
is reported to have gone down from 98 percent to 88 percent between 1996 and 2006.
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dramatic. All these concessions were designed around a mix of public and 
private fi nancing, with municipalities contributing annual budget transfers 
from the central government.
The second phase of water PPPs in Colombia was shaped after 2000 by 
the implementation of the PME. Most of the cities concerned had high rates 
of poverty, and the schemes were based on concession contracts with public 
support for fi nancing. The design was based on the central government pro-
viding grants in the start-up years to speed the rehabilitation of deteriorated 
systems and to expand access, while the contracting municipal government 
also made budgetary transfers on an annual basis to complement revenues.
The fi rst contract under the PME was awarded in 2000 in Monteria 
(350,000 people), and its performance in improving water access has been 
very good. Starting from less than 70 percent, water coverage had jumped 
to 96 percent by 2007, catching up with the national urban average, and 
the population with access to piped water more than doubled. The improve-
ment in sewer coverage was more modest, up from 26 percent to about 
40 percent. In Soledad (400,000 people), coverage went up from 69 percent 
to 84 percent for water, and from 36 percent to 73 percent for sewerage, in 
just fi ve years of operation.
Most of the PPP projects awarded under the PME were for small cities 
and towns, and limited data are available from Colombia’s national data-
base. Most contracts were signed between 2002 and 2004, and a compre-
hensive evaluation of the projects’ performance has still to be carried out. 
Silva (2007) indicates, nonetheless, that coverage expansion under most 
PME projects appears to have been satisfactory.
Overall, water PPP projects in Colombia have performed well in expand-
ing access. The largest and oldest PPP projects described earlier, which 
represent about half of the population served by private water operators, 
succeeded—in most cases—in improving access signifi cantly, often in cit-
ies with high rates of poverty. The same holds true for those implemented 
under the PME since 2000. The fi nancial approach adopted, which relied 
on a mix of private and public funding, no doubt contributed to their posi-
tive results.
However, it is not clear whether these partnerships performed signifi cantly 
better than publicly managed utilities. The public utility in Bogotá, which 
serves one-third of Colombia’s urban population, made strong progress in 
access over the past decade, reaching universal coverage. The performance 
of the public utility in Medellin was comparable, for expanding access, to 
the performance of the largest PPP in Barranquilla. This conclusion tends 
to be supported by two recent studies (Barrera and Olivera 2007; Gomez-
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Lobo and Melendez 2007). Using household surveys instead of data from 
utilities, these studies did not fi nd that private operators showed a clear 
advantage in improving water access, compared with public utilities. This 
can be attributed to several factors. The PME, which focused on introduc-
ing private operators into the worst-performing public utilities, must have 
helped to improve the average performance of the public sector.26 A solid 
regulatory framework was put in place at the national level, and the recent 
development of local fi nancial markets also allowed municipalities to access 
a viable source of investment funding for public water utilities, helping pub-
licly managed utilities to compete on more equal terms with PPPs. Overall, 
the progress achieved in Colombia for access to water supply and sewerage 
services must be credited to several good performers in both the public and 
the private sectors and to a national policy that fosters accountability and 
effi ciency of all service providers.
Large Concessions in East Asia
The concessions in Manila (the Philippines) and Jakarta (Indonesia) have 
been in place now for almost a decade, serving a combined population of 
18 million people in 2007. In both cities, the systems were divided into 
two separate concessions, a large portion of the population lacked access to 
piped water when the private concessionaires took over, and the fi rst years 
of operation were severely affected by the 1997–98 Asian fi nancial crisis.
The Two Concessions in Metropolitan Manila
Metropolitan Manila is the biggest metropolis in the developing world to 
be served by private water operators. Two concessions were awarded in 
1997 to cover two contrasting areas. The Western concession (Maynilad, 
operated by Benpres-Suez) was the larger and covered the oldest and most 
developed portions of the city, with a total population of about 7 million 
people. The smaller Eastern concession (Manila Water, operated by Ayala-
United Utilities) covered about 4 million residents and a large proportion of 
new neighborhoods in the process of development.
One-third of metropolitan Manila’s population lacked access to piped 
water when the concessionaires took over. A key contractual target was the 
requirement to achieve universal access by 2006. The performance of the 
two concessionaires in expanding access is presented in fi gure 3.3, which 
26.  The impact of the PME was twofold. First, it removed the worst performers from the 
public utilities sample, since the corresponding utilities became private, thereby improving the 
average public performance. Second, the central government used the PME as a way to pres-
sure nonperforming public utilities to reform.
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities56
shows the evolution of piped water coverage, number of connections, and 
number of households served for the concessions’ fi rst nine years.27
The implementation of the two concessions faced major diffi culties from 
the beginning. The Asian fi nancial crisis started just one month after the 
concessionaires took over. The Western zone operator, which had assumed 
most of the foreign currency–denominated debt of the previous public util-
ity, found itself in virtual bankruptcy as the Filipino peso lost half of its 
value. Both concessionaires severely curtailed their investments during the 
fi rst fi ve years.
Though the contractual target of reaching full coverage by 2006 was 
not met, access to piped water in Manila expanded signifi cantly during the 
decade. In the Western concession (Maynilad), coverage expanded from 
67 percent to 86 percent. In the Eastern zone (Manila Water), coverage 
jumped from 49 percent to 94 percent. Meanwhile, the national urban 
average for water coverage grew moderately, from 46 percent in 1997 to 
58 percent by 2004. An estimated 4 million people gained access to piped 
water in Manila during the period 1997–2006, about half of them as the 
result of low-cost community-based schemes, mostly in the Eastern zone. 
Access to sewerage services remained marginal, though, at about 10 percent 
by 2007.28
The evolution of water coverage has been markedly different between 
the two zones. In the Western zone, despite the fi nancial diffi culties, nota-
ble progress was made early on, but coverage stagnated after 2001 as 
Maynilad’s fi nancial and contractual situation deteriorated. Most of the 
expansion came through individual connections. In contrast, water cover-
age in the Eastern zone grew no faster than the national urban average until 
the 2003 rate rebasing, but subsequently, the concessionaire began to invest 
heavily in expanding its customer base. It installed as many as 160,000 new 
connections in just three years, between 2003 and 2006, and put in place a 
major program to expand access in poor areas through bulk-supply com-
munity schemes.
27.  The coverage level that the concessionaires achieved remains the subject of much debate; 
the regulator has not yet ruled on the methodology to be used, quoting the concessionaires’ 
estimates in its reports. These estimates are the fi gures quoted here.
28.  The concessions were designed with a decision to expand access to sanitation not through 
a sewerage network but through individual septic tanks with the concessionaires being respon-
sible for the periodic desludging of individual tanks. Between 1997 and 2006, sewer coverage 
went up marginally from 7 percent to 10 percent in the Eastern zone, and it went down from 
14 percent to 10 percent in the Western zone. 
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The Two Water Concessions in Jakarta
The two concessions in Jakarta were awarded in 1998, just one year after 
Manila’s. Access was even lower, with water supply coverage at a mere 
40 percent and a served population of about 4 million people. Many city 
dwellers obtained water from private wells.
Between 1998 and 2005, access to piped water in Jakarta’s Western zone 
(operated by Suez) went up from 32 percent to 50 percent, while access went 
up from 57 percent to 67 percent in the Eastern zone (operated by Thames 
Water). Together, the two concessionaires added 210,000 water connections 
to the system in the fi rst seven years, providing access for an additional 
Figure 3.3 Evolution of Water Supply Coverage under PPPs in Manila, 
the Philippines, 1997–2006
Sources: Regulator and companies’ data.
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1.7 million people. More than 65 percent of the households that gained 
access through a household connection in the Western zone were registered 
as poor or very poor.
On balance, the concessionaires’ performance in expanding access to 
water supply in Jakarta is rather mixed. It is positive when considering that 
signifi cant progress was made in these two concessions, whereas nationwide 
urban water coverage stagnated at a low 30 percent in the same period. 
However, half of the population in the Western zone, and one-third in the 
Eastern zone, were still not connected to the water network after almost 
a decade. One reason is the widespread development of private wells in 
Jakarta and the absence of regulation and control over the use of the aquifer. 
Many households were unwilling to pay a connection fee plus periodic bills, 
because they had already invested in pumping equipment and were not pay-
ing any extraction charge for the water they were getting from their wells.
Experience in Africa
Many water PPPs in Sub-Saharan Africa have followed the affermage 
model, often leveraging signifi cant amounts of donor funding. Several affer-
mages remained in place for more than fi ve years, serving a combined urban 
population of more than 17 million (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Sene-
gal, and Maputo [Mozambique]) and providing a good sample to analyze 
performance. Another specifi cally African feature is the existence of mixed 
water and power utilities, with concessions put in place in Gabon and Mali 
for national utilities, and in Morocco for the cities of Casablanca, Rabat, 
Tangiers, and Tetouan (water distribution only).29
Affermages and Combined Power and Water Concessions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of water access under private operators 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, measured in terms of household connections and 
improved access; the latter is an essential indicator, because a large portion 
of the urban population in the region relies on community standpipes.30
The private operator in Côte d’Ivoire (serving 7.5 million people) has 
been in place since 1960 and provides service to all urban centers and 
small towns in the country under an affermage arrangement. Between 1990 
and 2006, improved access to piped water went up from 68 percent to 
29.  In Morocco, water, sewerage, and electricity services in large cities are provided by munici-
pal utilities (either public or private) that focus on distribution of water and electricity, and that 
purchase water and electricity in bulk from national state providers (ONEP [Offi ce National de 
l’Eau Potable] and ONE [Offi ce National de l’Electricité], respectively).
30.  The data and analysis presented here have been published in more detail in a companion 
study by Fall and others (2009).
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Figure 3.4 Evolution of Household Water Supply Coverage under PPPs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(a) Household water connection 
(b) Improved access to water
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90 percent, and the number of people served more than doubled. Coverage 
through household connections went up from 41 percent to 60 percent, and 
the number of people served through residential connections also more than 
doubled, from 2 million to 4.9 million (see box 3.2). A total of 340,000 new 
water connections were installed.31 This performance is even more notable 
when one considers that, unlike in a typical affermage (where most invest-
ment is fi nanced by public money), almost no government or donor fi nanc-
ing was provided during the past 15 years. A water development fund was 
established in 1988 to fi nance investment using a tariff surcharge, and the 
private operator is responsible for managing this fund and carrying out all 
civil works. Over the past 15 years, US$200 million was collected from cus-
tomers through this fund and invested mostly in network expansion.
After Côte d’Ivoire, the next affermage implemented in Western Africa 
was signed in 1989 for the national water utility of Guinea (serving about 
1 million people). During the fi rst six years, the improved access ratio 
went up from 40 percent to 67 percent, with some 600,000 people (mostly 
in Conakry) gaining access to safe piped water. But after early progress, the 
PPP in Guinea encountered diffi culties. Unlike the case of Côte d’Ivoire, in 
Guinea the civil works were not implemented by the private operator but 
by a newly established public asset-holding company responsible for invest-
ment. The coordination of civil works between the private operator and the 
public asset-holding company proved a continuous challenge, and major 
delays occurred with the investment program. Frustrated with the slow pace 
of the public asset-holding company’s implementation of investments, the 
private operator directly arranged bilateral fi nancing for civil works con-
tracts, which were awarded to itself on a sole-source basis. Though this 
arrangement led to a timelier implementation of investments, it also dis-
tracted the operator from its main responsibility of running the utility and 
modifi ed the incentives framework. The expected gains in operational effi -
ciency failed to materialize, and the contract was not renewed after its expi-
ration in 1998.
The Senegal affermage (serving 4.7 million people) started in 1996, and 
its design drew lessons from the Guinea experience by incorporating spe-
cifi c contractual targets and penalties to increase the operator’s incentives to 
perform effi ciently. The expansion of access in Senegal has been even more 
impressive than that in Côte d’Ivoire, thanks to an important injection of 
funds from donors and the cash-fl ow surplus generated by the operator and 
transferred to the asset-holding company. Unlike in Guinea, in Senegal the 
31.  To put this achievement in perspective for a poor country, one must consider that over a 
decade, private concessionaires in Buenos Aires and Manila installed 310,000 (Aguas Argenti-
nas), 230,000 (Maynilad), and 250,000 (Manila Water) new connections.
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public asset-holding company proved effi cient in implementing the invest-
ment program to rehabilitate and expand the systems, and over a decade, 
improved access to piped water in urban areas jumped from 81 percent to 
almost full coverage. The number of residential customers went up from 
217,000 to 375,000 people. The connection ratio went up from 58 percent 
to 76 percent and is now the highest in Western Africa.
Box 3.2 
Using Subsidized Water Connection Programs to Expand Access 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
A major element in the success of the PPPs in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal for 
improving access through household connections was a social connection 
program to subsidize the cost of connection fees. In Senegal, connections 
were provided free of charge, and the benefi ciaries had to pay only an 
advance deposit on consumption equivalent to 30 cubic meters.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the social connection program was funded through 
the Water Development Fund tariff surcharge. About 340,000 social con-
nections were installed between 1990 and 2006, but many of the newly 
connected households proved unable to pay their quarterly water bills from 
their irregular incomes. The overall disconnection rate reached about 
15 percent in 2002, and there were about 70,000 inactive connections 
in the country in 2006. Most of these disconnected customers are still 
accounted for as covered under the “improved access” criterion, because
they obtain water from neighbors.
A social connection program was also implemented in Senegal, this time 
fi nanced by loans from donors through the public asset-holding company. 
Some 129,000 connections (75 percent of all new connections installed) 
were installed under this program, benefi ting poor households living in 
targeted neighborhoods. As in Côte d’Ivoire, a portion of the new connec-
tions were disconnected for nonpayment; most were families in the poorest 
income quintile. These experiences suggest that in the case of the poorest 
of the urban poor (who earn irregular wages in the informal economy) pro-
viding access to water through a household connection is not necessarily 
the most suitable solution, because many of these families fi nd it diffi cult 
to save money for paying bills at the end of the month. In Niger, a more 
modest subsidized connection program (about 10,000 new connections) 
was also implemented during the fi rst three years, funded through an 
International Development Association (IDA) credit and with the civil works 
directly implemented by the private operator.
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In Niger (serving 1.8 million people), the affermage started in 2000, and 
its performance in improving access has been fair. The investment program 
during the fi rst years of the PPP was more focused toward rehabilitation 
of existing assets than on expanding access. About 450,000 people gained 
access to piped water, but the coverage fi gures improved only marginally: 
the improved access and connection ratios went up from 65 percent to 
68 percent and from 31 percent to 40 percent, respectively.32 
The affermage in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo (serving about 1 million 
people), also started in 2000. Its performance for expanding access so 
far has been disappointing, with coverage remaining broadly stable at a 
low 35 percent by 2005 (25 percent through residential connections and 
10 percent through standpipes).33 Diffi culties have hampered the implemen-
tation of this PPP project since its inception. Catastrophic fl oods occurred 
in the fi rst month after the takeover, making it necessary to divert some of 
the original donor funding to emergency repair works. The private operator 
left in 2001, and although it was replaced by another experienced foreign 
operator (its junior partner in the initial consortium), the renegotiation of 
the contract between the new parties was not fi nalized until 2004. Because 
the original design of the contract made the private operator directly respon-
sible for implementing most of the civil works fi nanced by donors, the result 
was serious delays in implementing the original investment program, which 
has been limited so far to rehabilitation and extension of production capac-
ity instead of network expansion.
The performance of the two large concessions in Western and Central 
Africa for expanding access is satisfactory. In Gabon (serving 750,000 
people), the concessionaire is responsible only for providing water services 
through household connections; standpipes remain the responsibility of a 
government agency. Since 1996, water supply coverage through connections 
went up from 45 percent to 65 percent nationwide; an estimated 300,000 
people had gained access by 2007. In Mali (serving 1.6 million people), the 
private operator withdrew in 2005 but had signifi cantly extended access to 
water supply during its four years of presence: improved access to piped 
32.  The fact that the increase in coverage fi gures is rather modest is partly due to fast urban 
population growth, because Niger has one of the highest fertility rates in the world.
33.  Water access fi gures in Mozambique are not readily comparable to those from other 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Reported government fi gures use a ratio of about fi ve peo-
ple per individual connection to report water coverage fi gures—a ratio that does not account 
for households purchasing piped water from neighbors. It is estimated that about a quarter 
of the residents in Maputo obtain piped water from their neighbors. In other Sub-Saharan 
African countries, a ratio of 8 to 10 people per individual connection is typically used when 
reporting access fi gures, to account for the widespread practice of purchasing piped water from 
neighbors. 
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water rose from 52 percent to 81 percent in the area covered by the con-
tract, and about 600,000 people gained access (a 60 percent increase).
Concessions for Water, Sewerage, and Power Distribution in Morocco
The concession in Casablanca (serving 3.7 million people) has been in place 
for a decade. Its performance in expanding access has been satisfactory: 
between 1997 and 2005, more than 270,000 new water connections were 
installed, and about 1.3 million people gained access to piped water. Water 
supply coverage in the concession area went up from 71 percent to 93 per-
cent in the fi rst eight years. After taking over a utility in which coverage was 
9 percentage points below the national urban average, the concessionaire 
was able to catch up to and even exceed this average by 2005.
The fi nancial design of the Casablanca concession played an important 
role in supporting access expansion. A special work fund, fi nanced by a 
0.5 percent tariff surcharge, was set up; it fi nanced US$140 million of the 
US$500 million of civil works that the concessionaire carried out over a 
decade. Another major funding source has been the special mechanism 
applicable to all of Morocco’s water utilities (whether public or private), 
whereby new customers are required to pay a fi nancial contribution well 
above the actual cost of connection.34 Still, the operator did not meet targets 
for coverage expansion, mainly because of high connection fees and diffi cul-
ties in dealing with illegal settlements.
No coverage data were obtained for the Rabat concession, but in Tangiers 
and Tetouan (together serving about 1.1 million people), water coverage 
rose from 67 percent to 76 percent and from 79 percent to 86 percent, 
respectively, between 2001 and 2005. These concessions had a fi nancial 
design similar to that in Casablanca.
Data available for the 2001–05 period on the evolution of the number 
of customers suggest that the concessionaires in these four Moroccan cit-
ies performed well but not signifi cantly better than public operators, using 
data from the four largest municipal utilities (Fez, Marrakech, Agadir, and 
Meknes). The number of customers grew at about 6 percent per year under 
the four concessions—a rate of growth similar to that achieved in Fez, 
Marrakech, and Meknes. The best performer during this period was the 
well-performing public utility in Agadir, where water coverage rose from 
34.  Under this scheme, a new customer must pay a fi nancial contribution that is based on the 
property area and includes, in addition to the cost of connection, an amount equivalent to a 
portion of the value of the investment already made in existing systems. This fi nancial contri-
bution is called participation aux frais de premier établissement (participation in the costs of 
fi rst establishment). For utilities located in fast-growing cities, it typically represents 10 percent 
to 15 percent of revenues. 
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66 percent to 81 percent, with an annual growth of 9 percent in the number 
of connections.
Conclusions on Access and Expansion of Coverage under PPPs
Several conclusions can be drawn from this performance review of a large 
number of projects, regarding the overall contribution of public-private 
partnerships for expanding access in developing countries, the importance of 
designing sound fi nancial arrangements, and paying suffi cient consideration 
of the specifi c needs of the poor. Ultimately, many key factors for expanding 
access to basic water and sanitation services are beyond the scope of a util-
ity, regardless of whether it is privately or publicly managed.
More Than 24 Million People Gaining Access to Piped Water as a 
Result of Water PPPs
Many PPP projects failed to meet their contractual targets for coverage expan-
sion, and often concessionaires failed to invest the amounts they had initially 
committed to expand the systems. Still, many PPP projects did achieve sig-
nifi cant improvements in water and sewer coverage. This study found that 
since 1991, PPP projects in developing countries have provided access to 
piped water for more than 24 million people (see appendix B). Although this 
amount may be little in global terms, it is still signifi cant, considering that 
private operators were serving less than 1 percent of the urban population in 
developing countries in 1997 and that their market share had risen to a mere 
4 percent by 2002, reaching just about 7 percent by 2007.
The fi gure of 24 million people gaining access is quite conservative. It is 
based on 36 large long-term PPP projects (concessions, leases-affermages, 
and mixed-ownership companies) documented in this study. Together, these 
partnerships provided access to piped water to more than 24 million peo-
ple, but there were more than 220 active water PPP projects in developing 
countries by the end of 2007. The estimate excludes the contributions of 
several large contracts that have been in place for more than fi ve years 
but for which there were insuffi cient data (such as Aguascalientes, Campo 
Grande, Cancun, La Havana, Mendoza, Saltillo, and San Pedro Sula). Nor 
does it include the many PPP projects for towns and small cities in Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Colombia. The fi gure also does not include the improve-
ments achieved under management contracts, even though several of these 
achieved notable gains (as in Amman, where more than 400,000 people 
gained access).
No Clear Advantage of PPPs for Expanding Access to Basic Services
Many water PPP projects have performed well in expanding access to piped 
water as well as sewerage services in some cases. Several projects stand 
out as very good performers, including those in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
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(national utilities), in the province of Corrientes (Argentina), in East Manila 
(the Philippines), and in the cities of Cartagena and Monteria (Colombia), 
Casablanca (Morocco), and Guayaquil (Ecuador).
Overall, though, there is no evidence that PPP projects are necessarily 
more effi cient than publicly managed utilities for expanding access. In Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, and Morocco, for example, private concessionaires 
on average did not perform demonstrably better than public utilities, on the 
basis of data available. In Guayaquil (Ecuador), the concessionaire achieved 
remarkable progress in water coverage, but this can be largely attributed to 
a national public grant scheme that put the concessionaire at an advantage 
compared with other utilities in the country.35 In Jakarta (Indonesia) and 
Manila (the Philippines), the concessionaires performed better than their 
counterparts in secondary cities, but they cannot be meaningfully compared 
with them because of the differences in size and conditions for access to 
fi nancing. Finally, the performance of PPP projects in expanding access to 
sewerage has been uneven.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, private operators have clearly performed better 
than public utilities in expanding access through household connections. 
PPP projects accounted for almost 20 percent of the increase in household 
connections in the region, more than twice the amount that would have 
been predicted on the basis of their 9 percent market share.36 But half of 
these gains were made in just one country (Côte d’Ivoire), and when using 
the improved access criterion—which also considers more basic forms of 
access (such as community fountains) and one used for tracking whether 
or not countries meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—the 
difference between public and private national utilities is not obvious (Fall 
and others 2009).
The Close Link between PPP Coverage Expansion and Financing
The performance of PPPs in coverage expansion is closely linked to fi nanc-
ing. Expanding access to piped water and sewerage services usually entails 
major investments. Not surprisingly, much of the diversity in performance 
35.  The proceeds of the telephone tax are allocated among utilities, on the basis of where the 
call originated. Because Guayaquil is the largest city and the economic capital, it gets the lion’s 
share of the proceeds. Under the previous public utility in Guayaquil, the telephone tax was 
already in place but raised much less money, because the telecom boom took place in the early 
2000s, just when the concession started. Still, the private operator proved effi cient in making 
use of the opportunity given by this mechanism to rapidly expand its customer base, benefi ting 
at the same time the many poor who thereby gained access to safe piped water.
36.  Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 million people have gained access to household con-
nections since 1990, and although water PPPs served only 9 percent of the urban population, 
they provided more than 5 million people with household water connections (3 million in Côte 
d’Ivoire, 1.5 million in Senegal, and 0.3 million in Gabon). 
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among PPP projects can be traced to differences in fi nancial design and 
availability of funds for investment.
In concessions, the performance in expanding access was greatly infl u-
enced by the fi nancial conditions of the contract, which affected how much 
investment could be fi nanced through cash-fl ow generation and whether 
and how much the concessionaire could borrow. The assumption that 
private lenders would be ready to provide large amounts of nonrecourse 
project fi nancing to private operators proved unrealistic. Several conces-
sions proved vulnerable to economic crises, especially when concessionaires 
had borrowed heavily in foreign currencies. In Manila, the performance 
in early years was seriously affected by the Asian fi nancial crisis, and the 
Eastern zone concession started to make progress in extending access only 
after the regulator had granted a tariff adjustment—seven years after the 
start of the project.
In affermages, the government has the largest role for fi nancing invest-
ments, and how the investment program is executed has played a major role 
in the overall outcome of the PPP projects. Various situations are encoun-
tered in practice regarding who actually implements the civil works. In 
many affermages in Sub-Saharan Africa, investment has been carried out 
by a public asset-holding company, and the outcome for access expansion 
has depended on government priorities and on how fast civil works were 
implemented. In Senegal, the government adopted access expansion as a 
priority and, thanks to the good performance of both the asset-holding 
company and the private operator, has achieved the best access fi gures in 
the region. In Maputo (Mozambique), delays in completing the investment 
program, plus the priority given so far to rehabilitation and expansion of 
production capacity, have hampered progress in expanding coverage. Côte 
d’Ivoire is a special case because it is more of a hybrid between affermage 
and concession: investment has been fi nanced entirely through cash-fl ow 
generation, and the private operator implemented the civil works directly. 
In mixed-ownership companies under a lease arrangement such as in Carta-
gena (Colombia), the utility under private management carried out all civil 
works, but investment decisions were made jointly by the private partner 
and the city government.
Notably, the design of many of the successful PPP cases included the provi-
sion of public fi nancing (through grants or concessional loans) to accelerate 
access expansion. The advantages of such an approach are apparent from the 
good performance of the concessions in Cordoba (Argentina) and Guayaquil 
(Ecuador) and those awarded in Colombia under the PME (where a signifi -
cant amount of public funding was provided for investment). By contrast, the 
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diffi culties in La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia) and the Buenos Aires province (Aguas de 
Bilbao [Argentina]) concessions show the limitations of relying solely on the 
sector’s own cash fl ow to fi nance expansion when a large portion of the popu-
lation is poor. As for affermages, the fact that the water coverage achieved in 
Senegal (where a major injection of donor funding took place) is much 
greater than that in Côte d’Ivoire (where all expansion was fi nanced through 
customer revenues) shows that the level of achievement depends heavily on 
how much a government is willing to contribute for meeting social goals.
The Importance of Providing Low-Cost Service Alternatives
Providing low-cost alternatives adapted to the needs of the poor is impor-
tant. In many developing countries, affordability is a signifi cant issue for 
poor families, for whom the cost of connecting to the network can be pro-
hibitive. Several private operators have offered fi nancing schemes to help 
poor households pay connection fees (as in Argentina, La Paz–El Alto in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Manila in the Philippines), but this is not always 
enough. Subsidized connection programs in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal have 
played a major role in the good performance of these two PPP projects, 
though the signifi cant rates of disconnection suggest that household con-
nections are not necessarily the most suitable service option for the poorest 
urban families.
Several of the most successful PPP projects stand out for having developed 
alternative, lower-cost service options through community-based schemes. 
Examples are Cartagena and Eastern Manila, both of which had achieved 
almost universal access to piped water by 2007 despite high poverty rates. 
In Cartagena, the expansion in access was part of a pragmatic, phased 
approach whereby piped water was provided in bulk at the entrance to each 
settlement in a fi rst phase, while tertiary network and standard connections 
were gradually installed later as each settlement became legalized by the 
municipality. Though the service initially provided was less convenient than 
an individual connection, it still represented a major improvement over the 
previous situation and allowed a larger number of poor people to rapidly 
gain access to safe piped water.
It is also increasingly recognized that the small local private operators, 
who in many large cities of the developing world provide service to poor 
periurban neighborhoods, can play an important role in spearheading prog-
ress in expanding access for the urban poor. These largely informal players 
have usually surged in response to the defi ciencies of the main water utility 
and, if properly regulated, could become valuable partners for improving 
access for the poor. A noteworthy feature of the large investment pro-
gram fi nanced by donors in Maputo (Mozambique) is that it is not limited 
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to the lease contract with an international operator, but also includes fi nan-
cial support for small local operators to help them improve service quality 
and access.
Factors That Are Beyond Utilities’ Scope for Expanding Access
Several key factors for expanding access go beyond the scope of a water 
utility—whether it is publicly or privately managed. Illegal settlements and 
slums house a high portion of the population in large cities of the develop-
ing world, but water utilities are typically ill equipped to serve these neigh-
borhoods. Expanding networks in illegal settlements is often prohibited by 
law and raises land property issues that only active collaboration with local 
authorities can solve. Relying on community schemes for rapidly expanding 
access, as was done in Cartagena and East Manila, is not always legally pos-
sible because of prevailing technical standards, or accept as a viable solution 
by the population.
The fact that households are not always willing to connect to the water 
supply or sewerage networks can also be a challenge. In Jakarta, part of the 
reason coverage increased only modestly was that many residents already 
obtained water from wells and were often not interested in connecting to 
the water network. Even though this situation is creating problems for the 
environment (the current overexploitation of the aquifer) and public health 
(most of the water from wells is not safe), achieving better coverage fi gures 
would have required the government to enforce more control over the use 
of the aquifer. The same diffi culty occurs when municipalities or utilities try 
to get households to connect to a newly installed sewerage network when 
they have already invested in individual sanitation. These are situations that 
a utility cannot solve unless the government is willing to enforce strict rules 
for making connection compulsory and/or to subsidize connection costs for 
new customers.
Quality of Service
Quality of service can take various forms. This study focused on the perfor-
mance of water PPP projects for improving the continuity of water distribu-
tion (when a private operator took over a utility with intermittent service 
and water rationing) and for complying with drinking water standards.
Reductions in Water Rationing
Many water utilities in the developing world struggle with water rationing 
and low water pressure, usually because of massive water leaks in highly 
deteriorated networks. The poor are disproportionately affected. They tend 
to live in periurban areas on the edge of the distribution networks, where 
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service pressure is lower and water often arrives only for a few hours during 
the night. And they are less able to afford equipment, such as rooftop water 
tanks and fi lters, to mitigate the negative impact of intermittent supply.
The ability of a water utility to provide an uninterrupted supply of piped 
water is probably the most important determinant of the quality of service. 
Without service continuity, potability cannot be guaranteed because of the 
risk of external infi ltration and contamination in pipes. Water rationing 
lies at the root of the vicious circle of poor maintenance and service. Once 
rationing has become an established operating pattern, a network deterio-
rates faster because of repeated pressure surges. Attempts to restore con-
tinuous service often fail because any temporary gain in average pressure 
causes more pipe ruptures and seal failures, and hence, more water is lost 
to leaks. Because of this, utilities with deteriorated networks often adopt 
the short-term solution of reducing the number of hours of service to limit 
leaks, even though this practice produces poorer service to customers.
Reestablishing continuous supply once water rationing has been in place 
for many years is very diffi cult. Some public utilities in the developing world 
have succeeded in doing it, as in the cases of Phnom Penh (Cambodia) and 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), both of which received support from inter-
national fi nancial institutions. The review focuses on those PPP projects that 
started under conditions of water rationing and for which reliable data were 
available on the evolution of the average number of hours of service.
Reductions in Water Rationing through Concessions 
and Leases-Affermages
The widest body of evidence on the performance of long-term PPPs to 
reduce water rationing comes from Colombia, a country that offers a unique 
set of conditions for evaluating whether PPP projects can be effi cient in 
reducing water rationing: fi rst, rationing there is a widespread problem; 
second, private operators were introduced in the worst-performing utili-
ties; and third, data on service continuity are available from the regulator. 
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the average number of hours of service in 
10 PPP projects in Colombia that started under conditions of water ration-
ing. In all cases, strong progress was made, and service continuity was often 
reestablished after fi ve or six years. In the case of the PPP projects imple-
mented under the Programa de Modernización de Empresas (PME), the 
concessionaires started with more severe rationing but benefi ted from public 
grants to spearhead rehabilitation. The good performance of private opera-
tors for reducing water rationing in Colombia was confi rmed by fi ndings 
from national household surveys (Barrera and Olivera 2007; Gomez-Lobo 
and Melendez 2007).
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Apart from Colombia, few data are available from other Latin Ameri-
can countries on service continuity for long-term PPP projects. Many public 
utilities were providing continuous service before being transferred to pri-
vate operators (as in Chile, but also in La Paz, Bolivia’s capital). In Buenos 
Aires (Argentina), water shortages that had plagued the population during 
summer months were ended in the fi rst year the concessionaire took over 
(1993), and the overall improvement in service continuity was sustained 
over several years (Delfi no, Casarín, and Delfi no 2007).37 In Salta (Argen-
tina), the proportion of the population suffering intermittent service fell 
from 43 percent in 1998 to less than 10 percent by 2006. In Guayaquil 
(Ecuador), half of the population suffered from rationing when the conces-
sionaire took over in 2000, and little improvement had been made by 2005 
(Yepes 2007).
37.  Delfi no, Casarín, and Delfi no (2007) mention that the proportion of customers with 
appropriate water pressure jumped from 17 percent in 1993 to 60 percent in 1998, and to 
74 percent in 2003.
Figure 3.5 Evolution of Service Continuity in Selected PPPs in Colombia
(a) Average hours of service under 
PPP projects awarded in 1997–98
(b) Average hours of service under 
PPP projects awarded after 2000 
under the PME
Source: National regulator.
Note: The year following the city or town indicates the year the PPP project began operation. For the 
reader’s ease, the cases of Palmira (1998) and Girardot (1999) are not shown. In both these cases, water 
rationing was not initially as severe as in other cities and continuous service was reestablished in less 
than three years. 
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In Western Africa, the overall experience with continuity of service has 
been positive (Fall and others 2009). In Dakar (Senegal), the private opera-
tor started with an average of 16 hours per day, and continuous service was 
reestablished by 2006. The fact that it took a decade to achieve this result—
after combining investments in production capacity by the public asset-
holding company with leak reduction by the private operator—underlines 
the diffi culty of ending water rationing in a large and complex system while 
simultaneously expanding the population served. In Conakry (Guinea), con-
tinuous supply was reestablished within a few years of private operation 
but deteriorated again after the contract was concluded in 1998. In Niger, 
gradual progress was achieved in the capital, Niamey, from 2000 to 2006, 
improving from an average of 18 hours per day to 21 hours.
Few data were available from other regions. In Asia, the two conces-
sions in Manila (the Philippines) present a contrasting picture. The Eastern 
zone concessionaire started with a very poor situation in 1996, with about 
75 percent of its customers affected by water rationing. After a decade, it 
had reestablished continuous service for the whole concession area by 2006. 
In the Western zone concession, about 80 percent of the population received 
continuous service by 2001, but the situation rapidly deteriorated afterward 
as the concessionaire slid into bankruptcy; half of the customers suffered 
from intermittent service by 2005 when the contract was terminated. In 
Turkey, the lease contract in Antalya (serving 0.6 million) achieved a sizable 
reduction in rationing during its fi ve years of operation (from 16 to 21 hours 
of service per day on average), but the contract was terminated in 2002 fol-
lowing confl ict between the parties.
These achievements should be highlighted in the cases of Senegal; East 
Manila (the Philippines); and the Colombian cities of Cartagena, Barran-
quilla, Monteria, and Soledad. Not only was full continuous service reestab-
lished after starting from signifi cant rationing, but as was shown previously, 
these PPP projects simultaneously achieved very signifi cant increases in water 
coverage. If the Millennium Development Goal criteria for access to water 
were taken literally—by measuring coverage as access to safe water (that is, 
with continuous service) instead of just possession of a connection—the net 
improvements in access would be even greater.
Effectiveness of Management Contracts in Reducing Water Rationing
Another sample set is provided by management contracts, a signifi cant num-
ber of which were implemented in situations of water rationing. In these 
contracts, the evolution of the number of hours of service was often tracked 
closely, being one of the contractual targets used to determine the private 
operator’s remuneration. The performance of the 12 management contracts 
for which data were available is shown in fi gure 3.6. The fi gure compares 
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the average number of hours of service before the entry of the private opera-
tor with the level achieved by the contract end.
Although the methodology used for measuring the number of hours of 
service varies widely across contracts, a rather consistent pattern appears. 
Out of the 12 documented PPP projects that started with intermittent 
service and for which reliable before-and-after data were available, in 
10 cases water rationing was signifi cantly reduced by the end of the contract. 
Progress was particularly signifi cant in Mozambique,38 Monagas (República 
38.  The management contract in Mozambique covered four cities serving a combined popula-
tion of about half a million people (the same operator also runs the capital, Maputo, under a 
lease contract). Progress was particularly notable in the cities of Beira and Quelimane, where 
full, uninterrupted service had been reestablished by the end of the contract in early 2008, 
starting from an average of less than 10 hours per day before the PPP.
Figure 3.6 Gains in Service Continuity under 12 Management Contracts
Source: Author’s compilation of company or government project data.
Note: Years of private operation are indicated in parenthesis.
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Bolivariana de Venezuela), La Rioja (Argentina),39 and Yerevan (Armenia). 
Only in a few cases was no signifi cant improvement achieved: Trinidad and 
the Venezuelan state of Lara, to which should be added the cases of Chad 
and Guyana, which are not shown in fi gure 3.6 for lack of reliable data.40
Two cases deserve special notice. First, Yerevan (Armenia) typifi es the 
situation where water rationing results from a combination of high leaks 
and customers’ waste because of the absence of metering. When Yerevan’s 
management contract started in 2000, water was supplied for about six 
hours per day on average. The contract was designed so that the private 
operator would have access to a rehabilitation fund, with fl exibility to select 
and directly carry out priority civil works. Once the government had passed 
a law to aid in the installation of water meters for residential customers, a 
comprehensive installation campaign was carried out, together with network 
rehabilitation and repairs of buildings’ plumbing systems to reduce water 
losses. The continuity of service increased to 18 hours per day, exceeding 
the contract target by more than 25 percent, and by 2005, 70 percent of the 
population enjoyed continuous service.
Second, Uganda’s experience emphasizes that differences in system size 
prevent meaningful comparisons of performance between systems. The 
private operator improved the continuity of service in the capital, Kam-
pala, but faster progress was made in smaller towns, which had remained 
under public management (Mugisha and others 2007). This can largely be 
explained by the fact that smaller towns have distribution systems that work 
on simple hydraulics and are easier to fi x, something also attested to by 
the experiences of management contracts in Mozambique and Albania. In 
each of those countries, one private operator is operating in several cities of 
various sizes, and a much greater reduction in rationing could be achieved 
in small cities than in the two larger ones (Durres [Albania] and Maputo 
[Mozambique]).
Improved Compliance with Drinking Water Standards
The impact of PPP projects on the quality of water delivered is harder to 
assess than the impact on water rationing. The concept of potability involves 
the compliance of water samples with multiple chemical parameters. The 
methods used for water sampling (frequency, number, and relevance of sam-
pling points) can vary widely and have a major impact on the results. Reli-
able baseline data are typically not available, because many of the utilities 
39.  The PPP in La Rioja started as a management contract and evolved into a concession after 
year three.
40.  For the two PPPs for the national utilities in Chad and Guyana, no reliable before-and-
after data were available, but available information suggests that little progress, if any, was 
achieved in reducing water rationing as a result of the management contracts.
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transferred to private operators had not been previously conducting proper 
sampling and analysis. Meaningful project-specifi c data on the evolution of 
water potability in PPP projects are, therefore, hard to come by.
The few econometric studies that have looked at the impact of PPP 
projects on the quality of water delivered to customers all point to a clear 
positive impact. Andrés, Guasch, and others (2008) found that water pota-
bility in Latin America improved signifi cantly with the introduction of a 
private operator, in both the transition and the post-transition periods. In 
Colombia, using household and public health surveys, both Barrera and 
Olivera (2007) and Gomez-Lobo and Melendez (2007) found that PPP proj-
ects tended to achieve better potability fi gures than did public water utilities. 
In Argentina, Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) found that the child 
mortality rate fell in areas served by private operators.
The few data available in Latin America come from Argentina. Buenos 
Aires is one of the rare PPP projects for which reliable data are available on 
the yearly evolution of water potability for three key potability parameters 
(turbidity, chlorine, and bacteriology). As for access and service continu-
ity, the concessionaire performed well in early years. Before the concession 
began operating, only half of the water samples in Buenos Aires complied 
with turbidity standards, one-third had insuffi cient chlorine, and almost 
10 percent tested positive for fecal contamination. An overall compliance 
rate of more than 99 percent was achieved by the fourth year of private 
operation. However, Ducci (2007) reports that problems with water quality 
compliance started to occur after 2002 in Buenos Aires and also in the Santa 
Fe province concession. In Salta, the concessionaire has achieved gradual 
and consistent improvement in overall water potability in the various sys-
tems it has been operating in the province since 1998 (Yepes 2007).
In Manila (the Philippines), signifi cant improvements were achieved by 
both concessionaires after they took over from public management. In four 
years (1996–2000), the level of potability compliance went up from about 
96 percent to almost 100 percent, after a more stringent system of water 
quality monitoring was put in place under the control of the regulator. These 
improvements were sustained in later years, even in the Western zone, despite 
the concession going gradually into bankruptcy. Potability compliance in 
both concessions has averaged about 99 percent for the past seven years.
Positive performance was also registered for several PPPs in Western 
Africa. In Senegal and Niger, the improvement in water potability broadly 
followed the progress with service continuity. Potability compliance 
in Dakar went up from 95 percent in 1997 to 98 percent by 2001, and in 
Niamey it went from 96 percent to 98 percent in the fi rst four years. In 
Gabon, potability also improved after the start of the concession, with the 
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average turbidity index in Libreville falling from 2.5 to below 1.0. Finally, 
the population in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) has enjoyed safe tap water for 
decades, a notable exception in the subregion.
Operational Effi ciency
The analysis required to fully assess the operational effi ciency of a water 
utility—whether publicly or privately managed—is very complex, and 
undertaking individual effi ciency analyses for a comprehensive set of PPP 
projects would have obviously exceeded the scope of this study. The cost 
structure of a water utility is made up of many factors, and effi ciency gains 
can be achieved through different dimensions (such as changes in labor, 
leak reduction, or better use of chemicals or electricity) that involve mul-
tiple parameters. In most cases, information constraints limit the scope of 
analysis; for instance, analyzing the impact of energy and chemical use on 
a utility’s effi ciency cannot be done without disaggregated cost data, which 
are seldom available.
In practice, though, a large portion of a water supply company’s opera-
tional effi ciency can be captured by three key indicators—water losses, bill 
collection, and labor productivity—as follows:
• Water losses are a key cost element in most water utilities in developing coun-
tries. The non-revenue water (NRW) ratio is measured as the difference 
between the volume of water produced and of water billed to customers, 
divided by the volume of water produced. This ratio captures the effi ciency 
both of the distribution network (physical losses) and of commercial man-
agement (commercial losses due to metering and billing problems). The 
evolution of NRW is usually a good proxy for variable costs.
• The bill collection ratio directly affects the cash fl ow of the utility and 
captures a large portion of the effi ciency of commercial management.
• Labor productivity is a major input into an analysis of effi ciency, labor 
being usually the largest fi xed cost for a water utility.
These three indicators are discussed here in turn. The analysis of opera-
tional effi ciency is able to draw on a larger sample of PPPs than the analyses 
of access and quality could. Among long-term PPPs (divestitures, conces-
sions, leases-affermages, and mixed-ownership companies), 49 projects 
were reviewed, representing a combined population of more than 82 million 
people. A sample of 17 management contracts was reviewed, representing 
a combined population of more than 15 million people. These two samples 
combined represent close to 80 percent of the population served by long-
term PPP projects signed before 2003 (excluding Eastern Europe) and man-
agement contracts signed before 2005.
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Reductions in Water Losses
High water losses are a widespread problem in developing countries. They 
are made up of two elements—physical losses caused by leaks in the distri-
bution network, and commercial losses corresponding to water effectively 
delivered but not billed—both of which add to the operational costs of a 
water utility but are of a very different nature. A recent World Bank study 
estimated the full cost of water losses from urban water utilities in develop-
ing countries to be as much as US$5 billion per year (Kingdom, Liemberger, 
and Marin 2006).
Among published econometric studies on developing countries, only 
Andrés, Guasch, and others (2008) and Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) 
covered the impact of PPPs on water losses. Both studies found that the 
entry of a private operator signifi cantly reduced water losses.
Project-specifi c data on water losses can be diffi cult to analyze. Though 
physical and commercial losses differ and have different remedies, reliable 
segregated data are usually not available. The indicator most widely used 
to discuss the performance of a water utility with regard to water losses—
the NRW percentage—has limitations in practice and is not always the 
most appropriate indicator to assess the effi ciency of a distribution network 
(Kingdom, Liemberger, and Marin 2006).41 In general, data on water losses, 
and especially the baseline level when the private operator takes over, tend 
to be unreliable.42 Furthermore, in many countries, households are billed on 
the basis of consumption estimates (because of either low metering cover-
age or malfunctioning meters), making it very diffi cult to assess the actual 
level of water losses. Nonetheless, a clear picture can be drawn by looking 
at a large number of projects in various countries and regions. This study 
fi rst considers long-term PPPs in various countries and regions, and then 
analyzes the record of management contracts separately.
41.  Physical losses in a network are largely driven by the number of connections (a major 
source of leaks at pipe junctions), the overall pipe length, and the service pressure. Because 
both the number of connections and the network length are key structural factors, the Inter-
national Water Association (IWA) has been recommending complementing the widely used 
NRW percentage indicator with the average daily volume of water losses per connection or per 
kilometer of network.
42.  The public utilities that were transferred to private operators often lacked the proper frame-
work to calculate the level of water losses (owing to the absence of reliable macro-metering at 
production facilities, poor operational monitoring, and problems with the customer database, 
among other causes). In many cases, the baseline NRW level that had been estimated during the 
tender process was revealed to be grossly underestimated after the private operator had taken 
over and started to implement a proper measurement system.
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Reductions in Water Losses: The Case of Colombia
Colombia is one of the few countries in Latin America where billing of resi-
dential customers is largely based on actual metering instead of consump-
tion estimates, and the national regulator’s database contains a large sample 
of PPP projects. The evolution of the NRW indicator for the eight largest 
and/or oldest PPP projects, which represent more than half the Colombian 
population served by private operators, is shown in fi gure 3.7. The NRW 
level in the year when the private operator took over is compared with the 
level achieved in the last year of available data.
The assessment based on the NRW indicator is quite mixed. Strong gains 
were made in Monteria, Tunja, and Palmira, but the reduction seems to 
have been more modest in Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta, and 
no progress was achieved in Girardot or Soledad. However, using only the 
NRW percentage to gauge the evolution of water losses can be misleading in 
situations where major changes are made in the distribution network. This is 
the case especially when moving from intermittent to continuous service and 
expanding coverage—which is, indeed, what happened in the largest PPP 
projects in Colombia, as was discussed. For the three largest and oldest 
PPP projects, using the alternative indicator of water lost per connection pro-
vides a clearer picture of the performance for reducing water losses because 
it takes into account the major structural changes that took place due to 
system expansion. It shows that losses were more than halved in Cartagena 
and Barranquilla, and were reduced by 40 percent in Santa Marta. This was 
achieved while the average network pressure went up signifi cantly as service 
continuity was reestablished—emphasizing that major improvements were 
made in the hydraulics of the distribution networks.
Good Performance of PPPs in Reducing Water Losses in Morocco
Large municipal water utilities in Morocco concentrate on the distribution 
and commercial functions, purchasing water in bulk from the national util-
ity ONEP. Reliable data are available from the central government on the 
performance of both public and private providers.
The analysis compares the performance of four private concessions 
(Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and Tetouan) with that of the six larger 
municipal utilities (Marrakech, Fez, Agadir, Meknes, Kenitra, and Oujda) 
in reducing non-revenue water. Figure 3.8 shows that the four city water 
systems operated by private concessionaires all achieved a marked reduction 
in NRW.43 In the public utilities sample, Agadir stands out as an excellent 
43.  In Rabat, the level of NRW had initially deteriorated under the fi rst private operator, which 
had taken over in 1999. The data in the fi gure represent the evolution under the current opera-
tor, which replaced it in 2002. 
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities78
performer. Among the other fi ve public utilities, Fez’s was the only one to 
show an improvement over the past four years, but this improvement was 
much smaller than in the Tetouan concession, which started at a similarly 
high level of loss.
The reduction in water losses achieved by concessionaires in Morocco 
is even more evident from the evolution of the losses-per-connection 
Figure 3.7 Evolution of Water Losses under Eight PPPs, by NRW Level and 
Losses per Connections in Colombia 
Source: National regulator database.
(a) Changes in NRW percentage indicator 
(b) Daily losses per connection
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Figure 3.8 Water Losses under Private Operators and Public Utilities, 
by NRW Level in Morocco
Source: Morocco Ministry of Interior, Direction des Régies et Services Concédés (DRSC).
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indicator. The evolution of water losses in cubic meters per connection per 
day is shown in fi gure 3.9 for the same sample, putting public and pri-
vate utilities side by side using the same vertical scale. The concessions 
in Casablanca and Rabat were able to catch up with Agadir’s, the most 
effi cient public utility, and the concessions in Tangiers and Tetouan were 
performing better than any of the other public utilities except Agadir’s by 
the end of 2005.
Reductions in Water Losses in Sub-Saharan Africa
The performance of most of the Sub-Saharan African concessions and leases-
affermages that have at least two years of operation is shown in fi gure 3.10. 
Together, these PPP projects serve about 18 million people.
Most of these PPP projects signifi cantly reduced water losses. PPP projects 
in Gabon, Niger, and Senegal have achieved NRW levels below 20 percent, 
comparable with those in well-managed utilities in Western Europe and 
North America. In Côte d’Ivoire, where the private operator has been 
in place for more than four decades, NRW went up from 15 percent to 
23 percent between 1989 and 2006, but water losses per connection 
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(b) Water losses of six largest municipal 
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Figure 3.9 Evolution of Water Losses under Private Operators and Public Utilities, 
by Connections in Morocco
Source: Morocco Ministry of Interior, Direction des Régies et Services Concédés (DRSC).
(a) Water losses of four private 
concessionaires
Figure 3.10 Water Losses under Eight Long-Term PPPs, by NRW Level 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Author’s calculations based on various sources (see appendix A).
Note: Projects are listed in order of the year they began; data years are in parenthesis.
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remained stable, at 0.18 cubic meters per day. In South Africa, PPP projects 
achieved notable NRW reductions in the three cases for which data were 
available (Palmer Development Group 2003).44
Guinea and Maputo (Mozambique) stand out as two cases where a lease-
affermage contract failed to reduce NRW levels after several years of private 
operation. In Guinea, this can be linked to diffi culties in the implementation 
of the investment program by the public asset-holding company, as well as 
a lack of contractual incentives for the private operator—a feature that was 
corrected in the design of the subsequent affermage in Senegal (box 3.3). In 
Maputo, the PPP project had experienced diffi culties since its inception, and 
the implementation of the rehabilitation program was seriously delayed. 
Dealing with a high level of commercial losses has been a special challenge: 
less than half of the residential customers are metered, and many sell large 
volumes of water to their neighbors but are billed for only 10 cubic meters 
per month.
Reductions in Water Losses in Latin America
The performance of private operators in reducing water losses has been 
quite diverse across Latin American countries. The case of Colombia was 
already presented. Elsewhere in the region it is not uncommon for utilities 
to rely—at least partly—on estimates to bill households, making it diffi cult 
to track the actual evolution of water losses. This is especially the case in 
Argentina, where households often can choose whether to have their con-
sumption metered, with unmetered customers billed using formulas based 
on housing characteristics that have no link to actual consumption. In 
Buenos Aires (Argentina) for instance, only 12 percent of residential custom-
ers had meters in 1998, so the NRW fi gure is not representative—although in 
this case, some evidence suggests that the concessionaire did reduce leaks.45 
Given the limitations of available data, no meaningful conclusions could be 
drawn about loss reductions under the other Argentine concessions.
Figure 3.11 presents the evolution of NRW for 14 large concessions and 
divestures in Brazil (Manaus, Tocantins, Campo Grande, Campos, Limeira, 
Paranagua, Petropolis, Itapemirim, and Prolagos), Bolivia (La Paz–El Alto), 
44.  The largest lease contract in South Africa is for the city of Queenstown, serving a popula-
tion of 180,000 people in 2007. The lease in Stutterheim and the concession in Dolphin Coast 
were for smaller systems serving fewer than 50,000 people each. No data could be found in 
existing publications on the evolution of NRW in the Nelspruit concession (270,000 people, 
active since 1999) or the Fort Beaufort lease (1995–2000).
45.  Between 1992 and 1998, the number of connections increased by 20 percent while water 
production went up by only 4 percent (Alcazar, Abdala, and Shirley 2000), which is unlikely to 
have happened without signifi cant reduction in physical losses. And for the period 1999–2003, 
Casarín, Delfi no, and Delfi no (2007) report that, overall, leaks went down from 1.45 million 
cubic meters per day to 1.23 million cubic meters.
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Box 3.3 
Introducing Special Incentives for Effi ciency in Affermages in Western Africa
The affermage in Guinea (1989) was the fi rst PPP to be awarded in a devel-
oping country in decades. Its performance in reducing NRW and improving 
the bill collection ratio was unsatisfactory. One key lesson from its imple-
mentation was that the incentives for operational effi ciency that are 
contained in a standard affermage contract were insuffi cient to foster 
good operational performance from the private operator.
Building on this lesson, designers of the Senegal affermage, which 
was awarded in 1996, included specifi c contractual targets for NRW reduc-
tion as well as bill collection, backed by fi nancial penalties for noncompli-
ance. The operator’s remuneration is not simply based on a fee per cubic 
meter multiplied by the volume of water actually sold and collected; it 
is determined by a notional sales volume based on the amount of water 
actually produced, factored by predetermined annual targets for NRW and 
collection rates. Whenever the operator fell short of the NRW and bill col-
lection targets, the notional sales volume would be lower than the actual 
sales, penalizing the operator. This adaptation of the affermage scheme 
introduced specifi c contractual targets that are, in fact, more typical of a 
management contract.
Another innovation in Senegal’s PPP was that the private operator 
was made responsible for directly carrying out a portion of the network’s 
rehabilitation. This included replacing 17 kilometers of pipe, 14,000 water 
meters, and 6,000 connections each year, to be fi nanced by the operator 
through cash fl ow from its operating fee. This approach provided the opera-
tor with more fl exibility to identify and rapidly carry out actions to reduce 
water losses, reducing its dependency on the public asset-holding company.
These adaptations proved effective in bolstering the incentives for the 
private operator to control and reduce water losses. Senegal has now 
achieved a level of NRW comparable to that of the best water utilities in 
Western Europe. This approach was broadly replicated in the Niger affer-
mage contract, which started in 2001, as well as in the affermage for the 
national water utility in Cameroon that was awarded in 2007. Both use 
the same incentive formula for calculating the operator’s remuneration. 
The Niger affermage also made the operator responsible for carrying out 
the replacement of 64 kilometers of pipes, to be fi nanced directly out of its 
revenues during the fi rst fi ve years.
Source: Fall and others 2009.
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Chile (Santiago, Valparaiso, and ESSBIO), and Ecuador (Guayaquil). This 
sample of PPP projects represents a combined population served of 17 mil-
lion people. In Brazil, with the notable exception of Manaus,46 most large 
PPPs signifi cantly reduced NRW levels. Limeira even stands out for achiev-
ing an NRW level of only 13 percent, comparable to the best utilities in 
developed countries. NRW also went down in La Paz–El Alto and Guaya-
quil, but the improvement was only marginal.
Chile presents a peculiar situation. Water losses increased after the trans-
fer to private operators, with NRW going up at the national level from 
29 percent to 34 percent between 1999 and 2006. In Santiago (5.5 million 
people), which has about 40 percent of Chile’s urban population, NRW 
went up from 26 percent to 31 percent in that period. Several other utilities 
also saw their NRW rise by several percentage points. This is paradoxi-
cal, because it is widely considered that most Chilean private utilities are 
46.  The metering ratio in Manaus stood at only 61 percent in 2006, so the NRW fi gure is not 
quite representative of actual losses.
Figure 3.11 Evolution of Water Losses under 14 PPPs, by NRW Level in Latin America 
Source: National regulators (see appendix A).
Note: Not all cases have data available starting from year of takeover by the private operator.
ESSBIO (Empresa de Servicios Sanitarios del Bío Bío) is a water utility in Chile.
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well-managed (Bitran and Arellano 2005). Part of the reason for the rise 
in the NRW percentage could be the expansion of the system—something 
suggested by the fact that, when measured using alternative indicators, the 
increase in water losses is rather small.47 Another explanation may lie in 
the concept of “optimal level of leakage” (box 3.4). Reducing NRW is not 
a goal in itself, and it is possible that Chilean public utilities, which had 
achieved major improvements in operational indicators during the 1990s, 
may have reduced losses to below the optimal economic level. Under an effi -
cient regulatory framework, a profi t-seeking operator should be expected 
to economically optimize the level of leaks, and this can mean sometimes 
letting them go up if the cost of investing in further leak reduction activities 
exceeds the associated fi nancial benefi ts (Ducci and Medel 2007).
Reductions in Water Losses in Asia
The performance of Asia’s seven largest and oldest concessions in reducing 
NRW levels is shown in fi gure 3.12. The performance of concessionaires in 
Asia appears quite diverse, illustrating the fact that to succeed in reducing 
water losses when starting with a highly deteriorated network, both techni-
cal expertise and access to suffi cient fi nancing for rehabilitation investment 
are called for.
The concession in Macao stands out as a very good performer, with NRW 
at only 12 percent, while the case of the concessions in Manila (the Philippines) 
and Jakarta (Indonesia) illustrates that, in a badly deteriorated network, an 
operator cannot signifi cantly reduce water losses without major investments 
in rehabilitation. The two concessions in Jakarta had a series of diffi culties 
that limited their access to fi nancing, and water losses have remained high 
after almost a decade of private operation. In Western Manila, the concession 
was never fi nancially healthy, sliding gradually into bankruptcy until it was 
terminated and awarded to a different private consortium, and water losses 
remained high after a decade. In contrast, the concessionaire in the Eastern 
zone signifi cantly reduced its NRW level, but progress started only after the 
2002 tariff-rate rebasing that restored fi nancial equilibrium. The resulting 
increase in revenues then enabled the concessionaire to undertake a major 
program of leak reduction and thereby reduce NRW from 51 percent to 
30 percent in just three years (Navarro 2007).
47.  Nationwide, the number of customers in Chile went up from 3.3 million to 4.0 million 
between 1999 and 2006, while the network expanded from 30,000 kilometers to 36,000 ki-
lometers. Water losses per kilometer increased from 34 cubic meters per day to 38 cubic me-
ters, and from 300 liters per customer per day to 330 liters. When the 1998 data are used as 
reference instead of that of 1999, water losses appear stable. In at least the case of the utility 
ESSBIO, water losses decreased in 2000–06 when measured by these two indicators. 
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Box 3.4 
The Concept of the Economically Optimal Level of Leakage: 
Illustration from Chile
Water leaks in a large and complex distribution network cannot be totally 
eliminated. For each network, there is an optimal level of physical losses, 
which corresponds to the point at which the incremental fi nancial benefi t 
from further loss reductions is lower than the corresponding cost. This opti-
mal level varies considerably among utilities, depending on their specifi c 
situation and cost structure (particularly production costs and whether the 
network is gravity-fed or uses reboosting stations). In a long-term conces-
sion in which the private operator has control over investment and starts 
with a high level of leaks, it is usually profi table to invest in leak reduction. 
But many public utilities have achieved good technical results in reducing 
leaks. In such a case, when the utility is transferred to a concessionaire, 
the issue becomes not just technical but also economic, because a conces-
sionaire is usually much more motivated than a public operator by fi nancial 
incentives. Even though the concessionaire might have the expertise to 
reduce losses further, investing in leak reduction activities might just not be 
the most economical option, depending on each situation.
This may be the situation in Chile, whose overall level of NRW increased 
from 29 percent to 34 percent nationwide between 1999 and 2006, even 
though there is widespread agreement that the water services have been 
operated effi ciently under the supervision of a capable regulator. Because 
the regulator’s methodology for setting tariffs relies on a model company 
that has a 15 percent level of NRW (lower than that achieved by most 
utilities), these increases in NRW have not been passed on to customers 
through higher tariffs and have, therefore, directly affected the operational 
margin of the operators (Ducci and Medel 2007). Faced with such incen-
tives, several private companies may have decided to let leaks increase until 
they reached the economically optimal level the companies had calculated.
Performance of Management Contracts In Reducing Water Losses
For 14 management contracts, fi gure 3.13 compares the NRW level at the 
entry of the private operator with the NRW level achieved at the end of the 
contract. These projects represent a combined population served of close 
to 15 million people (about 75 percent of the population in developing and 
transition countries who have been served for at least three years by private 
operators under management contracts).
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities86
Figure 3.12 Water Losses under Seven PPPs, by NRW Level in Southeast Asia 
Source: Regulator or company data.
before start PPP last year of data
M
ac
ao
, C
hi
na
 
(1
98
2–
89
)
Ea
st 
M
an
ila
, t
he
 P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s 
(1
99
7–
20
06
)
W
es
t M
an
ila
, t
he
 P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s 
(1
99
7–
20
06
)
W
es
t J
ak
ar
ta
, I
nd
on
es
ia
 
(1
99
8–
20
05
)
Ba
ta
m
 Is
la
nd
, I
nd
on
es
ia
 
(1
99
5–
20
05
)
Ea
st 
Ja
ka
rta
, I
nd
on
es
ia
 
(1
99
8–
20
05
)
Jo
ho
r, M
al
ay
sia
 
(2
00
3–
06
)
80
60
40
20
0
40
27
4950
58
53
59
30
52
6666
12
38
32
%
 N
RW
Figure 3.13 Water Losses under 14 Management Contracts, by NRW Level
Source: Author’s calculations based on various sources (see appendix A).
Notes: Years of operation are indicated in parenthesis.
Ye
re
va
n,
 A
rm
en
ia
 (5
)
Ko
so
vo
 (4
)
M
on
ag
as
, V
en
ez
ue
la
, R
.B
. d
e 
(4
)
La
 R
io
ja
, A
rg
en
tin
a 
(3
)
Am
m
an
, J
or
da
n 
(6
)
Ga
za
 C
ity
, W
es
t B
an
k 
an
d 
Ga
za
 (7
)
Za
m
bi
a 
(4
)
La
ra
, V
en
ez
ue
la
, R
.B
. d
e 
(3
)
Ga
bo
n 
(4
)
before start of management contract by the end of the management contract
90
75
60
45
30
15
0
Tri
ni
da
d 
(4
)
Ch
ad
 (3
)
Ka
m
pa
la
, U
ga
nd
a 
(3
)
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
(4
)
Jo
ha
nn
es
bu
rg
, S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
 (5
)
%
 N
RW
 
87Performance and Impact of Water PPP Projects
The overall performance of management contracts in reducing NRW 
levels has been mixed at best. Among the 14 contracts for which data were 
gathered, fewer than half achieved a sizable reduction (Gaza City in West 
Bank and Gaza, Kosovo, Zambia, La Rioja province in Argentina, Monagas 
state in República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and Amman in Jordan). No 
signifi cant change occurred in fi ve other cases (Gabon, Trinidad, Lara state 
in República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Johannesburg in South Africa, and 
Kampala in Uganda), and in three cases the NRW level even deteriorated 
(Chad, Mozambique, and Yerevan in Armenia).
This lackluster result is not entirely surprising, considering the short 
duration and inherent limitations of management contracts. Such arrange-
ments are better adapted to dealing with commercial losses (which have a 
rapid payback and require little investment), than with situations where 
most of the losses come from physical leaks (which usually require large 
investments and pipe repairs over many years). The diversity of outcomes 
probably refl ects the diversity of the situations encountered, as well as the 
specifi c design of each contract.
An important element to consider is the correlation between water losses 
and service continuity. In a system in which water distribution has been sub-
ject to rationing but in which the average number of hours of service is gradu-
ally being increased, the average pressure in the network also tends to go 
up. The higher pressure generates new pipe breaks and more water losses 
unless signifi cant rehabilitation and improvement in network hydraulics take 
place simultaneously. This situation has practical consequences for evaluat-
ing the performance of an operator: in situations where service continuity is 
being improved, the evolution of the NRW indicator does not fully capture 
the actual effort for improving the network’s hydraulic functioning and for 
controlling leaks.48 In that regard, it is signifi cant that many of the manage-
ment contracts reviewed in the study were in such situations, starting under 
conditions of water rationing and achieving notable improvements in service 
continuity. This makes interpreting NRW data difi cult. 
A detailed analysis of the situation of each project would go beyond the 
scope of this study, but a few cases illustrate the complexity of analyzing the 
evolution of NRW in specifi c projects.
48.  For example, in a situation of intermittent service, an operator can easily reduce the NRW 
level by just reducing the number of  service hours, which also directly reduces the average pipe 
pressure and, hence, the amount of leakages. Because improving the number of service hours 
also increases the average pressure in the distribution network, even maintaining NRW levels 
under such conditions supposes that the operator takes active actions to control leakages and 
to improve the network hydraulic.
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In Johannesburg (South Africa), the responsibility for NRW reduction 
was shared between the private operator and the city under a complex 
framework. No progress was made in reducing NRW levels under the man-
agement contract, but a closer look at the situation shows that physical 
leaks in most of the network stood at only 15 percent, and the largest source 
of losses came from huge wastage by customers in the townships (whose 
consumption was not metered). The partners started to address this sensi-
tive issue only in the last two years of the contract, which ended before siz-
able results could be felt (Marin, Mas, and Palmer 2009).
The management contract in Yerevan (Armenia) focused on switching 
from estimated to metered billing for residential customers and on reestab-
lishing continuous service—something it largely achieved. The NRW level 
went up signifi cantly, as a result of both the increase in average network 
pressure and a 150 percent drop in billed volumes. But reducing water losses 
was not a priority objective: the management contract focused fi rst on rees-
tablishing continuous service.
The case of Amman (Jordan) is particularly important because one of the 
priorities of this management contract was to reduce water losses. The util-
ity faced acute water scarcity, and the contract was carried out in parallel 
with a major network rehabilitation program fi nanced by donors. The exe-
cution of the investment program, which was essential for reducing water 
losses, was the responsibility of a government agency. The implementation 
of the management contract proved complex, with repeated delays in com-
pleting civil works and several contractual adjustments. It offers important 
lessons regarding the need for smooth coordination between the partners 
for the implementation of civil works, as well as for realistic contractual 
targets (box 3.5).
Improvements in Bill Collection
It is widely accepted that private operators are usually effi cient in collect-
ing bills, for the simple reason that they are profi t oriented and collecting 
bills directly affects their fi nancial results. The rate of bill collection can be 
improved either by enforcing stricter collection policies or by improving 
service quality, which, in turn, increases customers’ willingness to pay their 
bills. In reviewing trends in bill collection, however, one often fi nds it dif-
fi cult to tell which of these elements has played a greater role.
How much a private operator can increase the rate of bill collection obvi-
ously depends on the starting level, but it is also infl uenced by cultural and 
country-specifi c issues. In Senegal, for instance, the population had a strong 
tradition of paying their water bills, and the collection ratio was already 
very good when the private operators took over. Elsewhere, private opera-
tors often have to face well-entrenched habits of nonpayment of water bills 
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Box 3.5 
Reducing Water Losses by Combining a Management Contract 
with Large Rehabilitation Work in Amman, Jordan
The management contract in Amman illustrates the diffi culty of assessing 
the contribution of the private operator in a management contract. The 
PPP was just one element of a major investment project (about US$200 
million) to completely rehabilitate Amman’s water distribution network. 
The plan was to move from a poorly designed hydraulic system to one with 
well-delineated zones that are gravity fed through reservoirs. The manage-
ment contract was supposed to ensure that an experienced operator would 
be in place so that this major structural change could be handled smoothly, 
reducing service disruptions and maximizing operational benefi ts from the 
new infrastructure.
There was acute water rationing in the city (customers received water 
for less than four hours per day on average), and reducing water losses was 
a top priority of the program, but it depended both on the rehabilitation 
program implemented by the government and on operational improve-
ments to be made by the private operator. These dual responsibilities 
were not clearly acknowledged in the original drafting of the contract. 
In addition, ambitious targets were imposed on the operator, backed by 
swift fi nancial penalties: the NRW level was to be reduced by 10 percent-
age points in the fi rst year of operation, down to 25 percent water loss 
(broadly halving the NRW level) by the end of year four.
Diffi culties started early on, as the government agency in charge of 
implementing the civil works experienced major contract delays. Further 
delays arose during execution as a result of the complexity of coordinating 
the work of many contractors. After tense discussions in the fi rst two years, 
it was recognized that the private operator could not be held liable for 
failing to meet the contractual NRW targets and that the targets had been 
overestimated. A special project monitoring unit was also set up to help the 
government better play its role as counterpart in the partnership.
As the program proceeded, another problem occurred: with the gradual 
reduction in water rationing, the increase in average network pressure 
caused a jump in the number of water leaks. The operator had to repair as 
many as 55,000 leaks in 2004. By the end of the contract, it had replaced 
on its own about 600 kilometers of pipe, or close to 10 percent of the 
whole network. The management contract was extended twice in order to 
(continued)
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or a variety of legal impediments that prevent them from enforcing payment. 
This can make progress diffi cult. A culture of nonpayment usually develops 
in reaction to many years of poor service, and achieving a behavioral change 
in the population takes time.
Improvements in Collection Rates in Latin America
Latin America presents the largest sample of PPPs with available data on 
bill collections, giving the opportunity to observe differences among several 
countries. Figure 3.14 shows the increase in bill collection ratio achieved 
after a few years of private operation in 16 large concessions, leases, and 
divestitures (representing a combined served population of 28 million).
Performance has been quite diverse across countries. Signifi cant prog-
ress was made in just a few years by several PPP projects in Brazil (Campo 
Grande, Campos, Limeira, Niteroi, Manaus, and Tocantins) and Colom-
bia (Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Monteria), as well as in La Paz–El Alto 
(Bolivia) and Guayaquil (Ecuador). In Chile, most regional public utili-
ties had already achieved high rates of bill collection, and collection ratios 
have usually remained at above 97 percent since the transfer (Valparaiso 
Box 3.5
Reducing Water Losses by Combining a Management Contract 
with Large Rehabilitation Work in Amman, Jordan (continued)
keep the private operator in place until the end of the capital expenditure 
program in 2006. By the end of the contract, NRW had been reduced from 
51 percent to 42 percent. This was a notable improvement, even though it 
fell far below the original target. At the same time, the average number of 
hours of service was doubled.
Important lessons can be learned from this case. Though the parties 
fi nally agreed that the original NRW target of 25 percent was unrealistic, 
their protracted negotiations on this subject distracted them in the early 
years from focusing on more productive tasks. Tracking the operator’s 
performance was made diffi cult by its dependency on the government’s 
timely execution of the investment program. Finally, the hydraulics of the 
network were being profoundly altered, so that the basic reference point 
for measuring leaks was, in fact, constantly changing. In such a context, 
using the NRW percentage as the sole contractual indicator of the opera-
tor’s performance to track water losses and impose stiff fi nancial penalties 
appears, in retrospect, to have been a mistake.
Source: El-Nasser 2007.
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was an outlier, allowing the private operator to make sizable gains). In 
Argentina, the performance of concessionaires in improving the collection 
ratio has been rather disappointing. Ducci (2007) indicates that only mod-
erate improvement was achieved in Buenos Aires (up from 90 percent to 
94 percent in seven years) and none in Santa Fe (still at only 80 percent by 
2001). The concessionaire in the Argentine provinces of Salta, La Rioja, 
and Corrientes also encountered diffi culties, as it was not allowed to cut off 
service in cases of nonpayment (Yepes 2007).
It is notable that many PPP projects that achieved signifi cant gains still 
had collection rates below 90 percent or even 80 percent after several years 
of private operation. This is the case especially in Colombia, even though in 
the three cases mentioned above the private operators have performed very 
well on other dimensions. This illustrates how long it can take to change a 
culture of nonpayment. In the successful case of Cartagena, the operator 
achieved a satisfactory ratio of 95 percent only after a decade of sustained 
service improvements.
Figure 3.14 Increases in Bill Collection Ratio under PPPs in Latin America 
Source: Author’s calculation based on public sources (appendix A).
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Bill Collection from Various Customer Categories in Sub-Saharan Africa
The performance of private operators in Western Africa for collecting bills 
presents a special picture. The collection of bills from residential customers 
has often far outpaced the overall collection rate, due to frequent diffi culties 
in collecting bills from government agencies.
Several private operators have had good success in the region in collect-
ing bills from domestic customers. In Senegal, the level of bill payment by 
residential customers was already at 98 percent under public management, 
and this was maintained under private management. In Niger, the collection 
rate from households improved from 93 percent at the start of the affer-
mage contract in 2001 to 97 percent in 2006. Good collection rates were 
also achieved from residential customers in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. A few 
PPP projects performed poorly: no progress was achieved in Guinea over a 
decade of private operation, with the collection ratio for residential custom-
ers remaining at about 60 percent; and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) is a rare 
case in which the residential bill collection rate went down after the private 
operator took over (that contract was terminated in its second year).
The high collection rates achieved in several cases are probably linked to 
the fact that in many of these countries only the richer portion of the urban 
population has access to piped water through a household connection; the 
poorest families use community standpipes or purchase water from neigh-
bors and, therefore, do not get monthly water bills. This is well-illustrated 
by the experience in Senegal, which has the highest coverage through house-
hold connections in the region (79 percent in 2006) thanks to the implemen-
tation of a large subsidized connection program. Senegal’s high collection 
rate from residential customers conceals the fact that the rate of disconnec-
tion has been in the range of 10 to 15 percent in recent years—meaning that, 
in practice, a sizable proportion of the poor households who benefi ted from 
the subsidized connection program ended up being disconnected at some 
time (most of these households still access piped water by purchasing it from 
neighbors). A similar phenomenon has been observed in Côte d’Ivoire.
A major issue in all water PPP projects in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
the serious diffi culty of collecting bills from public buildings and govern-
ment agencies, which typically represent a sizable portion of the revenues of 
water utilities in the region. Erratic payment by public customers has been 
a recurrent problem, even in an erstwhile successful PPP such as Senegal’s. 
Private operators are ill equipped to collect bills from accounts that ulti-
mately belong to their contractual partners, and donors regularly have had 
to step in and remind governments of their contractual obligations. Special 
mechanisms have been developed gradually to mitigate the problem. In Sen-
egal, the operator can now appeal directly to the Ministry of Finance, which 
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directly intervenes in the case of nonpayment by a public agency. In Niger, a 
system of advance payments has been put in place, with estimated monthly 
bills for all public agencies paid every month by the Finance Ministry, sub-
ject to adjustment at year’s end.
South Africa presents a special situation. During the apartheid years, 
nonpayment of utility bills by township residents was widely viewed as an 
act of civil resistance and became the norm. This behavior has continued 
since the end of apartheid; it affects all water utilities and has proved very 
hard to change. Because of social sensitivities, lease contracts (such as those 
in Queenstown and Stutterheim) were designed with the peculiarity of leav-
ing the responsibility for bill collection to the municipal government. As for 
concessions, the largest one in Nelspruit experienced major diffi culties in 
collecting bills, with the collection ratio going down to less than 30 percent, 
while the one in Dolphin Coast was more successful, going up from 
75 percent to 97 percent in four years (Palmer 2003).
Improvements in Bill Collection under Most Management Projects
Most management contracts have performed well in improving bill collec-
tion. Although the bills received by customers are still issued by a pub-
licly owned utility, the sharing of responsibility between the government 
and private operator for bill collection has varied among contracts. For the 
15 management contracts for which data were available, fi gure 3.15 com-
pares the bill collection ratio before the entry of the private operator with 
the one at the end of the contract.
Bill collection seems to be the dimension of performance in which man-
agement contracts have been most consistently effective. All documented 
management contracts have resulted in sizable improvements in bill collec-
tion in a relatively short time. These improvements were often accompanied 
by improvements in service quality (continuity of supply and/or customer 
service), as happened in Albania, Gaza City (West Bank and Gaza), Zambia, 
Amman (Jordan), Kampala (Uganda), La Rioja (Argentina), and Yerevan 
(Armenia). But there are also cases such as Guyana and Trinidad where the 
collection ratio was improved despite little objective improvement in service 
quality, suggesting that the main reason there was stricter enforcement.
In Gaza City and Amman, notable improvements were achieved through 
a combination of stricter enforcement, extensive education campaigns, close 
collaboration between the operator and public authorities, and sizable grad-
ual improvements in service quality. In Amman, the collection rate started 
at 83 percent. Improvement in the fi rst two years came from stricter collec-
tion policies, but the rate still kept rising afterward as progress was made 
on reducing water rationing and improving customer service. After seven 
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years of private operation, the contract ended in 2006 with a collection rate 
at 97 percent (El-Nasser 2007). In Gaza City, bill collection went up from 
63 percent in 1996 to 78 percent in 2000. However, the sharp degradation 
of general conditions in Gaza City after 2001 made bill collection policies 
diffi cult to enforce. The management contract ended with a collection ratio 
at 53 percent, a level even lower than when it took over the utility (Jme’an 
and Al-Jamal 2004).
The most spectacular improvement was achieved in Yerevan, with the 
collection rate going up from less than 20 percent to 80 percent in fi ve years. 
This was achieved through close collaboration between the operator and the 
government, and in parallel with sizable improvements in service quality 
(box 3.6).
Figure 3.15 Improvements in the Bill Collection Ratio under 15 Management 
Contracts 
Source: Author’s calculations based on various sources (appendix A).
Note: Years of operation are indicated in parenthesis. For Gaza City, the data are for the period 
up to 2000.
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Box 3.6 
The Management Contract: Remarkable Success in Improving 
Bill Collection in Yerevan, Armenia
The case of the management contract in Yerevan illustrates the link 
between improvement in service quality and the collection ratio, as well 
as the need for government to support the private operator with proper 
policy initiatives. The collection rate started at a very low level of 19 per-
cent. Initial efforts to improve bill payment resulted in some improvement, 
but by 2002, more than half of the billed revenues still went uncollected.
Changes in customer behavior and more improvements in the rate of 
payment did not begin until the government issued a decree (in 2002) 
that allowed the operator to disconnect nonpaying customers and passed 
a law that included provisions for partial forgiveness of customer debts in 
return for individual meter installation. Many households then accepted 
the installation of meters and negotiated a partial repayment of bills in 
arrears. This boosted the collection ratio in 2003, which was sustained as 
service continuity was gradually restored in most parts of the city. All this 
was complemented by education campaigns and specifi c actions to repair 
leaks in apartment buildings. The result of all these actions was remarkable: 
the collection rate stood at about 80 percent at the end of the manage-
ment contract, a fourfold increase over the pre-PPP level, refl ecting a major 
behavioral change in the population and a real shift in perceptions of the 
value of water supply and sanitation services.
Sources: Mugabi and Marin 2008; World Bank project reports.
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Productivity and Labor Issues
Workforce issues are important elements of water PPP projects, and falling 
employment levels have been a key concern of opponents of private partici-
pation in water utilities. Findings from Andrés, Guasch, and others (2008) 
and Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a) confi rm that introducing a private 
water operator usually results in lower staffi ng levels and higher labor pro-
ductivity. This raises a dilemma: workers are assets, and governments and 
donors cannot ignore social issues linked to downsizing. But labor costs are 
also a major component of utility costs, so productivity cannot be ignored 
either, regardless of whether a utility is privately or publicly managed. Fur-
thermore, moving from public to private management often entails a major 
change in corporate culture, affecting staffi ng and salary levels, job quali-
fi cations, work rules, and promotion practices. For the provision of better 
and more effi cient services, it is often necessary to replace staff members 
who have limited or no qualifi cations with others who are more qualifi ed, 
making some redundancies unavoidable.
Private Operators, Labor Productivity, and Employment Levels
The evolution of the labor productivity ratio—calculated as the number of 
staff members per thousand customers—was examined for 17 large long-
term PPPs, starting from the time the private operator took over (fi gure 
3.16). Most private operators have signifi cantly improved the labor produc-
tivity ratio, usually by combining a reduction in the number of staff with an 
expansion in the customer base through coverage expansion. Not surpris-
ingly, smaller gains were achieved where the productivity ratio was initially 
better, such as in Chile, Barranquilla (Colombia), Guayaquil (Ecuador), and 
Salta (Argentina).
In several cases, preparing for the transition to a water PPP involved 
layoffs carried out beforehand by the government, in an attempt to make 
the partnerships more attractive to private operators. This was especially so 
in the most obvious cases of overstaffi ng—an issue the private sector was 
reluctant to deal with directly because of the social sensitivity involved. Such 
layoffs are not refl ected in fi gure 3.16.
To present a fuller picture of what happened as a result of a PPP process, 
fi gure 3.17 shows the total layoffs that took place for 10 large PPP projects 
in Latin America. The fi gure combines the layoffs initiated by the contract-
ing government in the 12 months before the award of the contract with 
those that were carried out directly by the private operator in the year (or 
sometimes two years) after the takeover. In at least a few documented cases, 
the unions negotiated generous packages (Chile, Buenos Aires [Argentina], 
and Guayaquil [Ecuador]).
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Figure 3.16 Evolution of the Labor Productivity Ratio for 17 Large PPPs 
Source: Author’s calculation based on public data or consultants’ reports (appendix A).
Notes: The fi gure compares the ratio in the fi rst and last years of available data, or year 10 for PPPs that 
have been in place for a longer period. The labor productivity ratio for year one corresponds to when the 
private operator took over. In several cases important layoffs had already taken place before the signing 
of the contract (as in Buenos Aires, Guayaquil, and Manila). The Casablanca fi gure includes staff for both 
water and electricity.
ESSBIO (Empresa de Servicios Sanitarios del Bío Bío) is a water utility in Chile.
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Figure 3.17 confi rms that several water PPP projects have been accom-
panied by massive initial layoffs of utility staff. In the documented 
sample, the layoffs ranged from about minus 25 percent in Salta (Argentina), 
Barranquilla (Colombia), and Santiago (Chile) to as much as minus 65 percent 
in Cartagena (Colombia).
These layoffs were, in large measure, justifi ed by overstaffi ng, which came 
as a result of years of political interference and clientelism. The variations in 
the magnitude of downsizing can be largely explained by how much excess 
staffi ng existed before the reform. In Cartagena, where labor productivity 
stood at the dismal ratio of 15 employees per 1,000 customers in 1994, 
two-thirds of the staff were made redundant. In Buenos Aires, the state-
owned utility OSN (Obras Sanitarias de la Nación) had about 8,000 employ-
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ees, equivalent to a labor productivity ratio of 9 per 1,000 customers, and 
work practices were notoriously poor (Idelovitch and Ringskog 1995). Bar-
ranquilla had a different situation, because a signifi cant staff reduction had 
already been carried out gradually over the previous fi ve years under public 
management. The labor productivity ratio stood at a more reasonable 5.5 
employees per 1,000 customers in 1996, so the downsizing that was needed 
during the PPP process was more modest. However, in the case of Chile, 
signifi cant layoffs still took place even though the labor productivity was 
already satisfactory when the private operators took over.
It is noteworthy that after the initial staffi ng adjustments were made, 
the number of employees of the documented PPP projects usually rose or 
remained stable. This result occurred partly because suitably qualifi ed per-
sonnel had to be recruited after the initial layoffs, and partly because many 
PPP projects rapidly increased access to previously unserved customers. 
With larger customer bases, further productivity gains could be made with-
out having to resort to further layoffs. In Buenos Aires, after the sharp initial 
decrease, total staffi ng actually increased by 450 employees during the fi rst 
Source: Author’s calculation based on various sources.
Note: ESSBIO (Empresa de Servicios Sanitarios del Bío Bío) is a water utility in Chile.
Figure 3.17 Employment Reduction Associated with Implementation of 
10 Large PPPs in Latin America
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four years. The same situation was observed in Guayaquil, associated with 
the fast expansion of coverage there (the number of water connections went 
up by 65 percent in the fi rst fi ve years).
In practice, downsizing has been concentrated mostly in Latin America, 
although it also occurred in Manila (the Philippines), where staffi ng levels 
were reduced by about 40 percent. Elsewhere, a number of projects dealt 
gradually with excess staffi ng, through natural attrition. This occurred in 
several PPP projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Senegal and Gabon, modest 
reductions in staffi ng of only 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively, took 
place over a decade, and in Niger, staffi ng levels have thus far been unaf-
fected. Reductions were modest, too, in Maputo, Casablanca, and Jakarta, 
with staff numbers falling by less than 20 percent after several years.
The issue of subcontracting deserves special notice. Private operators 
tend to use subcontractors whenever possible because these provide more 
fl exibility. However, subcontracting makes it harder to assess the actual 
impact of PPP projects on net employment, because it can partially offset 
job losses within the utility. In Chile, for instance, the recourse to subcon-
tractors increased with the transfer to private operators. The national regu-
lator recently started to collect data on subcontracting by the water utilities. 
It  found that, in 2006, Chilean private utilities had more workers employed 
through subcontractors than through direct employment. For instance, the 
private utility in Santiago (Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias, or 
EMOS) had about 1,100 direct employees but also employed an equivalent 
of an additional 1,500 workers through subcontractors. Although no data 
on subcontracting exist for the period when the utilities where transferred 
to the private sector, it is not unlikely that the staffi ng reductions in Chile 
(from 6,600 in 1998 to 4,500 by 2006 for the combined regional utilities) 
were at least partially offset by increases in employment by subcontractors 
(Ducci and Medel 2007).
Impact of PPPs on Salaries and Working Conditions
The impact of PPP projects on labor goes beyond labor productivity and 
staffi ng levels. Water utilities are in the business of providing a service, so 
although staff are indeed a cost, they also are an essential asset. Providing 
good service to customers cannot realistically be done with a dissatisfi ed 
workforce.
The impact of private operators on labor costs—looking at the evolution 
of salary costs instead of just employment levels and productivity ratios—
has not been analyzed in published studies. This study collected only a small 
amount of data on the evolution of average salaries. Circumstantial data on 
Niger, Casablanca (Morocco), and Manila (the Philippines) suggest a pos-
sible upward trend under private management, but in Côte d’Ivoire, average 
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salaries in the PPP went down in real terms by 25 percent in 15 years.49 This 
important issue deserves further study.
Labor Aspects of Management Contracts
In management contracts, unlike other types of PPPs, the utility’s staff 
members retain their status as civil servants; although the private operator is 
carrying out the day-to-day management, it typically has little or no author-
ity over staffi ng levels, hiring and fi ring, salaries, or promotions, except 
in its advisory role. However, because management contracts are usually 
implemented as part of a broader reform to improve sector performance, 
operators have often had to deal with overstaffi ng.
The evolution of staffi ng levels in water utilities under management con-
tracts has been extremely diverse. In some cases, staffi ng levels were reduced 
through voluntary reassignment to other government or municipal depart-
ments, such as in Antalya (Turkey; down from 500 to 200 employees), and 
Amman (Jordan; down from 1,600 to 1,400 employees). In other cases, 
the number of employees remained broadly stable, such as in Johannes-
burg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), and Lara and Monagas (República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela). In yet others, the number of employees went up 
signifi cantly, as in Yerevan (Armenia) and Zambia.
Private operators’ biggest contribution to human resources under a man-
agement contract lies in the transfer of expertise and change in corporate 
culture. This contribution is very diffi cult to capture in numbers but plays 
a major role in achieving sustainable improvements in service quality and 
operational effi ciency. This issue has rarely been addressed in the published 
literature but was documented in the case study of the Johannesburg man-
agement contract (Marin, Mas, and Palmer 2009), prepared as part of this 
review (box 3.7).
Conclusions on PPPs and Operational Effi ciency
The previous discussion cites a large number of cases in which private opera-
tors have been effective in improving the effi ciency of water utilities in three 
key dimensions: water loss reduction, bill collection, and labor productivity. 
This study’s indirect and incomplete approach to measuring effi ciency still 
makes it possible to draw some relevant conclusions from the literature and 
the case studies reviewed.
49.  In the Niger affermage, the private operator gave a 20 percent salary raise in the fi rst year. 
In Casablanca, the operator reported that the salary received by a fi eldworker is twice the 
national average for a similar job, and a foreman gets 60 percent more. In Manila, the salaries 
are more than three times higher than those in public utilities (Navarro 2007). In Côte d’Ivoire, 
average salaries went down by 25 percent while labor cost per cubic meter sold was halved, 
and effi ciency savings were largely passed to customers, because the tariff went down by 
35 percent.
101Performance and Impact of Water PPP Projects
Box 3.7 
Using a Management Contract to Carry Out a Complete Corporate 
Reorganization of the Water Utility in Johannesburg, South Africa
Before 2000, responsibilities for water and sanitation services in Johannes-
burg were spread across six separate municipal departments: four geo-
graphical departments were in charge of water distribution and sewerage 
networks (answering to four local councils); one department was in charge 
of the operation of wastewater treatment plants; and the central level of 
the municipality directly handled all matters related to customer relation-
ships, revenue management, procurement, and fi nance. This fragmented 
structure had generated a “silo mentality” among the staff, with a dilution 
of responsibility and accountability, and customer service was notoriously 
poor. To remedy this situation, Johannesburg Water was established in 
2000 as a new corporatized public utility responsible for water and sanita-
tion services. The main rationale for bringing in a private operator under a 
fi ve-year management contract was to establish Johannesburg Water as a 
viable and effi cient water utility.
A major part of the job of the private operator was to organize the 
newly consolidated utility, putting the proper work procedures in place and 
training employees. The goal was not just to design a new organization 
chart; it was, most important, to instill a new corporate culture focused on 
service and effi ciency. This was a major challenge with employees who had 
previously operated under an old-fashioned bureaucratic culture. Imple-
menting such a change was a long and gradual process, in which the daily 
coaching by the operator staff played a major role. One example of the 
many measures taken to foster change was empowering line managers to 
take more initiative in their daily job, as long as this would benefi t the qual-
ity of service to customers or result in effi ciency savings. The average salary 
per employee went up by 23 percent in real terms during the management 
contract.
A major effort to promote a new generation of managers and profes-
sionals was carried out in parallel with this cultural change. The 693 pro-
motions that occurred during the management contract mostly benefi ted 
staff members belonging to groups that previously had faced discrimina-
tion in the apartheid era. Although the total number of staff members 
remained fairly stable (rising from 2,500 in 1999 to 2,600 in 2006), 
945 skilled employees were recruited during the management contract, 
again largely from previously disadvantaged groups.
Source: Marin, Mas, and Palmer 2009.
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities102
Operational Effi ciency of Concessionaires
Analyzing the operational effi ciency of private operators under concessions 
is made diffi cult by the interaction between investment and operation. The 
limited evidence on this subject in the published literature is mixed. In Chile, 
Bitran and Valenzuela (2003) reported that effi ciency improved signifi cantly 
during the fi rst two years after the entry of private operators. In Argentina, 
Estache and Trujillo (2003) used a total factor productivity methodology 
and concluded that effi ciency gains had been signifi cant in Buenos Aires and 
Salta,50 but Casarín, Delfi no, and Delfi no (2007) estimated that in Buenos 
Aires, most of the effi ciency gains had come from initial layoffs. Several 
authors highlighted that in Argentina, the regulatory scheme put in place for 
concessions was weak and not conducive overall to effi ciency gains.51
In Manila (the Philippines), a detailed assessment of the operational effi -
ciencies of the two concessions in 1997–2002 was carried out by the regu-
lator with the assistance of foreign experts.52 The assessment found that 
the concessionaire in the Eastern zone (Manila Water) had achieved the 
effi ciency level of its initial proposal. But although signifi cant cost savings 
had been achieved, sales volumes were lower than expected, which affected 
the fi nancial equilibrium. The outcome was different for the Western zone 
concession, where the effi ciency savings of the initial proposal were not 
achieved—one of the reasons why it ended up in bankruptcy.53
This study did not address the effi ciency of concessionaires for invest-
ments.54 As for operational effi ciency, the data reviewed suggest that conces-
sionaires have generally had a positive impact on overall effi ciency, though 
with some variations. In Colombia, several concessions (notably Barran-
quilla and Monteria) achieved signifi cant progress in the three performance 
indicators under analysis. So did the concession in La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia), 
50.  These were the only two cases with enough data to make reasonable estimates. The au-
thors indicated that their estimate of 2 percent gains per year on average was a rough one, and 
probably in the upper bound.
51.  See Solanes and Jouravlev (2007) on Buenos Aires and Yepes (2007) on the provincial 
concessions in Salta, Corrientes, and La Rioja.
52.  This assessment was based on a methodology that compared actual operating costs with 
the fi nancial projections that were submitted in the original bids, adjusted for input price 
changes and volume changes.
53.  A possibly more important factor was that the peso devaluation during the 1996–97 Asian 
fi nancial crisis sharply raised the cost of servicing the ongoing debt of the previous public util-
ity, which had been mostly transferred to the Western zone concession.
54.  In principle, it is expected that the concessionaire would make effi cient investment choices, 
with an impact on operational effi ciency, service quality, and access, as well as execute invest-
ments in a timely and cost-effi cient manner because of fi nancial incentives. But concerns have 
been expressed over certain practices of granting civil works to companies linked to the conces-
sionaire. Control of investment is a key aspect of effi cient regulation.
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which was consistently rated by the national regulator Superintendencia 
de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) as the best-performing large water utility 
in the country. The concessionaires in Macao (China) and Limeira (Brazil) 
achieved effi ciency levels comparable to the best-performing water utilities 
in developed countries. In contrast, in Argentina, the concessionaires’ per-
formance in bill collection has been mediocre, and the low rate of customer 
metering makes it diffi cult to assess the evolution of water losses. In Guaya-
quil (Ecuador), the operator signifi cantly improved the rate of bill collection 
but made no sizeable progress on water losses. And in Manila, the Eastern 
zone concessionaire performed well in improving effi ciency, while the West-
ern zone concessionaire failed to make gains. In a signifi cant number of 
cases, data were not available for all three indicators.
Evidence of Effi ciency Gains under Lease-Affermage Contracts: 
Cartagena, Colombia and Senegal
Detailed data were available on the mixed-ownership company in Carta-
gena, Colombia, which operates under a lease contract with the municipal 
government, and the affermage in Senegal. Together, they provide a good 
illustration of the overall operational effi ciency gains that a successful private 
operator can achieve (see fi gure 3.18). The analysis uses a simple approach 
that compares the evolution of the operating ratio (collected revenues in 
relation to operational costs)55 to that of the average tariff level. The operat-
ing ratio is driven essentially by two factors: the evolution of operational 
costs and collection rates (which are controlled by the private operator) 
and the evolution of the average tariff (which is exogenous). Whenever the 
operating ratio increases faster than the tariff, effi ciency gains are taking 
place.56
As described earlier in this chapter, both these PPP projects achieved sig-
nifi cant improvements in the three key effi ciency indicators under review 
(level of water losses, bill collection ratio, and labor productivity). Such 
improvements are refl ected in the rise achieved over a decade in the ratio 
of collected revenues to operational costs, as shown in fi gure 3.18. In the 
case of Cartagena, the initial fi nancial situation was much worse than that 
in Senegal, allowing for larger gains. That the average tariff went down in 
55.  This defi nition of operating ratio uses the actual amount of collected revenues every year, 
which is slightly different from the one commonly used in accrual accounting.
56.  Although this simple approach clearly illustrates the effi ciency gains achieved, it does not 
work for all situations. The fact that the operating ratio increases faster than the average tariff 
level in real terms does not mean that there is no effi ciency gain, especially where the initial 
tariff level was far from full cost recovery, and where a large portion of tariffs corresponds to 
the fi nancing of investment.
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real terms in both cases suggests that a signifi cant portion of the savings was 
passed to customers.
Data available from other affermage contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa 
show a mixed picture. The national water utility in Côte d’Ivoire attained 
a level of operational effi ciency comparable to that in the best utilities in 
developed countries, and its performance proved remarkably resilient in 
recent years despite civil unrest. In Niger, where the contract follows the 
same incentive design as that in Senegal, sizable initial gains have been 
made. In contrast, the overall performance in Guinea proved disappoint-
ing despite early improvements, and in Maputo (Mozambique) the many 
diffi culties that have affected the implementation of the partnership, and 
especially delays in implementing the rehabilitation program, have resulted 
in little improvement being achieved so far in operational effi ciency.
The Impact of Management Contracts on Operational Effi ciency
Under a management contract, the impact of the private operator on opera-
tional effi ciency is diffi cult to assess: the private operator typically has only 
limited control over operational costs, depending on the specifi c design of 
each contract. In all the management contracts reviewed, the government 
retained responsibility for staffi ng and salary levels.
The evolution of the global effi ciency ratio (defi ned as the ratio of the 
volume of water billed and for which payment has been collected, divided 
by the volume of water produced and injected into the network) is shown 
in fi gure 3.19. This ratio combines the two indicators—non-revenue water 
and bill collection—reviewed earlier in this chapter. The fi gure compares 
(b) Senegal
Figure 3.18 Effi ciency Gains under Leases-Affermages in Cartagena, Colombia and 
Senegal
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Tariff index represents evolution of average tariff level in real terms (corrected for infl ation) with 
100 percent representing the level when the PPP project was initiated.
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the global effi ciency ratio of the water utility before the entry of the private 
operator and at the end of the contract, analyzing 12 management contracts 
for which data on both the NRW percentage and the bill collection ratio 
were available.57
A rather consistent pattern appears, despite the many differences in the 
design of the 12 management contracts. In 10 cases, under private manage-
ment there was a sizable improvement of the global effi ciency ratio, often 
in the range of 10 to 20 percentage points. Mozambique (Beira and other 
cities) and Kampala (Uganda) also showed improvement, though of a lesser 
magnitude. In all cases, these effi ciency gains made a notable contribution 
to improving the fi nancial situation of the utilities concerned.
57.  This analysis underestimates the overall gains achieved, because it does not capture other 
dimensions of improvements in operational effi ciency that might have taken place, such as with 
chemical (treatment) uses and energy consumption. 
Figure 3.19 Global Effi ciency Gains under 12 Management Contracts
Source: Author’s calculations based on various sources (appendix A).
Note: Effi ciency ratio is calculated as the volume of water billed and for which payment has been collected, 
divided by the volume of water produced and injected into the network.
Years of operation are indicated in parenthesis.
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It is possible to look at the evolution of operational effi ciency in manage-
ment contracts by applying the same methodology as was used with leases-
affermages, that is, analyzing the evolution of the operating ratio against the 
evolution of the average tariff in real terms. Figure 3.20 gives the examples of 
Amman (Jordan) and Johannesburg (South Africa), for which detailed data 
were collected as part of this study and where sizable gains were achieved.
In Amman, the improvement in the global effi ciency ratio was 16 per-
centage points in fi ve years of private operation, stemming from a combi-
nation of a reduction in NRW and an increase in the bill collection rate. 
Other gains were made in operating costs, and the management contract 
resulted in a signifi cant fi nancial turnaround: the Greater Amman water 
utility went from fi nancial losses in 2000 and 2001 to a net profi t of 
16 percent of revenues in 2005 and of 23 percent in 2007. The management 
contract was implemented in parallel with a major capital investment pro-
gram undertaken by the government, so this is a clear case in which success 
must be credited to the actions of both partners.
In Johannesburg, the overall impact of the management contract on 
operational effi ciency and fi nancial viability has been very positive. The util-
ity went from a negative cash fl ow in 2001 to positive cash fl ow in 2004, 
and posted a net profi t by the last year of the management contract in 2006. 
During the last two years of the contract, an independent national panel 
ranked Johannesburg Water as the best-performing water utility among 
large cities in South Africa. A detailed fi nancial analysis conducted to assess 
(b) Johannesburg, South Africa
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Tariff index represents evolution of average tariff level in real terms (corrected for infl ation), with 
100 percent representing the level when the PPP project was initiated.
Figure 3.20 Example of Effi ciency Gains under Management Contracts in Amman, 
Jordan and Johannesburg, South Africa
(a) Amman, Jordan
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the impact of private management on various dimensions of operational 
effi ciency found that NRW levels did not change, labor costs went up, and 
new expenses (such as for sludge removal) had to be incurred to comply 
with environmental standards. The gains came mostly from the improve-
ment in the bill collection ratio and, to a lesser extent, from more effi cient 
use of electricity and chemicals at wastewater treatment plants (Marin, Mas, 
and Palmer 2009).
Tariffs
The tariff level is not a performance dimension in the same sense as the three 
dimensions reviewed previously. Whereas defi ning “improvements” is easy 
in the case of access, quality, and effi ciency, making judgments about tariff 
levels is more diffi cult, because they are highly dependent on the tariff policy 
put in place by the government and how investments are fi nanced. Further-
more, the fact that tariffs are rarely uniform across various categories of 
customers adds another element of complexity.
Although having low water tariffs may seem, at fi rst glance, to be desir-
able for making piped water affordable for the poor, the actual experience in 
developing countries is that low tariffs have mostly benefi ted the connected 
middle class (Komives and others 2005). Keeping tariffs below cost-recovery 
levels could, in theory, be compensated by periodic government transfers, so 
that a utility can still cover its operating costs and rehabilitation or invest-
ment needs. But this rarely happens in practice, because budgetary decisions 
can become subverted by political agendas. As a result, many water utilities 
in the developing world have lacked the resources to make necessary invest-
ments for expanding the network and provide access to poor families living 
in periurban areas. Too often, low water tariffs have worked against the 
interests of the unconnected urban poor; because utilities in poor fi nancial 
shape are not able to fi nance the investments in system expansion necessary 
to connect them, the poor end up having to get water from unsafe and/or 
more expensive sources.
The crux of the matter is that low water tariffs are not necessarily a good 
thing, because good service ultimately costs money. When service quality 
and access are low, and water tariffs are too low to cover costs and ensure 
the sustainability of the services, raising tariffs is often a necessary compo-
nent of a utility reform irrespective of whether a private operator is being 
introduced. When a tariff increase happens in conjunction with a PPP, the 
private operator is not necessarily the cause, as is well-illustrated by the case 
of the management contract in Guyana (box 3.8).
Analyzing in detail the tariff changes that took place in the PPP projects 
under review would have gone well beyond the scope of this study. The 
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following discussion is cast at a more general level, outlining the key factors 
that affect tariff levels and how they can play out in the context of a PPP 
project, while illustrating those points using relevant data from important 
projects.
Theory and Evidence
The impact that the introduction of a private operator can have on tariffs 
depends mainly on three factors: (1) the tariff policy adopted by the govern-
ment under the PPP project, which determines how much of the costs will 
be fi nanced through tariff revenues, (2) the difference between tariffs and 
cost-recovery levels before the start of the project, and (3) the level of cost 
reduction the private operator can achieve through effi ciency savings. In the 
case of concessions, the cost of private fi nancing (and whether this cost can 
be offset by savings in investment effi ciency) also plays a major role.
Box 3.8 
Raising the Water Tariff While Introducing a Private Operator in Guyana
The case of the PPP in Guyana is a good example of why associating the 
introduction of a private operator with tariff increases can be misleading. 
The management contract started in January 2003, and a tariff increase of 
37 percent was granted by the government in March 2003. At face value, 
the link may seem obvious, but in reality, the water utility was bankrupt. 
Tariff revenues did not cover operating and maintenance costs, nor even 
the electricity bill from the state electricity utility. The government was 
subsidizing the water service by not collecting the amount due to the 
public power utility and also had to make a budget transfer every year to 
ensure that employees and suppliers could be paid. The 37 percent increase 
was much less than was needed for the utility to cover all its operating 
and maintenance costs and was just a fi rst step. Thus, the tariff rise was 
just one element, together with the contracting of a private operator, in a 
larger plan to bring the utility back to fi nancial viability.
When the management contract started in 2003, only 45 percent of 
Guyana’s population had access to piped water, so most of the poor who 
were not connected to the network did not benefi t from this highly subsi-
dized tariff. For that matter, neither did many of the customers who were 
connected to the network receive a benefi t, because service averaged only 
2.5 hours per day. Tariff increases would have been necessary under any 
reform proposal (whether under public or private management), if services 
were to become viable and sustainable.
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In the context of developing countries, how the last two factors combine 
is hard to predict. They have opposite effects and can each be very large. 
Initial tariff levels are often very low,58 and whether tariffs go up or down 
will depend fi rst on how close the original tariff level is to cost recovery. But 
on the other side, the worst-managed utilities also offer considerable scope 
for effi ciency gains. The discussion earlier in this chapter showed that the 
most successful PPP projects achieved signifi cant improvements in opera-
tional effi ciency, but for cost savings to translate into lower tariffs, effi cient 
economic regulation needs to be in place.
Given the inherent diffi culties in analyzing the link between water tar-
iffs and PPPs, it should not be surprising that the evidence available from 
the literature has been inconclusive. Andrés, Guasch, and others (2008) 
found that, in Latin America, water tariffs rose substantially in association 
with the implementation of PPP projects—but this is something that can be 
attributed largely to the fact that previous tariffs were below cost-recovery 
levels in many cases.
Another way to evaluate the tariff record of PPP projects is to compare 
tariffs between public and private utilities, but this is made diffi cult by the 
fact that public and private utilities rarely operate under the same frame-
work. The fi ndings of Gassner, Popov, and Pushak (2008a)—who used a 
very large sample of water utilities to better control for the many exog-
enous factors—are, therefore, of special importance. As mentioned earlier, 
their study compared PPP projects with corporatized public utilities—that 
is, utilities that tend to operate under a framework that fosters fi nancial 
sustainability and full cost recovery. Thus, they tried to compare what was 
comparable. They found that PPPs had no statistically signifi cant impact 
overall on tariff levels. The evolution and levels of water tariffs in utili-
ties with private participation were no different statistically from those of 
similar public utilities. Other published evidence from country-specifi c data 
appears to be consistent with these fi ndings, because most papers report 
results that are either neutral or inconclusive.
Evolution of Water Tariffs in Several PPPs
Assessing the link between water PPP projects and tariff levels would require 
a comprehensive fi nancial and economic analysis, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. This section discusses a few cases for which relevant data were 
58.  According to Komives and others (2005), 58 percent of utilities in the Middle East and 
North Africa have tariffs too low to cover basic operation and maintenance costs. Another 
survey of 132 utilities around the world, conducted by the European Union’s Global Water 
Initiative in 2004, found that 39 percent operate with tariffs that do not cover such costs. The 
proportion of public utilities whose tariffs cover a portion of investment was even lower.
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available, essentially in Western Africa and Latin America. It also discusses 
in more detail the experience of Manila (the Philippines), where the regula-
tor carried out an interesting analysis of the effi ciency of private operators 
and the effect of effi ciency on tariff levels.
Western Africa
Many PPP projects that were put in place over the past 15 years in West-
ern Africa inherited tariffs that were relatively high by developing-country 
standards, and often quite close to cost-recovery levels.59 The evolution of 
average water tariffs for the PPP projects in Côte d’Ivoire, Niger (affermages), 
and Senegal, plus Gabon and Mali (concessions), is presented in fi gure 3.21. 
The fi rst panel shows the evolution of the tariff in real terms (average tariff 
level corrected for infl ation) since the entry of the private operator; the sec-
ond panel allows for comparison among PPP projects on tariff levels.
In four of these fi ve PPP projects, the average tariff level fell in real terms 
under private management. The fall was most notable in Gabon (to half 
the preconcession level by 2006) and Côte d’Ivoire (to 70 percent of the 
1990 level by 2000). Customers in these two countries are now benefi ting 
from some of the lowest water tariffs, as well as the best service levels, in 
Western Africa. In Senegal, the average tariff declined in real terms until the 
2006 tariff adjustment, when it was raised by 15 percent, back to its pre-
PPP level. But Senegal’s social tariff was left untouched; in 2007, the poor 
households that had gained access to a connection thanks to the reform, 
and whose consumption was within the social lifeline of 6 cubic meters per 
month, were still paying an average tariff lower than the pre-PPP level.
In Niger, the average tariff went up, albeit moderately. The tariff was 
raised in the fourth year of the contract to increase the revenue fl ow for 
the public asset-holding company and improve the self-fi nancing capacity 
of the sector; the remuneration of the private operator was not changed.60 
As in Senegal, this increase left the social tranche untouched, so the tariff 
paid by poor households remained below the pre-PPP level (Fall and others 
2009).
59.  Guinea’s affermage is an exception because it started with tariffs that were well below cost-
recovery levels. Tariffs were raised signifi cantly during the 10 years of implementation, but no 
yearly data were available to include in fi gure 3.21. 
60.  Under Niger’s affermage, tariff revenues are shared between the operator and the public 
asset-holding company (Société de Patrimoine des Eaux du Niger, or SPEN); only the portion 
of the tariff going to SPEN went up, while the private operator’s volumetric fee remained 
unchanged.
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Source: Fall and others (2009), based on government sources.
Note: Water services in Burkina Faso are operated under a recently corporatized public national utility. It 
is included in the fi gure to provide some reference to a public utility operating under a framework that 
fosters fi nancial viability. Water production costs in the capital, Ouagadougou, are very high, which partly 
explains the higher tariff levels.
Figure 3.21 Evolution of Water Tariffs after Entry of Private Operators in 
Western Africa
(a) Tariff index in real terms
(b) Evolution of average water tariff
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Latin America
Latin America is the region where the greatest number of PPP projects have 
been implemented during the past 15 years, but assessing the impact on 
tariffs is diffi cult. In the early 1990s, several countries had just been affected 
by severe economic crises. Periods of hyperinfl ation and wide variations in 
exchange rates made it very hard for those countries to assess the fi nancial 
situation of the utilities and calculate what tariff level would have been nec-
essary to cover costs under a normal regime.
A large majority of the PPPs implemented in Latin America were accom-
panied by signifi cant increases in water tariffs. This circumstance is not sur-
prising, because the region had a long tradition of keeping water tariffs well 
below the cost-recovery level. However, the situation was exacerbated by 
the poor fi nancial design of some concessions based on attempting to maxi-
mize private investment, which resulted in sharp tariff increases that often 
engendered major popular discontent.61
The evolution of the water tariff for concessionaires in Argentina, 
which was the largest market for private operators until 2006, is espe-
cially diffi cult to track. Because of the low rate of metering, customers’ 
bills are mostly based on estimates (calculated through complex formu-
las), and do not refl ect actual consumption volumes. Tariffs were frozen in 
2001, through a government emergency order in response to the economic 
crisis. The most publicized case has been the concession in Greater Buenos 
Aires, which operated for eight years before the tariff freeze. The regulator 
successively awarded large tariff increases, well above the infl ation level and 
above what had been originally planned in the contract (box 3.9). In fact, 
several authors have highlighted the weak regulation exercised in Argentina 
over water concessionaires in general and the nontransparent manner in 
which tariff adjustments were granted. This was probably instrumental in 
the current disaffection toward private concessionaires in Argentina.
In Chile, the situation has been very different. Before the regional utilities 
started to be transferred to the private sector in 1999, the central govern-
ment had been implementing a major corporatization reform for nearly a 
decade. Most public water utilities were already quite effi cient at the time of 
the transfer, and a competent national regulator had been established. Tariffs 
more than doubled in real terms in the decade before the transfer to pri-
vate operators took place, and they continued to increase signifi cantly after 
the transfer. These further increases were mostly linked to the requirement 
61.  This was the case, for example, in Cochabamba (Bolivia), where the tariff increase was 
above the amount required to reach full cost recovery. Part of the large tariff increase for resi-
dential customers was intended to fi nance a huge infrastructure investment that would have 
benefi ted farmers. 
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to fi nance considerable investments in wastewater treatment and were, in 
general, well accepted by customers (Ducci and Medel 2007).62
In Colombia, Cartagena’s is the only water PPP project in this study’s 
sample whose average tariffs fell in real terms after the introduction of a 
private operator. In practice, the fact that water PPPs in Colombia have 
tended to occur mostly in the public utilities that were in the worst shape, 
and whose initial tariff levels were far away from cost recovery, means that 
tariff increases were bound to happen in most cases. Two 2007 econometric 
62.  Sanitation tariffs went up much more than water tariffs as a consequence of overall re-
form, starting at US$0.09 per cubic meter in 1990 and rising, to as much as US$0.45 per cubic 
meter in 2006 for the private utility in Santiago (Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias 
S.A., or EMOS).
Box 3.9 
Multiple Tariff Renegotiations and Sharp Increases for Customers: 
The Concession in Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina
The Buenos Aires water concession was awarded to the Aguas Argentinas 
consortium in 1993, on the basis of a bid that offered a reduction of 
27 percent over the average tariff. In the fi rst year of operation, the new 
concessionaire negotiated a fi rst increase of 13 percent in the average 
tariff. Then in 1997, a major renegotiation took place, leading to an 
additional 19 percent tariff increase, accompanied by a major change in 
the tariff structure. In addition, a fi xed surcharge was adopted to fi nance 
expansion in unconnected areas—to be paid by all connected customers, 
in a move to switch the burden of fi nancing coverage expansion away 
from poor unconnected families—and to fi nance wastewater treatment. 
Ordoqui-Urcelay (2007) indicates that the water bill for households jumped 
by 88 percent on average between the takeover by the private operator 
and 2002. After the economic crisis in 2001–02, the tariff was frozen.
Average household spending on water signifi cantly increased in Buenos 
Aires after the concessionaire took over. The increase has been repeatedly 
decried as a typical case of regulatory weakness. One major argument 
that has been advanced is that the introduction of the fi xed surcharge was 
not supposed to modify the fi nancial equilibrium of the concession, but 
because the concessionaire made little progress after 1998 in coverage 
expansion and wastewater treatment (the two priorities to be fi nanced 
by the new surcharge), the surcharge may have resulted in a signifi cant 
increase in the private operator’s net remuneration.
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studies based on national household surveys are inconclusive regarding the 
impact of PPP projects on tariffs (Barrera and Olivera 2007; Gomez-Lobo 
and Melendez 2007).
The case of La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia) illustrates the diffi culty of assessing the 
impact of PPP projects on tariffs. The concession was accompanied by a major 
overhaul of the tariff structure. Average tariffs in La Paz–El Alto increased 
by an average of 20 percent with the entry of the private operator in 1997, 
but a fi xed charge that had penalized small consumers was also eliminated 
(Foster and Irusta 2003). In practice, this meant that most poor families 
with low monthly consumption saw a decline in their monthly water bills, 
while other customers saw sharp increases. Judging whether the 20 percent 
average tariff increase was justifi ed is diffi cult. The average tariff of the 
concessionaire in La Paz–El Alto in 2003 was signifi cantly lower than those 
in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (about 21 percent and 31 percent lower, 
respectively), the two other large utilities in the country, but differences in 
local factors affecting costs (such as water availability) could explain most 
of these differences.
Manila (the Philippines)
The two concessions in Manila deserve special attention. They represent the 
largest population served by private operators in the developing world, and 
a detailed analysis of overall effi ciency gains and their impact on tariffs was 
available from the regulator. The analysis shows that the two concessions 
have performed very differently in practice (Navarro 2007).
The tender process had taken place in the mid-1990s, at a time when 
private investors were very optimistic about the prospects for water PPPs 
in developing countries. The tender was based on the lowest tariff, and the 
results surprised even the most optimistic observers. The concessions were 
awarded with a considerable reduction in tariffs, with the new tariffs rep-
resenting only 26.4 percent and 56.6 percent, respectively, of prebid levels 
in the Eastern and Western zones (Dumol 2000). The concessionaires took 
over in August 1997 (just one month after the start of the Asian fi nancial 
crisis) and by the end of 1998, the value of the Philippine peso had halved. 
The fi nancial equilibrium of the Western zone concessionaire, which carried 
most of the foreign currency debt of the former public utility, was severely 
affected.
Despite several petitions by the concessionaires, the regulator did not 
allow tariff adjustments above infl ation to start until 2000. Then another 
major increase took place in 2002–03, as a result of the fi ve-year rate-
rebasing exercise that was outlined in the contract. By the end of 2006, the 
tariff stood at 250 percent of the pre-PPP level in the Western zone, but at only 
23 percent in the Eastern zone (fi gure 3.22a).
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Figure 3.22 Changes in Water Tariffs over 10 Years of Concessions (Eastern and 
Western Zones) in Manila, the Philippines
Source: Navarro (2007) annd Manila regulator, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS).
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Figure 3.22b compares the actual tariffs with the tariffs that would have 
been charged had Manila’s water service remained in public hands. This 
hypothetical tariff was calculated by the regulator based on the operational 
effi ciency of the utility under public management, taking into consideration 
the equivalent tariff impact of the investment actually made by the conces-
sionaires. The results show that the tariff charged by the well-performing 
concessionaire in the Eastern zone was probably lower than if the services 
there had remained in public hands, even after the adjustments granted after 
2000. It was the reverse in the Western zone.
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities116
Although these results are obviously infl uenced by the methodology used 
to establish the counterfactual (that is, how one determines the effi ciency 
level that would have been achieved had the utility remained under pub-
lic management), they do illustrate a fundamental point: ultimately, the 
impact of water PPPs on tariffs in the long run depends on the good or 
bad operational performance of the private operator. In the Eastern zone, 
Manila Water made sizable gains in operational effi ciency, and this seem-
ingly resulted in a lower tariff for the population, even though the tariff 
did go up (moderately) in real terms. In contrast, in the Western zone the 
concessionaire failed to achieve sizable effi ciency gains. Even though a large 
portion of the huge tariff increase that was granted to Maynilad was linked 
to the higher cost of the debt that the concessionaire was carrying from the 
previous utility, the customers possibly ended up with a tariff that was more 
expensive than if the service had remained in public hands.
Overall Performance of PPP Projects
The performance of a large number of water PPP projects in developing and 
transition countries was presented in the previous sections of this chapter. A 
consistent picture emerges despite the diversity of the projects’ background 
and data. In many cases, private operators have improved operational effi -
ciency, quality of service, and access to water and sanitation services. The 
fi ndings can be broadly summarized as follows:
• Expansion of coverage. Although many PPP projects have expanded 
access to piped water, there has been a wide diversity in actual perfor-
mance. The performance of PPP projects in expanding access has been 
highly dependent on their fi nancial design. Expanding access to previ-
ously unserved populations often requires large investments in systems 
expansion, and the conditions for access to funding have varied widely 
among contracts. Several of the projects that relied solely on private 
investment achieved disappointing results.
• Improved service quality. Intermittent service is the main quality issue in 
water supply for most countries of the developing world. Data from both 
Colombia and Western Africa on the performance of several PPP projects 
that started under water rationing suggest that PPPs can be an effi cient 
approach for turning around deteriorated systems.
• Improved operational effi ciency. Data available on the performance of 
PPP projects in reducing water losses and improving bill collection and 
labor productivity suggest that operational effi ciency is the area where 
the positive contribution of private operators is the most consistent.
• Impact on tariff levels. Attempting to measure the impact on tariffs of the 
introduction of private operators is fraught with diffi culty, especially in 
117Performance and Impact of Water PPP Projects
the context of developing countries. Published studies have not been able 
to fi nd any signifi cant difference in tariff levels between PPPs and com-
parable public utilities. Tariffs often went up with the implementation of 
PPPs, but rarely as a direct result of the entry of a private operator.
The analysis of this study has thus far treated the various dimensions of 
performance separately. Many projects scored well on several dimensions 
and deserve to be qualifi ed overall as successes, whereas others showed 
some improvement for only a few indicators. The previous review of perfor-
mance must now be consolidated. Identifying the partnerships that were the 
most successful is important not just because they show that water PPPs can 
work in developing countries, but also, and even more important, because 
they point the way for the next generation of contracts.
Obviously, assessing the overall outcome of a PPP requires some elements 
of judgment. To get a notion of the overall outcome of the more than 260 
contracts that were signed since 1991, the study classifi ed PPP projects in six 
categories (number in parenthesis) according to the following:
• PPP projects with contracts that were active by the end of 2007, with 
more than four years of private operation, and for which suffi cient per-
formance data were available. These projects have been classifi ed in 
two categories: (category 1) contracts that were broadly successful and 
(category 2) contracts whose mixed outcomes (because of mixed or 
mediocre performance and continued diffi culties in establishing a work-
ing partnership between the parties) do not allow them to be called 
successes.
• PPP projects for which contracts were active by the end of 2007 but 
for which no performance data were collected in this study and/or for 
which it was not possible to pass a judgment. Again, these projects have 
been classifi ed in two categories: (category 3) contracts awarded since 
2003 (too recent to pass a judgment) and (category 4) contracts awarded 
before that year (relevant for the analysis but lacking available data).
• PPP projects whose contracts were no longer in place by the end of 2007 
because they were either (category 5) not renewed at expiration or (cat-
egory 6) terminated early following confl icts.
The broad outcome of this classifi cation, based on the size of the total 
population served by PPP projects in each category, is shown in fi gure 3.23 
(with rounded fi gures). In total, about 205 million people in developing and 
transition countries have had experience with water PPP projects at some 
point since 1990. Of these, more than 160 million were still served by pri-
vate operators in 2007, and about 45 million were served by utilities that 
had returned to public management. Each category is discussed next.
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The fi gure of 45 million for terminated or expired PPP projects means 
that about one-quarter of the population that was served at one time by a 
private operator in the past 15 years is again being served by public utilities. 
As many as 24 countries have returned to public management only since 
1990, after having experimented with water PPP projects. These are very 
signifi cant numbers, especially given the effort that international fi nancial 
institutions have put into developing and fi nancially supporting many of 
these arrangements. If anything, it underlines the importance of the risks 
and challenges associated with introducing the PPP approach in developing 
countries, with their volatile economic environment and often weak institu-
tional capacities.
Passing a judgment on the performance of the PPP projects that ended 
with a return to public management is not straightforward, however. Sev-
eral of the terminated contracts, such as those in Dar es Salaam (Tanza-
nia), Cochabamba (Bolivia), and Buenos Aires province (Argentina), can 
certainly be qualifi ed as failures. Several terminated contracts such as those 
in Buenos Aires (Argentina) and La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia) also brought siz-
able benefi ts for their customers, even though they proved unsustainable as 
the relationship between the parties deteriorated over time. In the case of 
management contracts, some utilities also returned to public management 
Figure 3.23 Overall Outcomes of Water PPP Projects, by Size of Population Served, 
1992–2007
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: People in millions (rounded) are indicated in parenthesis.
recent projects
since 2003
(60)
mixed outcome,
still active
(20)
expired,
not renewed
(20)
early 
termination
(25)
active,
no data
available
(30)
active,
clearly 
successful
(50)
119Performance and Impact of Water PPP Projects
even though the private operator performed to the full satisfaction of the 
contracting government, as in Johannesburg (South Africa) (Marin, Mas, 
and Palmer 2009) and Gaza City (West Bank and Gaza).63
At the other end of the spectrum, water PPP projects that can be quali-
fi ed as broadly successful serve a combined population of about 50 million 
(box 3.10). They include a large number of partnerships in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Guayaquil in Ecuador), West-
ern Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal), Morocco, and Asia (East 
Manila [the Philippines] and Macao [China]). It is important to note that 
none of these PPP projects is perfect. All have encountered some diffi culties. 
But overall, they have proved over time to be functioning partnerships that 
brought clear and consistent benefi ts for the population and governments 
concerned, validating the decision to adopt a PPP approach for reform. 
Most important, both public and private partners must be credited for the 
positive outcome in all these cases.
PPP projects that were reviewed and are still active after many years, but 
were classifi ed as having a mixed outcome, represent a served population of 
about 20 million people (see fi gure 3.23). They include cases such as West 
Manila, Jakarta, or Maputo, where performance has been mixed or disap-
pointing so far, often because of repeated diffi culties in implementation. To 
be conservative, the study also included in this category several projects in 
which the limited data gathered suggested positive achievements but were 
not suffi cient to pass a full judgment (Campo Grande in Brazil, Johor state 
in Malaysia). It is noteworthy that a successful PPP project such as that in 
Eastern Manila would have been classifi ed as mixed only a few years ago. 
Successful reforms take time, and several PPP projects in this category might 
prove successful in the near future.
A large proportion of PPP projects could not be assessed, for lack of 
performance data. PPP contracts awarded from 2003 onward represent 
about 60 million people, or more than 35 percent of the population that 
was served by private operators in 2007. Many of these contracts are too 
new to pass a judgment on; they include most of those in China (serving 
more than 26 million people), Malaysia (7 million), Russia (10 million), 
and Algeria (6.5 million). This category also includes older PPP projects 
that are still active after more than fi ve years of operation but for which 
no performance data were gathered; they include all of those in new 
63.  It is diffi cult to judge the performance of management contracts, because most of the 
benefi ts often come from intangibles such as knowledge transfer and company reorganization. 
These are not easily captured by performance indicators, and their impact usually goes beyond 
the short duration of such PPP projects.
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European Union countries (about 15 million people, including large cities 
such as Bucharest, Budapest, Gdansk, Prague, Sofi a, and Tallinn);64 sev-
eral large contracts, such as those in Mexico (Aguascalientes, Cancun, and 
Saltillo), Argentina (Mendoza province), Honduras (San Pedro Sula), South 
Africa (Nelspruit), and Cuba (La Havana, where a foreign private opera-
tor has been operating the water utility under a mixed-ownership company 
64.  The performance of water PPP projects in new European Union countries was not reviewed 
as part of this study. Still, limited evidence available from the IBNET database (http://www
.ib-net.org) suggests a positive contribution for improving operational effi ciency. For example, 
in Prague (the Czech Republic), with 1.1 million people, during the fi rst fi ve years of private 
operation: the level of NRW went down from 17 percent to 12 percent, the bill collection ratio 
went up from 95 percent to 98 percent, and labor productivity improved from about 12 to 
8 staff employees per 1,000 connections to about 8 staff employees.
Box 3.10 
A Snapshot of Successful Urban Water PPPs in Developing and 
Transition Countries
In Latin America, Colombia stands out as a country where the overall 
experience with water PPPs has been largely positive. Gains in access, 
service continuity, and operational effi ciency were achieved in many large 
and middle-size cities, often having a high poverty rate and a much-
deteriorated infrastructure (Barranquilla, Cartagena, Monteria, and 
Soledad). In Guayaquil (Ecuador), strong progress was made in expanding 
access to piped water. Good results in access and service quality were 
also achieved by several national operators in Argentina and Brazil.
Western Africa is a region where PPP registered several notable suc-
cesses (Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal), despite also being the region 
where the rate of early contract termination has been highest. Senegal is 
a well-known success. It has achieved the highest rate of access to piped 
water through household connection in the region, continuous service is 
provided in Dakar, the average tariff has gone down in real terms, and the 
urban water sector has become self-fi nanced—a notable feat for a poor 
country. In Côte d’Ivoire a private operator has been operating success-
fully for the past 40 years, and the population with access to piped water 
has doubled over a decade (from 3.5 million people to about 7 million), 
without any direct government funding and while the average tariff went 
down in real terms.
(continued)
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Box 3.10
A Snapshot of Successful Urban Water PPPs in Developing and 
Transition Countries (continued)
In Asia, the Eastern zone concession in Manila (the Philippines) has 
turned into a success story since the 2002 rate rebasing, and the conces-
sion in Macao (China) has been a success story for many years. In Morocco, 
private operators now serve close to half of the urban population, and 
the overall experience can be considered a success. Signifi cant improve-
ments were achieved in operational effi ciency and service quality, and the 
introduction of private water operators generated strong momentum for 
sector reform at the national level, fostering accountability from all water 
providers.
Taking place in a very different context, Chile is another case in which 
signifi cant benefi ts have been obtained with the transfer to the private 
sector. Contrary to what typically happened in other developing countries, 
the public utilities were transferred to private operators only after they had 
been turned into effi cient providers and a competent regulatory agency 
had been put in place. Still, there was a huge fi nancial benefi t for the gov-
ernment with the transfer, which brought US$2.3 billion in cash receipts, 
plus a doubling of yearly revenues from income and value added taxes 
paid by the regional water companies (Ducci and Medel 2007). The private 
sector invested a total of US$1.2 billion in wastewater treatment between 
1999 and 2006, and Chile is now the only country in the world (including 
North America and Europe) where full treatment of urban sewage is being 
achieved without any government money, fi nanced entirely by private 
investors.
since 2000); and many contracts for small cities and towns (especially those 
in Colombia and Brazil).
This overall review shows that the track record of water PPPs in develop-
ing countries has been very diverse, with good, mixed, and poor projects. 
Such diversity in outcomes is well-illustrated by the experiences in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these two regions, documented 
successful projects account for 20 million and 25 million people, respec-
tively, compared with 16 million and 20 million people for terminated and 
expired projects. Clear success stories (Senegal and Cartagena [Colombia]) 
coexist with outright failures (Dar es Salaam [Tanzania] and Cochabamba 
[Bolivia]). Contract terminations have often proved disruptive for the gov-
ernments and utilities involved, but the fact that 50 million people benefi t 
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from successful PPP projects also shows that this can be a viable option for 
developing countries, when the partnerships can be made to work. Among 
the various approaches available to governments for reforming their poorly 
performing water utilities, public-private partnership must probably be 
regarded more as a “high risk, high reward” option than schemes that rely 
on public management.
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4.
TOWARD MORE SUSTAINABLE 
WATER PPPs
This chapter summarizes a few general lessons that can be drawn from the 
fi ndings and observations presented in the preceding chapters. Using this 
performance review of what worked or did not work in practice, some of 
the earlier assumptions that guided the development of water sector public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries during the 1990s are 
questioned, especially with regard to private fi nancing of water infrastruc-
ture. It does not pretend to offer a comprehensive discussion of all lessons 
to be learned from the projects that were reviewed, and most of the lessons 
identifi ed would need to be researched further. Still, this discussion provides 
important insights on how to enhance PPP as a viable option to improve 
quality and access to water supply and sanitation services in the developing 
world.
Lessons for More Effi cient and Sustainable Water PPPs
Water PPP projects in developing countries have shown a wide diversity of 
outcome, and identifying the key reasons for the success or failure of specifi c 
projects can be challenging. Yet some clear patterns have emerged from this 
performance review, regarding (a) the appropriate main rationale for intro-
ducing private operators in support of utilities reform; and (b) the need for 
more realism, proper regulation, and due consideration of social issues in 
project design.
The Roles and Contributions of Private Water Operators
The performance review suggests that the emphasis in the 1990s on imple-
menting water PPPs in order to attract large amounts of private investment 
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was largely misled. The largest contribution of private operators is through 
improved service quality and operational effi ciency. Direct investment from 
private operators has proved disappointing in most cases. Effi cient private 
operators do have a positive fi nancial contribution, but it is mostly indirect, 
by improving the creditworthiness of the utility and allowing it, henceforth, 
to secure funding for investment more easily and at better terms.
Private Operators Can Improve Service Quality and Operational Effi ciency
The performance review highlights service quality and operational effi ciency 
as the two dimensions in which the positive contribution of private operators 
has been most consistent over a large number of PPP projects. In practice, 
though, the outcome among contracts has varied signifi cantly. How much 
improvement can be achieved depends on the allocation of responsibilities 
and risks, which, in turn, is based on multiple factors. Two are of particular 
importance: (a) the incentive structure and (b) the nature of the arrange-
ment between the private partner and the government for implementing 
civil works when the latter remains responsible for funding investment.
In concessions, the incentives for operational effi ciency come directly from 
the increased profi ts that the private operator generates through effi ciency 
savings. However, whether such effi ciency gains can be achieved depends 
heavily on the capacity of the regulatory institutions that the operator faces. 
If regulation is lax, the operator will have little incentive to make effi ciency 
gains and might seek, instead, to negotiate tariff increases as the easiest 
means to make profi ts.
For leases-affermages65 and management contracts, incentives for effi -
ciency are usually spelled out in more detail in the contracts. Progress is, 
therefore, directly related to the specifi c design of the remuneration and 
incentive scheme. In leases-affermages, the operator is typically remuner-
ated by a fi xed volumetric fee, in exchange for being responsible for all oper-
ational costs. This creates a direct incentive for making effi ciency savings, 
because these translate directly into profi ts. Such a simple approach worked 
well in Côte d’Ivoire but proved insuffi cient in Guinea. The PPPs that were 
developed for Niger and Senegal introduced more incentives for effi ciency 
than did typical lease-affermage contracts, with penalties for not meeting 
contractual targets for non-revenue water and bill collection ratios.
In management contracts, the remuneration typically comprises a fi xed 
component plus a variable bonus for meeting contractual targets. Key 
elements include the choice of the indicators for measuring progress, the 
65. A newly established private utility operates a publicly owned system and collects revenues 
that it then shares with the public owner, who remains in charge of investment.
125Toward More Sustainable Water PPPs
reliability of the baseline, and the mechanism for verifying compliance with 
the agreed-upon targets. In Guyana, the lack of a reliable baseline and of 
clarity over the methodology for calculating contractual indicators created 
major confl icts between the parties, and was one of the factors leading to the 
early termination of the contract.
How the investment program is implemented is also of major impor-
tance. When private operators take over highly deteriorated systems, 
improvements in service quality and effi ciency cannot usually be achieved 
without major investments in rehabilitation. The effi cient and timely execu-
tion of civil works is, therefore, of paramount importance for achieving 
the expected performance improvements. In concessions, private opera-
tors fi nance and directly carry out the investment program, but in leases-
affermages and management contracts, where most of the investment is not 
privately fi nanced, the responsibility for the execution of the investment 
program is often left to the public partner. There are, however, potential 
risks associated with the separation of the operation and investment func-
tions. Coordination problems may arise, and the outcome of the PPP project 
ends up depending, in large part, upon the ability of the public agency in 
charge to execute the civil works without delays. In practice, a variety of 
arrangements have been used for the execution of investments fi nanced by 
public funds (discussed later in this chapter).
Direct Investment by Private Operators Has Been Less Than Expected
During the 1990s, it was widely hoped that large amounts of private invest-
ment would fl ow to urban water utilities, allowing donors and governments 
from developing countries to redirect scarce aid money to other social sec-
tors. But these expectations did not materialize. Compared with other infra-
structure sectors, the water sector experienced a very low rate of private 
investment.
The expectation that private investors could fund most of the investment 
needs of the urban water sector was largely built on the experience in West-
ern Europe and North America, where water utilities are among the lowest 
credit risks. Water utilities in those regions enjoy very stable and predictable 
cash fl ows. The condition of the assets is usually well-known and so are 
future investment needs. Consumer access to water supply is not an issue, 
and tariffs are usually set at cost-recovery levels with predictable adjustment 
rules. For these reasons, water utilities, both public and private, have usu-
ally been able to access private debt on very favorable terms.
The situation is very different in many developing countries. Water utili-
ties there are hardly a stable and low-risk business. Major investments are 
usually needed to rehabilitate deteriorated systems and expand access in 
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a context of rapid urban development, but there is also much uncertainty 
as to the required level of investment. Tariffs are usually well below cost-
recovery levels, and the future evolution of the regulatory framework is 
uncertain. Furthermore, the most solvent customers have often already 
invested in coping equipment (such as private wells, roof tanks, and fi lters) 
to deal with water shortages, so they resist tariff increases. Finally, there are 
many poor families having diffi culty paying for the full cost of water.
The practical consequence is that private fi nanciers have come to con-
sider water concessions in most of the developing world as risky endeavors. 
This was apparent even during the late 1990s when international opera-
tors were attempting to raise fi nancing for their newly awarded large con-
cessions: private bankers have regarded nonrecourse project fi nancing as 
too risky and were requiring private operators to give fi nancial guarantees 
backed by their balance sheets, which, in turn, limited the amount of funds 
that could be invested in the sector. Furthermore, the recourse to borrow-
ing in foreign currencies, which was used in the 1990s to compensate for 
the lack of local fi nancial markets in most countries, backfi red badly as the 
result of economic crises and turbulence in the fi nancial markets. All in all, 
private equity in water has been expensive (with investors often expecting 
annual rates of return of 20–30 percent to compensate for risks), and so has 
private debt, except where creditors were able to obtain additional guaran-
tees. This situation has put a serious constraint on the development of water 
concessions in many developing countries, because high rates of return for 
shareholders and creditors are hard to reconcile with the need to keep tariffs 
low and recoup investments over a long period.
The Financial Contribution of Private Operators to Investment 
Has Been Mostly Indirect
Better management not only improves service, but also ultimately leads to 
increased investment. More effi cient operation contains costs and results 
in more cash fl ow becoming available for investment. Better service makes 
customers more willing to pay their bills, making it easier to improve collec-
tion ratios and gradually raise tariffs to cover a larger portion of investment. 
All this creates a virtuous circle. Effi cient operators have easier access to 
funding with which to expand coverage (whether from government, donors, 
or commercial banks), which, in turn, enlarges the customer base and aug-
ments cash fl ows. As Moss and others (2003) note, better management 
and increased investment are linked; ineffective management drives up the 
cost of providing services and makes it harder to obtain funding for needed 
investment. Any fi nancier, whether private, a government entity, donor, 
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customer, or taxpayer, will be reluctant to provide money if it distrusts 
management to deliver.
The link between better management and increased investment is well 
illustrated throughout the cases reviewed in this study. Only a portion of 
the estimated 24 million people who gained access to piped water under 
PPPs did so because of direct private investment, but the effi ciency of pri-
vate operators in turning around those utilities was, in many cases, essential 
for achieving this result. In Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon, for example, effi cient 
operation allowed most investment to be funded for more than a decade 
through direct revenues from cash fl ows, without borrowing, and with aver-
age tariff levels going down in real terms. Access expansion was directly 
fi nanced by customers, but this would not have been possible if the opera-
tors had not been effi cient. In Senegal, the presence of a well-performing 
operator was instrumental in giving comfort to donors, assuring them that 
the investments they were fi nancing would bring improvements for the 
population and that the assets would be properly maintained. The opera-
tional effi ciency savings achieved in Senegal allowed the amount of revenue 
cash fl ow transferred to the public asset-holding company to go up gradu-
ally, without tariff increases, to a level where the sector gradually became 
self-fi nanced. Senegal’s public asset-holding company has now been able to 
obtain fi nancing for investment without a sovereign guarantee.
The Need for More Realistic Design and Implementation
The review of cases indicates that water PPPs can bring tangible benefi ts for 
the populations and governments concerned. But at the same time, bring-
ing in a private operator from outside is not a magic formula to solve all 
the problems of an ailing utility, following decades of mismanagement. 
Future PPP contracts should refl ect a better understanding of what PPPs 
can contribute and a more adequate allocation of risks and responsibilities. 
Realistic expectations are essential both for setting contractual targets and 
for considering what should remain the responsibility of the contracting 
government.
Successful Water PPPs Have Been Part of Well-Designed 
Overall Sector Reforms
A PPP cannot restore effi cient operations and fi nancial health in an ail-
ing water supply utility unless it is implemented within a well-conceived, 
broader sectoral reform. Many elements that are essential for the viability of 
urban water and sanitation services are outside the control of the operator, 
whether public or private.
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In that perspective, some important lessons can be drawn from the suc-
cessful experiences of countries as diverse as Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Morocco, or Senegal. In all these cases, the introduction of a PPP was part 
of a wider reform by the central government to establish a sector frame-
work that supported fi nancial viability and accountability for performance. 
Although these countries have used a wide range of PPP schemes, all had 
clear policies to move to cost-recovery tariffs in a sustainable and socially 
acceptable manner. Also in all these cases, the fi nancial design of the PPP 
ensured that suffi cient funding would be available for investment in expan-
sion and rehabilitation—an essential condition for bringing tangible benefi ts 
to the population and making the partnership sustainable. And in countries 
where private and public operators coexist (as in Colombia and Morocco), 
benchmarking was promoted at the national level to promote a sense of 
competition among providers. In all those cases, the government played an 
essential role in making the PPP projects ultimately successful, and both 
public and private partners deserve to be equally credited for the positive 
outcome.
In contrast, most of the terminated or mixed-outcome PPPs failed to 
solve key issues of fi nancial viability and accountability for results. Many 
failed concessions were fi nancially nonviable initially, either because of 
faulty design (as in Cochabamba) or because of the opportunistic behavior 
of some bidders. Establishing credible regulatory schemes for concessions 
has often been diffi cult, even though it has proved essential for the sustain-
ability of PPPs. In Argentina, the country with the largest number of con-
tract terminations, the regulatory mechanisms of most concessions proved 
weak and insuffi cient to deal with economic and political crises.
Contracts Must Be Designed with Realistic Targets
A recurrent problem of water PPPs has been that many contracts included 
unrealistic targets. For a PPP to be viable, contractual targets need to refl ect 
realistic goals if providers are to be held accountable. In establishing such 
targets, governments and their advisers must not forget that many urban 
water utilities in the developing world operate in diffi cult environments. 
Expectations about what can be realistically achieved given each situation 
need to be adjusted accordingly.
Closely related to the issue of contractual targets is the diffi culty of set-
ting the baseline against which to measure progress. The original baseline 
used for performance measurement was often found to be inaccurate after 
the fi rst months of PPP operation. This circumstance has motivated many 
contractual renegotiations and generated many confl icts, often seriously 
affecting contract implementation in the critical fi rst years (as in Amman 
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[Jordan]). Establishing a reliable baseline presents a fundamental challenge: 
a poorly performing utility usually lacks the equipment necessary to prop-
erly measure key performance indicators, such as the level of water losses, 
and its operational record and customer database are usually fraught with 
multiple errors. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be solved just by bring-
ing in an experienced consultant before the tender to establish the correct 
baseline.
A few PPP projects have solved this dilemma by adopting a fl exible 
approach. They recognized that a reliable baseline could not be established 
at the time of the signing of the contract, and left to the private operator the 
task of putting in place the necessary framework. The baseline was agreed 
to in the fi rst year of operation, under the control of an independent techni-
cal auditor. This approach was adopted in the successful management con-
tract in Johannesburg (South Africa) (Marin, Mas, and Palmer 2009) and in 
the Niger affermage for establishing the non-revenue water (NRW) baseline 
(Fall and others 2009).66
Establishing a Good Partnership That Achieves Tangible 
Results Takes Time
Many PPPs that have now proved successful took a long time to deliver tan-
gible results. For instance, the good results in Senegal took a whole decade 
to be achieved, and in Niger, where the same approach is being replicated, 
positive results are only now starting to be felt after fi ve years of implemen-
tation. The Eastern Manila concession in the Philippines was in a tight fi nan-
cial situation for many years, and its performance started to improve only 
with the 2002 rate rebasing, more than six years after the contract award. 
Improving a failed urban water utility in a developing country takes time.
The outcome of a PPP depends heavily on the development of a solid 
collaboration between the public and private partners—something that also 
takes time. For the partner government, implementing a PPP often repre-
sents a radical change in administrative culture. Government offi cials need 
to move away from direct control and old habits of interfering in the opera-
tion of the water utility, to an arm’s-length relationship based on contractual 
66.  The baseline used for non-revenue water is of paramount importance in the design of the 
affermages that have been put in place in Niger and Senegal, because it is part of the formula 
used to calculate the remuneration of the private operator. In Senegal, the baseline that was 
used in the original contract was a rough estimate; it proved different from the actual fi gure 
and prompted an early and diffi cult renegotiation. The lesson was learned in the Niger con-
tract, which was designed so that the actual NRW baseline would be calculated in the fi rst year 
of the contract, on the basis of joint monitoring by the private operator and the government, 
with the assistance of an independent technical auditor. 
Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities130
rules. This change has proved particularly diffi cult where the civil servants 
who are entrusted to act as counterparts to the private operator were the 
previous managers of the public utility. New regulators also need time to 
understand their institutional role and build capacity. The most successful 
PPPs were always supported by a sustained commitment from the contract-
ing government to make the partnership work. This included being ready to 
adjust to changing conditions, and making the right choices when appoint-
ing key people to be involved in supervision and regulation.
A private operator brought from outside also needs time, even if it is an 
experienced company, to understand the situation of a specifi c water utility 
and prioritize the actions that are needed, especially if the infrastructure 
is severely deteriorated and few records are available. The diffi culty for 
an outsider in mastering the hydraulics of a large and often highly dete-
riorated water network (usually without maps and records) can be easily 
underestimated. Even though there are sometimes a few opportunities for 
rapid improvements, achieving tangible benefi ts for the population usually 
requires important investments in rehabilitation and upgrading—a long 
process that involves fi rst identifying such investments, then raising fi nanc-
ing, and fi nally implementing the civil works.
Developing Countries Can Have Their Own Private Water Operators
In the 1990s, it was widely assumed that water PPP contracts should be 
signed only with private companies that had considerable previous expe-
rience in operating urban water systems. Because private operation of 
water utilities was by then limited to only a few countries, this conservative 
approach meant that most of the market was limited in practice to a few 
large international players.
An important fi nding of this review is that local private operators have 
developed considerably in recent years, serving more than 40 percent of the 
market by 2007, and several have performed well. Many of the PPPs classi-
fi ed as broadly successful were implemented with local private investors that 
had little or no previous experience in operating water utilities. In Eastern 
Manila (the Philippines) and Salta (Argentina), partnerships with experi-
enced operators to transfer operational know-how allowed local operators 
to bridge the initial expertise gap over a few years. In other cases, inves-
tors with previous experience in the water sector through the construction, 
engineering, or consulting businesses proved able to operate water utilities 
satisfactorily (as in Brazil, Colombia, and Malaysia). Usually, those new 
operators just hired managers and engineers who previously worked for 
public utilities in order to have the necessary technical capability (as inter-
national operators do when they enter a new country).
131Toward More Sustainable Water PPPs
This suggests that the need for investors to have strong previous expe-
rience in operating water utilities has probably been overestimated. The 
benefi ts from an improved commercial orientation can be achieved equally 
through international and local investors—and the latter have the advantage 
of knowing more about the local needs and culture. Operational and tech-
nical experience is important, but it can be obtained through many means. 
What counts is not so much whether the local investors have been involved 
with operating water utilities before, but whether they can credibly ensure 
that they have experienced people in their team to run the utility.
Regulation of Water PPPs
Natural monopolies such as water utilities require economic regulation: a 
visible hand to substitute for the lack of market forces and ensure that the 
service provider does not abuse its monopolistic position. This approach is 
not easy to achieve in practice. Whether or not the government owns the 
utility, there is always a strong asymmetry of information between regula-
tor and operator. Private operators can abuse their monopoly position to 
extract undue and excessive profi ts. Public water utilities can be captured 
by special interests, resulting in overstaffi ng, perks for political appointees, 
sloppy work and procurement practices, and lack of client orientation.
Water PPPs Are Not Necessarily More Diffi cult to Regulate 
Than Public Utilities
Concerns about the diffi culty of regulating private operators, in the chal-
lenging context of developing countries, have been one of the major argu-
ments against PPPs for urban water utilities. A regulator can, indeed, be 
captured by a private operator, which has strong fi nancial interests at stake. 
Water PPPs are complex contracts and, in many cases, local governments 
with little experience in complex transactions face powerful multination-
als. However, one might also observe that at least private operators operate 
under a framework that fosters accountability. A detailed contract spells out 
performance targets and mandates regular reporting. Methods for setting 
tariffs are stated in regulations and/or contracts, with usually much greater 
transparency than before. Private operators can be fi ned for noncompliance 
and can even have their contracts cancelled. Finally, PPPs tend to receive 
intense scrutiny from civil society—much more, in fact, than poorly per-
forming public utilities.
Various Options Are Available for a Viable Regulatory System
The regulatory frameworks under which water PPPs operate in the develop-
ing world fall into two broad categories. In some countries, the focus has 
been on regulation by contracts, with all elements detailed in the contract 
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and a dedicated team assigned to supervise its execution on the govern-
ment’s behalf. In others, the focus has been on the establishment of a broad 
legal and regulatory framework for the sector, usually accompanied by the 
creation of a regulatory agency with various degrees of discretionary power. 
In practice, the difference between these two approaches is not always obvi-
ous, and assessing how well they have worked would go beyond the scope 
of this study. Nonetheless, this review of PPP performance highlights the 
following observations:
Clear and detailed contracts are important, whether they are at the core 
or just one element of regulation. The most recent literature (Ehrhardt 
and others 2007), as well as this review, shows that the use of contracts as 
the main point of reference for holding private operators accountable has 
worked well in places as diverse as Western Africa, Macao (China), Colom-
bia, the Czech Republic, and Morocco.
Anchoring the regulation of water PPPs in a comprehensive regulatory 
framework, in which contracts are present but the main tools are the laws 
and regulations, has had more mixed results, especially where newly created 
regulatory agencies were granted signifi cant discretionary power. In Chile, 
the regulatory arrangement has worked well, but the regulator had been in 
place for a long time before the transfer to the private sector and was, by 
then, a respected and credible player. In many other places, the establish-
ment of credible regulatory agencies has proved challenging, which eventu-
ally affected the implementation of many contracts.
The diffi culties encountered with regulatory agencies are not themselves 
surprising: building a whole regulatory framework takes time and the pro-
cess can be easily derailed. In this context, processing a single contract to 
address a well-identifi ed problem may be simpler. Still, establishing a strong 
framework might be worth the effort, because once a framework is in place, 
it provides a clear and standardized point of reference that reduces the dis-
cretion that can be exercised by parties negotiating individual contracts or 
their adjustments. Ultimately, the right choice of whether to focus on the 
contract or on the framework must depend on the specifi cs of the country, 
including, among other things, the type of legal and regulatory framework 
(if any) that governs its water supply and sanitation sector, the current level 
of institutional capacity within government, and the urgency of engaging in 
a given partnership at the time of the decision.
Transparency Must Be a Cornerstone of Regulation
PPPs are by nature incomplete contracts, and in the volatile environment 
of developing countries, it is natural that they be adjusted over time to 
changing conditions. However, the issue of contract renegotiation has been 
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controversial. In many cases, it has been conducted behind closed doors, 
without transparency. In a comprehensive study on renegotiation of infra-
structure PPPs in Latin America, Guasch (2004) found that a high propor-
tion of water PPPs ended up being renegotiated shortly after the start of the 
contract.67 All this activity fueled criticism that private operators could have 
been taking advantage of contractual adjustments to make fi nancial gains, 
and it has undermined the credibility of the PPP approach as a valid option 
to improve the performance of urban water utilities in several countries.
Progress is clearly needed in this area. It is essential that the ongoing 
supervision and regulation of a PPP contract be carried out in a structured 
and fully transparent manner. All PPP contracts should be made available 
for public scrutiny as a standard policy. Performance monitoring and report-
ing of obligations must be strictly enforced and the results made available 
to the public as a matter of routine. Governments also have an obligation 
to communicate to the public the rationale and justifi cations behind each 
regulatory decision. This is especially important for all that is related to tar-
iff adjustments (even when based on existing contractual clauses) or other 
modifi cations that may affect the fi nancial equilibrium of a PPP. Contractual 
adjustments are probably unavoidable in the volatile environment of devel-
oping countries, but they cannot be expected to be accepted by the popula-
tion and other stakeholders unless conducted in full transparency. This is 
an area where the involvement of international fi nancial institutions during 
the implementation phase can be of much value, especially in countries with 
weak governance and institutional capacity.
Incorporation of Social Goals
Social issues have been controversial in many water PPPs. It is clear that 
more needs to be done to ensure that more PPP projects benefi t the poor. 
To do this, designers of PPP projects must explicitly recognize and factor in 
the costs of social goals as well as consider the options of subsidizing the 
poor and unlinking customer tariffs from the remuneration of the private 
operator. Also, the wide-ranging impacts of PPPs on the workforce deserve 
further study in order to be better addressed.
67.  For the period 1985–2000, the study found that renegotiation in the water sector had 
occurred in 74 percent of cases, a much higher incidence than in other infrastructure sectors. 
Guasch also found that renegotiation had occurred sooner than in other sectors, taking place 
on average just 1.6 years after the award of the contract, and was (in most cases) instigated by 
the private operator. It must be noted that this study used widely defi ned criteria for renegotia-
tion, and its sample included contractual arrangements that are not considered in the present 
study, including build, operate, and transfer (BOTs) and similar arrangements for new treat-
ment plants.
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Water PPP Projects Need to Be Made More Pro-poor
This study has shown that PPP projects have brought tangible benefi ts in 
access and quality of service to the population as a whole, but because data 
from utilities are rarely organized by customer income category,68 the study 
could not specifi cally assess the impact of PPP projects on the urban poor.
There is circumstantial evidence that poor households signifi cantly 
benefi ted from the increased access and reduced water rationing that was 
achieved by a signifi cant number of PPP projects. This was notably the case 
in cities with high poverty rates, and where access was improved signifi -
cantly by expanding the water network to poor neighborhoods that were 
previously unserved, as in Côte d’Ivoire; Senegal; Cartagena, Barranquilla, 
and Monteria (Colombia); Guayaquil (Ecuador); Manila (the Philippines); 
and even La Paz–El Alto and Buenos Aires (Argentina). In Colombia, the 
fact that residential customers are billed a different tariff according to their 
social condition allowed the study to track which household groups bene-
fi ted from new connections, showing that most of the benefi ciaries of access 
expansion were poor families.
Yet, many PPP projects do not show much evidence that sizable improve-
ments occurred for the poor. A huge data gap exists. Admittedly, the 
explosive development of marginal settlements in periurban areas of many 
fast-growing cities has made the task of coping with demand very diffi cult 
for all utilities. Yet, given the considerable needs in the developing world, 
and the large efforts made by international fi nancial institutions to support 
a large number of PPPs, it is fair to say that the overall outcome has been 
disappointing. With the exception of a few places, the benefi ts from water 
PPPs to the urban poor as a whole have not been suffi cient.
Water PPP projects can bring signifi cant benefi ts for a society as a whole, 
but the automatic trickle-down effect that was implicitly assumed in the 
early 1990s has not fully materialized. Private operators are merely agents 
acting (effi ciently, it is hoped) under a set of incentives and obligations 
expressed in a contract, and on behalf of the contracting government. Their 
behavior is ultimately dictated by the design of the project. It is up to each 
government to ensure that effi ciency gains are passed to customers and that 
benefi ts end up being equitably distributed among all groups of the society. 
Governments must also ensure that negative impacts are addressed through 
well-designed and well-funded mitigation measures.
68.  For instance, data on access levels for the poor were available only in the cases of Colombia 
and Jakarta (Indonesia), where customers are invoiced on the basis of different tariff brackets 
depending on their income level. Findings from household surveys were available in only a few 
other cases, but their interpretation was diffi cult because their sample did not correspond to the 
boundaries of the utilities under review. 
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The Cost of Social Goals Must Be Recognized in the Design 
of PPP Projects
One important fi nding from this study is that water PPP projects can pro-
vide safe water and improved sanitation services to the poorest population if 
the design approach differs radically from the PPP approach often adopted 
in the 1990s. Instead of looking at PPPs as a means to reduce the fi nancial 
burden of the sector and disengage, governments need to recognize that the 
water sector will require continuous public support for many years to come. 
Reaching ambitious social goals does have a cost, and the utility’s tariff 
revenues might not be suffi cient, even allowing for potential effi ciency gains 
brought by professional management.
The correct approach involves starting the design process by fi rst estab-
lishing social priorities and estimating their cost. When the projected cash 
fl ows of a utility are not enough (after accounting for the expected effi ciency 
savings) to cover the cost of such social goals, then it will be the govern-
ment’s task to step in with additional funding. The PPP projects that have 
been most successful in bringing benefi ts for the poor are those in which 
the government provided public funding in order to complement tariff rev-
enues and accelerate progress. A strong illustration is the PPPs developed 
by the Colombian government under the Programa de Modernizacíon de 
Empresas (PME), with public grants provided to support the turnaround of 
utilities in poor cities with highly deteriorated infrastructure, but successful 
concessions in Guayaquil (Ecuador) and Cordoba (Argentina) and the affer-
mage in Senegal also provide solid examples.
Subsidizing of Access for the Poor Should Be Considered
In many parts of the developing world, poor families cannot be expected 
to afford the full cost of the water and sanitation services. Still, these are 
essential services to which all people must have adequate access. In addition 
to promoting social equity, access to piped water and adequate sanitation 
for the poor in dense urban areas generates large benefi ts for the whole 
population in terms of public health and environmental protection. These 
are reasons enough to subsidize access (and even sometimes consumption) 
wherever poor families cannot afford to pay the full actual costs.
Remarkably, most of the successful PPP projects included some form of 
subsidy scheme for the poor. A variety of mechanisms was used to make the 
cost of connection more affordable for poor families. Many private operators 
offered interest-free fi nancing so that poor households could pay for their 
new connections through installments, as in Buenos Aires (Argentina), La 
Paz–El Alto (Bolivia), Barranquilla and Cartagena (Colombia), and Manila 
(the Philippines). Other PPP projects included large subsidized connection 
programs, as in Côte d’Ivoire, Guayaquil (Ecuador), and Senegal. The need 
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to provide subsidized connection programs for the poor is increasingly rec-
ognized, and several projects were set up recently for existing PPP projects 
by providing grant money from donors through the Global Partnership for 
Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) facility, including in Cameroon, Morocco, and 
Manila (the Philippines).69
Separation of Customer Tariffs from the Remuneration of the 
Operator Can Have Advantages
A major challenge when implementing a water reform has been how to 
move tariff levels toward cost recovery, starting from levels that are too low 
even to cover the costs of operation and maintenance (O&M). The diffi culty 
stems from the fact that although the fi nancial equilibrium of the operator 
needs to be guaranteed for the PPP project to be viable, customers are usu-
ally reluctant to accept tariff increases before tangible improvements are 
made—which can take many years when starting from a dilapidated infra-
structure. This situation creates a major dilemma for the fi nancial design of 
PPP projects.
To break the vicious circle of poor services, low willingness to pay, and 
insuffi cient revenues, designers of several PPP projects separated the remu-
neration to the private operator from customer tariffs. This plan allows gov-
ernments or regulators to adjust tariffs more gradually, in keeping with the 
evolution of service quality and customers’ willingness to pay. During the 
period until tariff levels reach full cost recovery, the government covers the 
operational defi cit through a payment to the operator in addition to tariff 
revenues. The main advantage of this approach is that it allows customers 
to see improved services before being asked to pay for them. It also has limi-
tations, because it can last only as long as somebody else—governments or 
donors—fi nances the revenue gap.
This approach has been used in several affermage contracts in Western 
Africa (Guinea, Niger, and Senegal), in which the private operator is remu-
nerated through a volumetric fee that covers the full O&M costs but not the 
investment cost, which remains the responsibility of the government. The 
operator’s fee is set by the contract and differs from the customer tariff, over 
which the government retains complete control. The rationale is that during 
the early years of the PPP project, most of the revenue collected from cus-
tomers is used to cover the operator’s fee, with the asset-holding company 
69.  GPOBA is a multidonor trust fund, administered by the World Bank, whose objective is 
to promote access to basic infrastructure services for the poor through the output-based aid 
mechanism. The grant is disbursed to the service provider only after benefi ciaries’ households 
have been connected (for more details, see http://www.gpoba.org).
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having to absorb the fi nancial gap. As the cash fl ow of the utility improves, 
thanks to effi ciency gains and access expansion, a larger portion of tariff 
revenues can be allocated to the asset-holding company—to the point that, 
as in Senegal, the tariff level has now become suffi cient to cover the full cost 
of O&M plus investment.70
Though delinking tariff levels from the remuneration of a private opera-
tor is relatively simple for a lease-affermage, it is more complex for a con-
cession in which the operator is responsible not just for O&M costs but 
also for investment costs. Several concessions have adopted an indirect 
approach, with the government providing grant fi nancing for some invest-
ments to reduce the impact on tariffs. Among the PPP projects reviewed for 
this study, Jakarta (Indonesia) provides the only examples of concessions in 
which the customer tariff was explicitly delinked from the operator’s remu-
neration. There, the concessionaires were remunerated through a volumetric 
water charge (much as in an affermage) that was set in the contract, leaving 
the government free to change the customer tariff. Because Indonesia was 
severely affected by the Asian fi nancial crisis, and because the government 
was unwilling to adjust tariffs for infl ation during some periods, the water 
charge was well above the tariff level several times. The fl exibility of this 
arrangement allowed the government to adjust its tariff policy in response 
to social and economic changes, and it is probably a major reason why the 
two Jakarta concessions have survived despite being implemented against 
severe odds.
The Wide-Ranging Impact of PPPs on Labor Must Be Better Addressed
One of the major criticisms against private participation in urban water 
utilities has been the potentially negative impact on labor. As discussed in 
chapter 3, in many instances, improved labor productivity has indeed been 
accompanied by decreases in employment. Some massive initial layoffs took 
place in PPP projects in which overstaffi ng had been pervasive. Although 
they were usually justifi ed on technical and effi ciency grounds, they obvi-
ously raise serious social concerns.
Workers are assets and are, therefore, essential stakeholders in a PPP 
reform. Whenever layoffs are needed, adequate fi nancial packages should be 
designed to mitigate the social impact on the families affected. This is neces-
sary even though the employment changes in the water utilities may be small 
70.  How this approach is applied in practice varies among cases. In Senegal, the tariff level 
when the PPP started covered all O&M costs plus a portion of investment, but in Niger, it 
barely covered O&M costs. In Guinea, the initial tariff level did not even cover the full O&M 
cost (a World Bank loan was used to bridge the fi nancial gap and pay the operator’s fee). 
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in relation to total employment in the economy. In several cases of massive 
layoffs, such as those in Buenos Aires (Argentina), Chile, and Manila (the 
Philippines), workers were able to negotiate generous compensation pack-
ages, but this study could not assess whether this was the case with most 
other PPPs. Several PPP projects did avoid sharp drops in employment by 
dealing with excess staffi ng gradually, encouraging natural attrition and vol-
untary programs.
Discussions of PPPs and labor have often been limited to productivity 
and staffi ng, but the issue is much broader. Bringing in a private opera-
tor has wide-ranging implications for utility employees, who typically lose 
their civil servant status and its associated benefi ts. At the same time, the 
change in working conditions can introduce new opportunities, including 
better access to training; strengthened career paths; and, ultimately, better 
skilled and (it is hoped) better paid employees. Unfortunately, these impor-
tant issues are still not properly understood, and further studies would be 
needed to assess the full impact of PPPs on labor.
A New Generation of PPPs for Urban Water Utilities
PPPs are complex arrangements, and the developing and emerging countries 
are highly diverse. The study’s fi ndings suggest some key elements of an 
improved paradigm for water PPPs in the developing world that may help 
governments better harness private initiative in urban water utilities.
A Focus on Improving Effi ciency and Service Quality
In the 1990s, the main attraction of having private operators take over 
urban water utilities was their supposed ability to supply private money. 
Experience has shown that this was largely the wrong focus. The biggest 
contribution that private water operators can make is through improve-
ments in operational effi ciency and service quality. These advances, in turn, 
improve the creditworthiness of the utility and facilitate its access to fi nanc-
ing for investment.
If improving operational effi ciency and service quality are the key rea-
sons for seeking PPPs, it is clear that more attention needs to be paid to 
providing suitable conditions for partnerships to achieve these goals. In that 
regard, the fi ndings of this study largely confi rm what was already known: 
the key ingredients are well-designed and appropriately supervised con-
tracts, together with a sound policy and regulatory framework.71 But the 
fi ndings also highlight two important elements that have been sometimes 
overlooked.
71.  See PPIAF and World Bank (2006) for a comprehensive review of good practice in PPP 
design and implementation.
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First, the gains that a private operator can bring are not automatic. Pri-
vate operators do not always deliver. To make progress requires careful 
attention to details in contract design, especially for setting up the incen-
tive schemes. Contracts need to be well-supervised, with strict reporting 
requirements and, if possible, the engagement of an independent, credible 
technical auditor to monitor achievements. A true partnership needs to 
develop between the operator and the contracting government to make it 
easier to fi nd solutions to the inevitable problems that will arise over time. A 
key challenge in this regard remains the need to build institutional capacity 
within the government (ministries and regulators), so that the partnership 
between the private operator and the public authorities can be formed on 
an equal footing. This is where international fi nancial institutions can play 
a key role, as was shown in Amman (Jordan).72
Second, different types of PPPs cannot achieve the same thing. The scope 
for improvements rests heavily on what responsibilities are actually trans-
ferred to the private operators and on the actual duration of contracts. From 
this perspective, PPP projects fall into two broad groups. Management con-
tracts are essentially low-powered instruments: the private operator takes 
on relatively limited risk, with limited responsibilities for a short duration. 
Concessions, leases-affermages, and mixed-ownership companies can be 
considered more as high-powered instruments, with more risks and respon-
sibilities assumed by the private operator over a longer period.
Options for Securing Long-Term Financing through a Mix of Public 
and Private Sources
Finding alternative ways to fi nance the investment needs of the urban water 
utilities is of major importance, given the failure overall of private operators 
to meet the high expectations that were placed on them during the 1990s. 
In practice, several fi nancing options have been emerging, based on various 
combinations of public and private sources.
Though private borrowing in foreign currency to fi nance large water 
investments has often proved problematic, it would be a mistake to dis-
miss private fi nancing altogether. Financial markets in some middle-income 
countries such as Chile, China, Colombia, Malaysia, and Morocco have 
matured considerably, and in the most advanced developing countries, some 
72.  The management contract in Amman found itself in a diffi cult situation after the fi rst two 
years of implementation, with the public and private partners in a deadlock over several issues. 
At the government’s request, international fi nancial institutions supported the establishment 
(through grants and technical expertise) of a special project management unit with a dedicated 
team of professionals to ensure that the government could play a more effi cient role as coun-
terpart in the management contract.
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private water companies have been able to raise medium- or even long-term 
funds in local currency at reasonable rates.73 This makes water concessions 
a more viable proposition for the most advanced countries.
But in the majority of developing countries, whose local fi nancial 
markets are not suffi ciently developed, at least part of the investment carried 
out under water supply PPP projects will need to come from government 
and donor funding. This is the approach typically adopted under leases-
affermages, management contracts, and most mixed-ownership companies. 
In such cases, the private operator’s contribution to investment is indirect 
but can be very signifi cant: by improving operational effi ciency and service 
quality, the utility strengthens its ability to generate cash fl ow for invest-
ment, and boosts its creditworthiness, so that it can raise debt more easily 
(whether from donors or fi nancial markets) and on better terms.
Various Options Are Available for Hybrid Long-Term PPPs
One element that came out of the study is that the traditional classifi cation 
of PPP projects as management contracts, leases-affermages, and conces-
sions has become obsolete. Most of the projects that have ultimately proved 
the most sustainable over time do not easily fi t in one of these categories, 
especially when one looks at the source of fi nancing for investment. Two 
good examples are the cases of Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. In Gabon, the 
contractual arrangement has been a concession, whereas in Côte d’Ivoire, 
it has been usually classifi ed as an affermage. Yet in both cases, most of the 
investment has come from directly reinvesting the cash fl ow collected from 
customer tariffs, without public or private borrowing.
In practice, the most successful fi nancing models that are emerging for 
long-term water PPP projects in developing countries are basically hybrid 
schemes. Though the actual contractual arrangements vary, they do share 
the same basic principles. They transfer all commercial and operational risk 
to the private operator and rely for investment on a variable mix of govern-
ment and private money, together with direct revenues from customer tar-
iffs. Generally, all require some private investment (at least through equity 
contribution), but more as a means to ensure that the private partner has 
some money at stake than to cover the investment needs. Several schemes 
have been developed:
73.  In Morocco, loan tenures of more than 16 years were available to concessionaires in 2007, 
which have been able to borrow about US$300 million in local currency since 1997. In Manila 
(the Philippines), the initial public offering (IPO) that was carried out in March 2005 for a por-
tion of the shares of Manila Water proved to be highly successful. This was the fi rst local listing 
in the Philippine Stock Exchange since the 1997 crisis to be offered simultaneously to local and 
international investors. It was oversubscribed 15 times and raised US$96 million.
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• Concessions that rely largely on direct revenues from customers to 
fi nance investment. Concessions for combined power and water utili-
ties in Gabon and Mali have fi nanced a large portion of their investment 
programs by reinvesting each year a portion of the cash fl ows collected 
from tariff revenues, without contracting much debt. In Morocco, tariff 
revenues were complemented by a special surcharge allocated to a Work 
Fund and by a large fi nancial contribution paid by newly connected cus-
tomers (well above the actual cost of connection). The Côte d’Ivoire PPP, 
in which system expansion has been entirely fi nanced by a tariff sur-
charge during the past 15 years without any government funding, is more 
of a hybrid PPP than a true affermage and also falls into this category.
• Affermage model in Western Africa: from public fi nancing to self-
fi nancing through cash generation. This is a specifi c model that evolved 
from the French standard affermage approach, incorporating additional 
targets and penalties to encourage the private partner to operate effi -
ciently. It relies heavily on public borrowing through an asset-holding 
company, but with the goal that after a transition period the sector should 
become self-fi nanced with customer tariffs supporting both the O&M 
cost (represented by the operator’s fee) and the government’s debt ser-
vice.74 A portion of investment is left to be fi nanced and/or implemented 
by the private operator.
• Mixed-ownership companies, with fi nancing schemes that vary across 
the cases. This scheme is inspired by the Spanish PPP approach. Private 
operators initially contribute some equity funds to the utility, which then 
fi nances its investment through borrowing with or without guarantees 
from its main shareholders.75 Mixed-ownership companies were success-
fully adopted in several large cities in Colombia (Barranquilla, Carta-
gena, Palmira, and Santa Marta), and in La Havana (Cuba) and Saltillo 
(Mexico). They are also common in several new European Union mem-
ber countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary).
74.  In Senegal, funding for the asset-holding company was initially obtained through govern-
ment borrowing from donors at concessional rates, and the portion of the revenues left to the 
asset-holding company after the operator’s fee had been paid was insuffi cient to cover the debt 
service. But with the gradual turnaround of the sector, the portion of tariff revenues assigned 
to the asset-holding company gradually increased and ended up completely covering the debt 
service. Thanks to its fi nancial health, the asset-holding company has now been able to borrow 
directly without sovereign guarantees.
75.  This approach depends on the nature of the contract between the utility and its main pub-
lic shareholder, among other things (for instance, a lease in the case of Cartagena, and a conces-
sion in the case of Barranquilla), and on the creditworthiness of the utility and the conditions 
in local fi nancial markets, which determine whether it can directly borrow or whether fi nancial 
guarantees from the public and/or private partners are needed.
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• Concessions with government grants to fi nance a portion of investment. 
This approach combines all three potential sources of funding (public 
funds, private funds, and customer tariffs). It is exemplifi ed by the many 
water PPP projects developed in Colombia under the PME, with govern-
ment grants to spearhead rehabilitation and expansion while reducing 
the impact on tariffs. It was also used in Guayaquil (Ecuador) and in 
Cordoba and Salta (Argentina). In Guayaquil, the connection subsidy 
and portion of network extension was fi nanced by central government 
transfers from the telephone tax. Under the concession in Cordoba, the 
city government remained in charge of fi nancing the extension of the 
network, and in Salta, the government provided grant fi nancing for sew-
erage investment.
Several Mechanisms Exist for Implementing Civil Works 
Funded with Public Money
The arrangement between the public and private partners for the execution 
of the investment program plays a very important role in the fi nal outcome 
of a PPP project. In cases in which most of the investment is supported by 
public funding, a variety of schemes have been adopted in practice. The 
review of cases in this study suggests that a delicate balance needs to be 
found between the partners. The issue is still very much open as to whether 
such investments are best handled by the operator or a public agency.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the implementation of affermage contracts has 
typically been accompanied by the creation of a public asset-holding com-
pany, which both owns the systems and is responsible for most civil works. 
The track record has been mixed. In Guinea, signifi cant delays were experi-
enced in the implementation of the investment program, negatively affecting 
the performance of the PPP project. In Senegal, the asset-holding company 
(Sociéte Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal, or SONES) was able to execute 
the investment program in a timely and effi cient manner—something that 
proved instrumental in the good overall performance of this PPP project.
Important delays in the execution of investments were also experienced 
with management contracts in cases in which the projects included major 
capital works under the responsibility of the public partner. In Amman (Jor-
dan), the management contract had to be extended twice to allow the public 
agency in charge to complete the investment program. Part of the delay 
experienced by the public investment agency was due to cumbersome public 
procurement rules and coordination problems between the operator and its 
public counterpart.
Many successful PPP projects have been able to mitigate the risks of 
delays in civil works by passing on to the private operator at least some 
responsibilities for investment. In the affermage in Côte d’Ivoire, investment 
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has been directly carried out by the private operator (focusing essentially on 
network extension). In mixed-ownership companies such as those in Carta-
gena, the private operator in practice runs the entire investment program, 
and the same occurred in management contracts in which the utilities under 
private management remain in charge of executing the investment program 
(as in Johannesburg). In Senegal and Niger, the affermage contracts include 
some portion of yearly rehabilitation work to be carried out directly by the 
operator, fi nanced out of its own revenues. This idea was taken further in 
the Niger and Cameroon affermages, where the execution of some of the 
donor-funded investment program was delegated to the private operator to 
reduce its dependency on the asset-holding company’s performance during 
the fi rst (and most critical) years of the PPP project (box 4.1).76
Though passing on to the private operator the responsibility for carrying 
out civil works (when investment is publicly fi nanced) may seem a solution 
to the problems that might result from the separation of the investment 
and operation, experience shows that the issue is more complex. In Guinea, 
the operator gradually became responsible for carrying out (directly as a 
construction company) a large portion of the donor-funded program, out 
of frustration with the underperformance of the public asset-holding com-
pany. But this undertaking distracted it from its operational responsibility; 
distorted the incentive framework; and, ultimately, negatively affected the 
performance of the PPP project. In Maputo (Mozambique), the lease con-
tract was designed so that the private operator would be responsible for the 
execution of the major portion of the donor-funded investment program, 
but this arrangement did not prove satisfactory in practice, partly owing 
to the lack of experience of the operator with donor-funded investment 
projects.77
The success of the PPP project in Senegal suggests that a valid approach 
might be to leave large civil works to the public asset-holding company, 
while also passing some responsibilities to the operator, including for 
some civil works in network extension and rehabilitation. Delegating to a 
76.  In Niger, the private operator was responsible for the execution of the International De-
velopment Association (IDA)-funded network extension and subsidized connection program 
during the fi rst years. In Cameroon, the affermage contract was tendered together with a con-
struction contract for about US$20 million of civil works for emergency rehabilitation, to be 
implemented by the private operator in the fi rst three years. 
77.  In Maputo, the contract provided for two categories of civil works to be implemented 
by the operator: (1) the Capital Works Projects (such as rehabilitation of mains, pumping 
stations, and expansion of plant production capacity) for which the operator was responsible 
for tendering, contracting, and supervising the work following country and donors’ rules; and 
(2) the Delegated Works Program for the rehabilitation and extension of the distribution net-
work, which the operator could execute itself or contract out in a more fl exible manner.
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Box 4.1 
How Private Operators Helped Foster Effi cient Public Investment in 
Affermages in Senegal and Niger
The affermage schemes in Senegal and Niger illustrate the important role 
that an effi cient private operator can play, even when the government 
not only fi nances most of the investment, but also directly implements it 
through an asset-holding company. Leaving these responsibilities to gov-
ernment is sometimes perceived as a fundamental weakness of affermages, 
because there is no guarantee that the government will effi ciently carry out 
the investment function. The design of the affermage contracts in Senegal 
and Niger include several features to mitigate that risk.
Both contracts provide for a portion of rehabilitation investment to be 
carried out every year directly by the private operator. In addition to provid-
ing fl exibility for the operator to carry out emergency work that directly 
affects operations, this arrangement allows for an ongoing benchmarking 
of procurement costs. Because the private operator has some responsibility 
for investment, many items such as pipes are purchased by both the opera-
tor and the public agency, providing a valuable reference point. A recent 
study in Niger showed that the private operator was able to purchase pipes 
and meters at prices 30 percent to 75 percent lower than those paid by the 
public utility before the affermage.
The private operator in Senegal also plays a major role in defi ning the 
investment program, even though it is not responsible for most of the 
program’s execution. The contract provides for revision of the government’s 
investment program every three years, based on the operator’s input. This 
approach ensures that the money is spent on operational priorities that 
have a real impact on the service delivered to the population, instead of on 
white elephants of dubious operational value. Besides shaping investment 
decisions, the operator is also routinely consulted in the supervision of all 
civil works. In addition, it has strong incentives to ensure that these are car-
ried out adequately, because it will have to operate the assets afterwards. 
Most important, the operator must give its own approval before any civil 
work is approved and paid for by the government, giving the staff of the 
asset-holding company a strong incentive to properly supervise the work of 
the contractors.
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private operator the execution of some donor-funded emergency works—as a 
way to mitigate the risk of nonperformance by a newly created public asset-
holding company—might be an option to consider, but with caution. Given 
this study’s fi ndings, how best to channel public funds for investment remains 
an open question. The best solution probably depends on each case.
Time to Rebalance the Debate
In retrospect, it is not surprising that PPPs for urban water utilities have 
been controversial. In the 1990s the challenges in the sector were huge. 
Major structural reforms were needed in many countries, and it was inevi-
table that such reforms would prove diffi cult and encounter stiff resistance 
from those who benefi ted from the status quo. By considering public-
private partnership as the preferred (and sometimes only) option for reforms 
in many countries, stakeholders generated unduly high expectations that 
translated into contractual obligations that were diffi cult to meet. Disap-
pointment was bound to result.
This study has shown that soundly designed and implemented PPP proj-
ects can be a viable option for improving the operational and fi nancial 
performance of poorly performing water utilities in developing countries. 
But contrary to initial expectations, long-term PPP projects in the water 
sector did not bring in the large international infl ows of capital that were 
needed to close the access gap and rehabilitate ailing utilities. The main 
contribution of private operators has been in improving service quality and 
operational effi ciency, something they achieved to varying degrees over a 
large number of projects. Admittedly, this report is not the last word on the 
many issues related to water PPP, and much remains to be done in terms of 
analysis. This is especially the case with regard to the impact on the poor, 
which could not be analyzed in detail.
As these lessons were being internalized by the market, a new generation 
of water PPP projects has been gradually emerging, based on a more bal-
anced allocation of risks between the public and private partners. This new 
generation of PPP projects focuses on using private operators to improve 
service quality and operational effi ciency, rather than to attract private 
money. Although governments retain the main responsibility for mobiliz-
ing long-term fi nancing, several fi nancing options are emerging, including 
hybrids with some contributions from the private sector. The recent surge 
of new private operators from developing countries is also a major develop-
ment that may greatly enhance the viability and acceptability of water PPPs 
in many countries.
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This study showed that public-private partnership can be a viable option 
to improve urban water utilities in developing countries, but this does not 
mean that it should be the only option on the table. Well-managed public 
utilities can be found within the developing world—a fact that was obscured 
during the PPP fashion of the 1990s. Several public reforms supported by 
the World Bank and other donors in the past decade have enjoyed suc-
cess, even in very poor places such as Burkina Faso; Uganda; and Cambo-
dia’s capital, Phnom Penh. Many well-managed public water utilities are 
operating in many countries, and sector practitioners are gaining a better 
understanding of how to successfully reform water utilities (Baietti, King-
dom, and van Ginneken 2006). Well-functioning public utilities are those in 
which tariffs are high enough to recover costs, labor productivity is satisfac-
tory, customers pay their bills, and the infrastructure is properly maintained 
and effi ciently run. To achieve this, the concerned governments have had to 
make choices. These include putting in place sound tariff policies, refraining 
from interference in operations, and putting in place professional manage-
ment that is held accountable for results.
Among the various options for water utilities reform, it is probably fair 
to characterize PPPs as high-risk, high-reward propositions for govern-
ments, the more so as one moves across the PPP spectrum from manage-
ment contracts to leases-affermages and then to concessions. PPP projects 
are complex arrangements; they are diffi cult to implement in the context 
of developing countries’ weak institutional capacity and economic volatil-
ity and involve signifi cant transaction costs. They are vulnerable to vested 
interests and, unfortunately, can make easy targets for opportunistic politi-
cians, especially during the early years when the population often still does 
not perceive tangible improvements in service. And fi nally, the fact that pri-
vate operators do not always deliver must not be overlooked.
Public-sector-only reforms, by contrast, might bring less-rapid improve-
ments but might also pose much less political risk. However, as the experi-
ences of successful public utilities have shown, these reforms are no less 
demanding for governments. To achieve tangible results, the reforms require 
the same structural changes in the sector in general, and in the governance of 
the utility in particular, as do PPP projects. Vested interests that are opposed 
to reform must still be dealt with. Applying sound commercial management 
practices is needed to ensure the fi nancial sustainability of the services.
Although this study has shown that private participation in the urban 
water sector brought signifi cant benefi ts to tens of millions of people in many 
countries, the benefi ts brought about by PPPs probably go well beyond the 
populations served by these successful projects. Even in a country where 
PPP projects serve only a minority of water customers, the introduction 
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of a few private operators alongside public utilities can bring a sense of 
competition to an erstwhile monopolistic sector, increasing the pressure on 
public players to improve performance and deliver better services. This situ-
ation is well-exemplifi ed by the recent positive evolution of the urban water 
sector in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Morocco. Also, the well-
publicized diffi culties encountered by private operators in meeting contrac-
tual targets for expansion of coverage in periurban areas probably helped 
bring to the top of donors’ agendas the key issue of how to provide access 
to basic water and sanitation service to the urban poor.
It is time to move beyond a rather sterile public-versus-private debate. 
That an international private operator has been running the water utility 
of La Havana in Cuba since 2000 shows that the question of how to turn 
around poorly performing urban water utilities cannot be reduced to mere 
ideology. Well-run public utilities of the developing world have much in 
common with effi cient private providers. The type of water and sanitation 
services that a country wants and how much it is prepared to pay for them 
(through tariffs and tax transfers) are fundamental decisions that any gov-
ernment needs to face. Part of the allure of PPPs in the 1990s was that they 
appeared to offer an elegant solution to a complex problem. However, the 
fact that the underlying causes of the sector’s woes were social and political 
as much as technical and fi nancial was not suffi ciently appreciated at that 
time. Setting tariff levels, holding service providers accountable, and making 
fi nancial trade-offs to achieve competing social and environmental goals are 
public issues that are independent of how utilities are managed, and they 
cannot be avoided by public authorities. Private operators can inject dyna-
mism, improve effi ciency, and build a culture of service and accountability, 
but they cannot obviate the need for the government to make profound and 
sometimes diffi cult choices. At root, many countries are still struggling with 
the principle that was adopted at the Dublin Water Summit in 1992—that 
water is both a social and an economic good. The diffi culty of fi nding an 
institutional model that delivers that good in a socially and economically 
viable way reveals deep underlying issues that are not yet resolved among 
stakeholders. The question of how to solve this challenge in each country 
goes well beyond the mere question of whether water utilities should be 
privately or publicly managed.
Though wiser contractual arrangements are emerging for PPP projects in 
water and sanitation—with better risk allocation; sounder fi nancial design; 
and a larger, more diverse corps of operators to rely upon—delegating the 
provision of urban water supply and sanitation services to private operators 
remains a challenging endeavor, and seems unlikely at this time to become 
the dominant model in the sector. This said, the scope for private sector 
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involvement has been widening. Many water utilities that have remained 
public have opened the door to the private sector without delegating their 
management responsibilities. The public utility in Bogotá (Colombia) sub-
contracted the entire operation of its network to local private companies. In 
Mexico City, private operators have been handling meter reading and billing 
for more than a decade. A growing number of public utilities are expanding 
subcontracting in a drive to gain fl exibility and contain costs, following a 
practice well-developed by effi cient public utilities in Northern Europe.
Private fi nancing is also making new headway, although not through pri-
vate operators themselves but through private fi nanciers, which are show-
ing a growing interest in directly fi nancing well-performing public utilities, 
without guarantees from central governments. This approach is becom-
ing possible in more and more countries as local fi nancial markets have 
developed and public utilities have improved their performance and credit-
worthiness. In addition to accessing private funds through build, operate, 
and transfer (BOT) contracts for treatment facilities, an increasing number 
of public utilities have started to access private fi nancing, either by selling 
shares to minority shareholders (as in São Paulo, Brazil) or by borrowing 
directly from local private banks (as in Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco). 
In many countries, increased access to market-based fi nancing without sov-
ereign guarantees provides incentives for public water utilities to improve 
their fi nancial and operating performance—in turn, helping them to com-
pete on more equal terms with privately managed utilities.
The private sector has much to offer, and in many forms. There is no 
such thing as a purely public water utility, because most of them routinely 
involve the private sector in multiple ways (such as with civil works and ser-
vice contractors or with commercial banks). Similarly, purely private water 
utilities (such as in Chile) represent only a very small portion of PPPs, and 
arrangements such as those the PPP in Senegal involve government agencies 
as much as the private sector. Recently, publicly owned utilities from both 
developed and developing countries have started to look for contracts out-
side their jurisdictions, where they act legally as private entities. As the tra-
ditional boundaries between public and private sectors are getting blurred, 
decision makers in government have an increasing number of options at 
their disposal to improve the performance of their urban water utilities. To 
tackle the immense challenges facing the urban water sector in developing 
countries, policy makers need all the help they can get. It might just be time 
for a broader partnership, one that includes all and excludes none.
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Table A.1 Water PPPs Whose Performance Was Reviewed under This Study
  Performance Years of Population
Economy Type of PPP dimension operation served (millions)a Data source
Africa      
Chad MC S, OE 2000–04 1.1 Bank (SCS)
Côte d’Ivoire Lease-affermage A, S, OE, T 1961– 8.7 Gov, Op (SCS)
Gabon Concession, MC A, S, OE, T 1997– 0.7 Gov, Op (SCS)
Guinea Lease-affermage A, S, OE 1991–98 1.1 Bank (SCS)
Mali Concession A, OE, T 2000–05 1.5 Gov (SCS)
Mozambique
 Beira and three others MC S, OE 1999– 0.6 Bank
 Maputo Lease-affermage A, S, OE 1999– 1.0 Bank
Niger Lease-affermage A, S, OE, T 2001– 1.8 Gov, Op (SCS)
Senegal Lease-affermage A, S, OE, T 1996– 4.7 Gov, Op (SCS)
South Africa
 Dolphin Coast Concession OE (limited data) 1999– 0.05 Palmer Development Group 
       (2003)
 Johannesburg MC OE 2001–06 3.2 Gov, Op (SCS)
 Queenstown Lease-affermage OE 1992– 0.2 Palmer Development Group 
       (2003), Op
 Stutterheim Lease-affermage OE (limited data) 1995–01 0.05 Plummer (2000)
Uganda
 Kampala MC S, OE 2002–04 0.6 Gov (SCS)
Zambia
 Zambia mining towns MC S, OE 2001–04 0.3 Bank
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East Asia and Pacifi c       
China 
 Macao Concession OE, T 198x– 0.6 Op
Indonesia
 Batam Island Concession OE (limited data) 1995– 0.7 Op
 East Jakarta Concession A, OE 1998– 3.1 Gov, Op
 West Jakarta Concession A, OE 1998– 3.1 Gov, Op
Malaysia
 Johor province Concession OE 2001– 3.0 Op
Philippines
 East Manila Concession A, S, OE, T 1996– 5.4 Gov, Op (SCS)
 West Manila Concession A, S, OE, T 1996– 6.4 Gov, Op (SCS)
Europe and Central Asia       
Albania
 Durres and others MC S, OE 2003– 0.8 Bank
Armenia 
 Yerevan MC S, OE 2000– 1.3 Bank (SCS)
Kosovo
 Gjakova and Rahovec MC S, OE 2002–05 0.2 Bank (SCS)
Turkey
 Antalya Lease-affermage  S (limited data) 1996–02 0.6 Bank
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Table A.1 Water PPPs Whose Performance Was Reviewed under This Study (continued)
  Performance Years of Population
Economy Type of PPP dimension operation served (millions)a Data source
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 
 Buenos Aires Concession A, S, OE, T 1993–06 8.0 Pap, Op
 Cordoba Concession A, S, OE 1997– 1.3 Pap, Op
 Corrientes province Concession A, S, OE, T 1991– 0.6 Op (SCS)
 La Rioja province Concession, MC A, S, OE, T 1999– 0.2 Op (SCS)
 Salta province Concession A, S, OE, T 1998– 1.2 Op, Gov (SCS)
 Santa Fe province Concession A, S, OE 1995–06 1.9 Pap, Op
Bolivia
 La Paz–El Alto Concession A, S, OE, T 1997–07 1.5 Pap, Gov
Brazil
 Campo Grande Concession OE 2000– 0.8 IBNET
 Campos Concession A, OE 1999– 0.4 IBNET
 Itapemirim Concession A, OE 1998– 0.2 IBNET
 Limeira Concession A, OE 1995– 0.3 IBNET, Op
 Manaus Concession A, OE 2000– 1.5 IBNET, Op
 Niteroi Concession A, OE 1999– 0.5 IBNET
 Paranagua Concession A, OE 1997– 0.15 IBNET
 Petropolis Concession A, OE 1998– 0.25 IBNET
 Prolagos (Cabo Frio) Concession OE 1998– 0.3 IBNET
 Tocantins state Divestiture OE 1999– 1.0 IBNET
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Chile 
 ESSBIO-ESSEL Divestiture S, OE, T 1999– 2.1 Gov (SCS)
 Los Lagos (ESSAL) Divestiture S, OE, T 1999– 0.6 Gov (SCS)
 Santiago (EMOS) Divestiture S, OE, T 1999– 5.5 Gov (SCS)
 Valparaiso (ESVAL) Divestiture S, OE, T 1999– 1.4 Gov (SCS)
Colombia
 Barranquilla Mixed-ownership A, S, OE, T 1997– 1.3 Gov, Op (SCS)
 Cartagena Mixed-ownership A, S, OE, T  1996– 0.9 Gov, Op (SCS)
 Girardot Mixed-ownership A, S, OE, T 1999– 0.15 Gov
 Marinilla and 
  neighboring towns Concession A, S, OE 1997– 0.25 Gov, Op
 Monteria Concession A, S, OE, T 2000– 0.3 Gov, Op, Pap
 Palmira Mixed-ownership A, S, OE, T 1998– 0.25 Gov
 Santa Marta Mixed-ownership A, S, OE, T 1997– 0.4 Gov, Op
 Soledad Concession A, S, OE, T 2001– 0.45 Gov, Op
 Tunja Concession A, S, OE, T 1996– 0.15 Gov
Ecuador
 Guayaquil Concession A, S, OE, T 2001– 2.2 Op, Gov (SCS)
Guyana MC S, OE 2002–06 0.4 Bank
Trinidad MC S, OE 1996–99 1.2 Bank
Venezuela, R. B. de
 Lara MC S, OE 1999–02 1.3 Gov (SCS)
 Monagas MC S, OE 1997–01 0.6 Gov (SCS)
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Table A.1 Water PPPs Whose Performance Was Reviewed under This Study (continued)
  Performance Years of Population
Economy Type of PPP dimension operation served (millions)a Data source
Middle East and North Africa      
Jordan
 Amman MC S, OE 1999–06 2.2 Gov (SCS)
Lebanon
 Tripoli MC OE (limited data) 2003–05 0.2 Pap
Morocco 
 Casablanca Concession A, OE 1997– 3.8 Gov, Op
 Rabat Concession OE 1999– 2.0 Gov
 Tangiers and Tetouan Concession A, OE 2000– 1.1 Gov
West Bank and Gaza
 Gaza City MC S, OE 1996–03 1.0 Bank
Total    98.4 million
Source: Author.
Note: The table shows contracts that have been in place for at least fi ve years (three for management contracts) and for which performance data were obtained as part of this 
study. It does not include large PPPs, such as those in Cochabamba (Bolivia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and Tucuman (Argentina), that were terminated after just one or two years 
of private operation (these PPPs are still discussed in the text of the report). The estimates of population served take into account the corresponding coverage levels. No end-year 
means that the PPP project was still active by the end of 2007.
A = access; Bank = World Bank project documents; Gov = government; IBNET = International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities, http://www.ib-net.org; 
MC = management contract; OE = operational effi ciency; Op = operator; Pap = published paper(s); S = service quality; SCS = specifi c case study prepared with consultant(s) as 
part of this review; T = Tariff.
a. 2007 or last year of PPP.
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Table B.1 New Connections and Increased Access in 36 Large PPP Projects
   Population
 Period of  New water gaining access
PPP project reference connections to piped water
Manila, Eastern zone (Philippines) 1997–2006 250,000 2,900,000
Manila, Western zone (Philippines) 1997–2006 230,000 1,900,000
Jakarta, West and East (Indonesia) 1998–2006 210,000 2,000,000
Batam Island (Indonesia) 1996–2006 80,000 500,000
Johor state (Malaysia) 2000–06 180,000 800,000
Macao (China) 1991–2006 75,000 180,000
Casablanca (Morocco) 1997–2005 260,000 1,200,000
Rabat (Morocco) 2002–05 65,000 250,000
Tangiers and Tetouan (Morocco) 2002–05 45,000 150,000
Gabon 1996–2006 50,000 300,000
Mali 2001–05 40,000 400,000
Buenos Aires (Argentina) 1993–99 240,000 2,000,000
Corrientes, La Rioja, and Salta provinces (Argentina) 1991 or 1998–2006 140,000 650,000
Guayaquil (Ecuador) 2001–06 160,000 800,000
Santa Fe (Argentina) 1995–2006 60,000 500,000
Cordoba (Argentina) 1997–2006 n.a. 200,000
La Paz–El Alto (Bolivia) 1997–2005 80,000 400,000
Tocantins state (Brazil) 1999–2006 130,000 600,000
Manaus (Brazil) 2000–06 50,000 300,000
Campos, Niteroi, and Petropolis (Brazil) 1999–2006 80,000 350,000
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Barranquilla, Santa Marta, and Soledad (Colombia) 1997–2006 100,000 600,000
Monteria and Tunja (Colombia) 1996 or 2000–05 n.a. 200,000
Total for 30 large concessions  2,500,000 17,200,000
Cartagena (Colombia) 1996–2006 70,000 500,000
Guinea 1989–98 n.a. 600,000
Senegal  1996–2006 190,000 1,700,000
Côte d’Ivoire 1990–2006 300,000 4,000,000
Maputo (Mozambique) 1999–2006 20,000 150,000
Niger 2001–07 30,000 450,000
Total for 6 large leases-affermages  600,000 7,500,000
TOTAL  3,200,000 24,700,000
Source: Author’s calculation (rounded fi gures) based on various sources.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for Urban Water Utilities: A Review
of Experiences in Developing Countries is directed at policy makers in
governments as well as donors and other stakeholders. This book
analyzes the access, service quality, operational efficiency, and tariff
levels of more than 65 large water PPP projects (representing more
than 100 million people) over 15 years in different regions. Its goal
is to contribute to a better understanding of how to tackle the
many challenges of providing water and sanitation services to urban
populations in the developing world.
The urban population served by private water operators in  the
developing world has grown every year since 1990. The results
achieved by many projects in service and efficiency improvements
reaffirm the value of PPPs, even though the level of private financing
did not match initial expectations. Over time, a more realistic market
has developed, the number of private investors from developing
countries has grown, and contract designs have more pragmatic risk
allocations. 
Implementing water PPP projects in the developing world has often
proved challenging, and they should not be considered the sole
option for reform. However, an examination of the available empiri-
cal evidence shows that well-designed partnerships between the
public and the private sectors are a valid option to turn around
poorly performing water utilities in developing countries.
The water sector has many features that set it apart from other
infrastructure sectors. This book suggests the value of careful
consideration of these specificities for successfully involving private
operators. Emphasis should shift from trying to attract private
investment to using private operators to improve service quality and
efficiency. This approach fosters a virtuous circle: the utility improves
its financial situation and gradually becomes able to finance a larger
share of its investment needs. Although concessions have worked in
a few places, contractual arrangements that combine private opera-
tion with public financing appear to be the most sustainable option
in many countries. An obvious implication for governments and
donors is that they need to remain heavily engaged in the water
sector, especially in the poorest countries.
